United States of America v. Brandon McIntyre

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 18-2464
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
BRANDON MCINTYRE,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D. C. No. 2:16-cr-00013-001)
District Judge: Honorable Kevin McNulty
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on June 27, 2025
Before: MONTGOMERY-REEVES, ROTH and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 28, 2026)
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OPINION*
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ROTH, Circuit Judge
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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A jury convicted Brandon McIntyre of multiple federal offenses after he coerced
and threatened minors into producing child pornography and engaging in criminal sexual
conduct. The District Court sentenced him to 240 months’ imprisonment with lifetime
supervised release, with a condition prohibiting McIntyre from accessing the internet
without prior approval. McIntyre appeals his sentence, arguing that it is unreasonable and
that the District Court improperly calculated the applicable criminal history score.
For the following reasons, we affirm McIntyre’s imprisonment sentence and the
lifetime term of supervised release. However, in similar cases, we have hesitated to uphold
a blanket internet restriction as a condition to lifetime supervised release. We will not do
so here—instead, we vacate that condition and remand for the limited purpose of allowing
the District Court to impose a more appropriately tailored internet restriction.1
I.2
When he was 21 years old, McIntyre initiated sexually explicit conversations with
multiple minor girls on Facebook, using both an alias and his personal account. He sent
sexually explicit images to the girls, demanded that they do the same, and threatened them
when they refused. Even after he was briefly incarcerated for stalking an adult woman and
1 We note that we have yet to receive McIntyre’s Reply Brief. However, our decision is
not dependent on receipt of the brief, particularly because any new issues McIntyre may
have raised in his Reply would be forfeited. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 n.3
(3d Cir. 1993) (citing Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 78 (3d Cir. 1989)) (“[W]here
an issue is raised for the first time in a reply brief, we deem it insufficiently preserved for
review before this court.”).
2 Because we write for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to our disposition.

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impersonating a law enforcement officer in violation of New Jersey law, McIntyre
continued to coerce and threaten minor girls through Facebook.
Following a police investigation and McIntyre’s audiotaped confession, McIntyre
was indicted and convicted of two counts of production of child pornography, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e); one count of online enticement of a minor to engage in
criminal sexual conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b); two counts of making an
interstate extortionate threat, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c); and one count of stalking,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B).
At sentencing, the District Court adopted the Presentencing Report (PSR), which
recommended life imprisonment under the United States Sentencing Guidelines based on
McIntyre’s offense level (43) and his criminal history categorization (Category II). The
PSR also recommended a special condition of supervised release, in which McIntyre would
refrain from accessing or using the internet or any online bulletins or computer-based
methods of exchanging communications. The District Court imposed a sentence of 240
months’ imprisonment with lifetime supervised release and the PSR’s recommended
special condition. Despite the downward variance, McIntyre appealed his sentence pro se,
arguing that resentencing is necessary because (1) the District Court plainly erred when it
deferred to the PSR’s determination of McIntyre’s criminal history score; (2) the
supervised release term is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable; and (3) the
District Court plainly erred by imposing the restriction to his internet access. We address
each in turn.

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II.3
McIntyre claims that the District Court incorrectly assigned him a Category II
criminal history score, asserting that his prior New Jersey conviction—which resulted only
in a probationary sentence—fell within § 4A1.1(c) and therefore, the 187 days he spent in
pre-trial detention should not have counted toward his scores.4 But even adjusting his
criminal history to Category I yields the same Guidelines range, as his offense level score
remains at 43—which McIntyre does not contest.5 And still, the District Court sentenced
McIntrye to an imprisonment term well below the life sentence he faced.6 We therefore
cannot see how the District Court’s criminal history calculation reflects an error.
III.
Next, McIntyre challenges his lifetime supervised release term as procedurally and
substantively unreasonable.7 Procedurally, McIntyre contends that the District Court
failed to sufficiently justify its imposition of a lifetime term of supervised release. We
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
4 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1. We review unpreserved sentencing challenges for plain error.
United States v. Valentin, 579 118 F.4th 579, 588 n.15 (3d Cir. 2024).
The parties dispute whether McIntyre properly preserved this sentencing challenge for
appeal, but resolution of this issue would have no bearing on our conclusion that
McIntyre failed to demonstrate that the District Court’s criminal history score calculation
was incorrect.
5 See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing Table).
6 Gov. Br. at 14; A1:539.
7 “We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of
discretion,” but we review “[u]npreserved challenges to the reasonableness of the
sentence . . . only for plain error.” Valentin, 579 118 F.4th at 590 n.19. The parties again
dispute whether McIntyre properly preserved this issue on appeal, and again, our
outcome remains unchanged under any applicable standard of review.

