Franklyn Prillerman v. City of Philadelphia

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 19-3685
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FRANKLYN PRILLERMAN,
Appellant
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; WARDEN CURRAN FROMHOLD CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY; C.O. SAM; C.O. COLEMAN; C.O. LYNCH; SYLVIA MELTON,
Correction Officer
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-01414)
District Judge: Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 23, 2020
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 30, 2020)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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2
Pro se appellant Franklyn Prillerman appeals the District Court’s order granting
summary judgment to the defendants. We will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
Prillerman was detained in the Curan-Fromhold Correctional Facility (CFCF)
while awaiting extradition to Arkansas, where he faced charges of violating the terms of
his probation. Before the extradition hearing, Corrections Officer Tanya Lynch permitted
Prillerman to speak to his lawyer, a public defender, over the telephone. However,
Officer Lynch allegedly instructed Prillerman to answer only “yes” to questions posed by
the attorney and prohibited him from asking questions or otherwise discussing his case.
Prillerman complied with these instructions. During the subsequent video-conference
hearing, Prillerman waived extradition after being questioned on the record. He was then
returned to Arkansas. The trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to five years’
imprisonment, but the Court of Appeals reversed. See Prillerman v. State, 2014 Ark.
App. 46 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014).
Prillerman then filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Officer
Lynch violated his constitutional rights by preventing him from speaking freely to his
attorney and that the City of Philadelphia was liable under Monell.1 The District Court
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and Prillerman appealed. We
affirmed the District Court’s judgment in large part, vacating and remanding only to
permit the District Court to consider in the first instance Prillerman’s claim that Lynch’s
conduct violated his rights under the Due Process Clause (and the related Monell claim).
1 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

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3
See Prillerman v. Fromhold, 714 F. App’x 184, 186 (3d Cir. 2017). On remand, the
District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on these claims as well,
concluding that Prillerman had no constitutional right to counsel and therefore could not
“state a due process claim that he was denied the opportunity to consult with counsel at
the hearing.” ECF No. 77 at 5. Prillerman appealed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment. See Wiest v. Tyco Elecs. Corp.,
812 F.3d 319, 327-28 (3d Cir. 2016). We may affirm on any ground supported by the
record. See Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 469 (3d Cir. 2015).
We will affirm the District Court’s judgment as to Lynch because she is protected
by qualified immunity. Qualified immunity “shields officials from civil liability so long
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” James v. N.J. State Police, -- F.3d --,
No. 18-1432, 2020 WL 1922370, at *3 (3d Cir. Apr. 21, 2020) (quoting Mullenix v.
Luna, 136 S Ct. 305, 308 (2015)).2 “[C]learly established rights are derived either from
binding Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent or from a robust consensus of cases
of persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals.” Id. at *4 (quoting Bland v. City of
Newark, 900 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2018)).
2 There are two prongs to the qualified-immunity analysis—the plaintiff must show “(1)
that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was
‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). We have
discretion to consider the prongs in either order, see id., and conclude that it is
appropriate here to begin with the second prong.

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Here, Prillerman has not cited, and our independent research has not revealed, any
case law holding that a defendant has a due process right to counsel during an extradition
hearing. Prillerman argues that such a right is created by the Pennsylvania Rules of
Criminal Procedure, but “officials do not forfeit qualified immunity from suit for
violation of a federal constitutional right because they failed to comply with a clear state
statute”; rather, the “clearly established right must be the federal right on which the claim
for relief is based.” Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 318–19 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Walker
v. Coffey, 905 F.3d 138, 150 n.63 (3d Cir. 2018). Accordingly, because Prillerman has
not shown that Lynch’s conduct violated his clearly established due process rights, she is
entitled to judgment in her favor. See generally Mann v. Palmerton Area Sch. Dist., 872
F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2017).
Further, Prillerman failed to show that Lynch’s conduct was based on a policy or
custom so as to establish that the City of Philadelphia is liable under Monell. Rather, it
appears that Lynch’s alleged conduct was essentially “ad hoc . . . without reference to any
formal administrative or policy channels”—which is insufficient to establish Monell
liability. McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 659 (3d Cir. 2009). Nor has
Prillerman “demonstrate[d] that [the] city’s [alleged] failure to train its employees
‘reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.’” Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914
F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 215 (3d
Cir. 2001)).
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment

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