JOHN DOE 1, in their own capacity v. Upper Saint Clair School District, a Pennsylvania governmental entity

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 22-2106
JOHN DOE 1, in their own capacity and as parent of Child Doe 1;
JANE DOE 1, in their own capacity and as parent of Child Doe 1;
JOHN DOE 2, in their own capacity and as parent of Child Doe 2;
JANE DOE 2, in their own capacity and as parent of Child Doe 2;
JOHN DOE 3, in their own capacity and as parent of Child Doe 3;
JANE DOE 3, in their own capacity and as parent of Child Doe 3;
JOHN DOE 4, in their own capacity and as parent of Child Doe 4;
JANE DOE 4, in their own capacity and as parent of Child Doe 4;
JOHN DOE 5, in their own capacity and as parent of Child Doe 5;
JANE DOE 5, in their own capacity and as parent of Child Doe 5
and on behalf of those similarly situated,
Appellants
v.
UPPER SAINT CLAIR SCHOOL DISTRICT, a Pennsylvania governmental entity;
PHILLIP J. ELIAS, all individual elected officials sued in their official capacity as
members of the Upper Saint Clair School District Board of Directors; DAPHNA GANS,
all individual elected officials sued in their official capacity as members of the Upper
Saint Clair School District Board of Directors; BARBARA L. BOLAS, all individual
elected officials sued in their official capacity as members of the Upper Saint Clair
School District Board of Directors; PATRICK A. HEWITT, all individual elected
officials sued in their official capacity as members of the Upper Saint Clair School
District Board of Directors; LOUIS P. MAFRICE, JR., all individual elected officials
sued in their official capacity as members of the Upper Saint Clair School District Board
of Directors; MICHAEL R. MASCARO, all individual elected officials sued in their
official capacity as members of the Upper Saint Clair School District Board of Directors;
ANGELA B. PETERSEN, all individual elected officials sued in their official capacity
as members of the Upper Saint Clair School District Board of Directors;
JENNIFER A. SCHNORE, all individual elected officials sued in their official capacity
as members of the Upper Saint Clair School District Board of Directors;
DANIELLE Z. WETZEL, all individual elected officials sued in their official capacity
as members of the Upper Saint Clair School District Board of Directors; UPPER SAINT

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CLAIR SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF DIRECTORS, a Pennsylvania elected
legislative body
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-22-cv-00112)
District Judge: Honorable William S. Stickman, IV
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 11, 2023
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 13, 2023)
____________
OPINION*
____________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs-Appellants (for ease of reference, “Plaintiffs”) are school-age children and
their parents who sued to enjoin the Upper Saint Clair School District from instituting an
optional COVID-19 masking policy in January 2022. They claimed violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
In connection with Plaintiffs’ complaint, they sought a temporary restraining order
from the District Court. That request was denied. Plaintiffs next filed an interlocutory
appeal with us. Along with their appeal, they moved for emergency injunctive relief. We
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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granted that relief on a temporary basis the same day it was sought to preserve the Parties’
status quo pending our decision on the merits. We then extended the temporary injunction
pending further briefing and oral argument.
But before we could consider the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims (much less render a
decision), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published revised
guidance for COVID-19 mitigation measures. We concluded that guidance mooted
Plaintiffs’ claims. As such, we dismissed their appeal and directed the District Court on
remand to dismiss their complaint without prejudice. Following dismissal on remand,
Plaintiffs motioned the District Court for attorneys’ fees and costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205;
29 U.S.C. § 794a. It denied that request, ruling that they were not prevailing parties entitled
to statutory relief. We agree.
Plaintiffs have not obtained a “judgment on the merits” or a “court-ordered consent
decree.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532
U.S. 598, 605 (2001). This case also does not present the “rare situation where a merits-
based determination is made at the injunction stage.” Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v.
Milgram, 650 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citing People Against Police
Violence v. City of Pittsburgh, 520 F.3d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 2008)). We merely issued limited
injunctive relief “on a temporary basis” to facilitate the forming of a “full three-judge panel
of this Court” to consider the substance of Plaintiffs’ claims. J.A. 390. In the end, the
Parties’ dispute was resolved by the CDC’s “nonjudicial alteration of actual
circumstances,” a situation that does not call for an award of attorneys’ fees or costs.
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 606 (cleaned up).

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Because Plaintiffs achieved none of the outcomes that warrant the relief they seek,
we affirm.

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