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disagree. When deciding the term of a defendant’s supervised release, sentencing courts
must provide an explanation sufficient for our Court “to see that the particular
circumstances of the case have been given meaningful consideration” consistent with the
factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).8 However, the court need not conduct a separate §
3553(a) analysis to determine the appropriate length of imprisonment versus supervised
release.9
Here, the transcript from McIntyre’s sentencing confirms the District Court did not
hide the ball in imposing a lifetime term of supervised release. Rather, it thoroughly
discussed the § 3553(a) factors when sentencing McIntyre to 240 months’
imprisonment—an outcome that fell below the life sentence McIntyre may well have
received.10 McIntyre’s disagreement with the District Court’s reasoning does not render
its explanation procedurally insufficient.
Substantively, McIntyre argues that a lifetime term of supervised relief was
unreasonable given his offense. But when “the district court’s sentence is procedurally
sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the
same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”11
8 United States v. Joline, 662 F.3d 657, 660 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal citation and
quotations omitted).
9 United States v. Clark, 726 F.3d 496, 501 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[W]e have never required
that a district court conduct two § 3553(a) analyses, one related to the term of
imprisonment and a second related to the term of supervised release.”).
10 A1: 524–39 (considering McIntyre’s criminal conduct, childhood, rehabilitation
efforts, victims’ trauma, refusal to acknowledge his guilt as well as the extended pre-trial
detention period and the need for generic and specific deterrence).
11 United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).

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On this basis alone, McIntyre’s argument falls flat. Considering the egregious and
recidivist nature of McIntyre’s crimes and the fact that the lifetime term was within the
range prescribed by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), we cannot say that no reasonable sentencing
court would have similarly imposed a lifetime term of supervised release.
IV.
Finally, McIntyre argues that the District Court’s imposition of the special
condition to his lifetime supervised release—which effectively prohibits him from ever
purchasing, owning, or using any device with internet access—is “overly [b]road,
[v]ague, and too restrictive.”12 Though 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) empowers district courts to
impose special conditions of supervised release, the government agrees—as do we—that
the current internet restriction “deprive[s] [McIntyre] of more liberty ‘than is reasonably
necessary.’”13
While we certainly acknowledge the disturbing nature of McIntyre’s crimes and
recognize that those crimes occurred via the internet, we must also ensure that internet
bans are both supported by findings in the record and properly tailored to McIntyre’s
specific conduct.14 Indeed, “we have long recognized the draconian nature of internet
bans, even in cases where we have upheld them.”15 And given the internet’s prominent
12 Br. at 31, 73. We review objections to special conditions of supervised release that
were not raised at the sentencing hearing for plain error. United States v. Maurer, 639
F.3d 72, 82 (3d Cir. 2011).
13 Gov. Br. at 26. United States v. Holena, 906 F.3d 288, 291 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2)).
14 Id.
15 United States v. Heckman, 592 F.3d 400, 408 (3d Cir. 2010) (cleaned up).

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role in our society, we do not see how prohibiting McIntyre’s access to all internet-based
sites and application upon release from prison, such as “Google Maps or Amazon” or
even “this Court’s website,” prevents McIntyre from initiating contact with minors.16
The District Court therefore committed plain error when it imposed a blanket internet
restriction as a condition to McIntyre’s lifetime supervised release term.
Still, McIntyre’s request that we vacate his entire sentence goes a step too far
beyond the relief that is appropriate in this case: vacating only the internet condition. We
will therefore do so and order limited remand, upon which the District Court must tailor
any new internet restriction to McIntyre’s conduct and ensure the restriction furthers the
purpose of “deterring crime, protecting the public, or rehabilitating [McIntyre].”17
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court, but
vacate the special condition to the lifetime term of supervised release, and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
16 Holena, 906 F.3d at 293.
17 Id. at 295.

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