Jafarnia Williams, a/k/a Jeff Schirone Williams v. Superintendent Rockview Sci; Attorney General of Pennsylvania

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 23-1306
JAFARNIA WILLIAMS, a/k/a Jeff Schirone Williams,
Appellant
v.
SUPERINTENDENT ROCKVIEW SCI;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA
_____________________________
On Appeal from the U.S. District Court, W.D. Pa.
Judge David S. Cercone, No. 2:13-cv-01171
Before: RESTREPO, BIBAS, and FISHER, Circuit Judges
Argued: Apr. 20, 2026; Filed: June 15, 2026
_____________________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
BIBAS, Circuit Judge. The writ of habeas corpus is an excep-
tion to ordinary rules of finality; it gives prisoners a second bite
at the apple. Rule 60(b) motions for relief from judgment do
the same. When a prisoner tries to use that Rule to reopen a
habeas petition, courts must be careful lest there be no apple
left.
Jafarnia Williams has tried to file successive habeas peti-
tions many times over. Years later, after those efforts failed, he
turned to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to reopen those
claims. But Rule 60(b)(1) has a one-year time limit, and Rule

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60(b)(6) requires him to show extreme or unusual hardship
from extraordinary circumstances. Because he has not met that
demanding standard, we will AFFIRM the denial of his motion
to reopen.
I. WILLIAMS’S REPEATED COLLATERAL ATTACKS
In 2007, Jafarnia Williams was convicted of kidnapping,
corruption of a minor, and several drug crimes. He was sen-
tenced to fifteen to thirty years in Pennsylvania state prison,
with some credit for time served on other crimes.
Williams thought he deserved more time-served credit. So,
after exhausting his ordinary appeals, he embarked on an odyssey
through Pennsylvania and federal collateral review. First, he
filed a federal habeas petition, which was dismissed without a
certificate of appealability. Then he petitioned under Pennsyl-
vania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). The Common-
wealth’s lawyer conceded that if Williams’s view of the facts
was right, “he would be entitled to” more credit against his sen-
tence. App. 57. So the Superior Court remanded for a hearing
“to determine whether or not he would be entitled to that credit
time for [the] sentence.” App. 55–56.
On remand, the Court of Common Pleas partly agreed with
Williams. The court was “not satisfied that three months and
twelve days” that Williams was owed had, in fact, been cred-
ited. App. 78. So it issued a document titled “SENTENCE
MODIFIED 6-26-13 FOR TIME CREDIT,” providing that
Williams “is hereby sentenced by this Court as follows” and
resentencing him on all counts, listing the days for which he
“shall receive credit for time served.” App. 88–89. Williams
appealed his new sentence, seeking still more time-served

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credit. But the Superior Court affirmed his “current sentence.”
App. 288. Though it rejected Williams’s “incorrect premise”
that he was “legally entitled to any credit for time served on
his prior sentence,” it declined to disrupt the lower court’s rul-
ing crediting him with three months and twelve days. App.
287–88 (emphasis in original). So Williams filed another
PCRA petition challenging his 2013 sentence; that was denied
and then affirmed on the merits.
Also in 2013, Williams filed another federal habeas petition
challenging his convictions and a sentence enhancement, but
not his time-served credits. That petition underlies the motion
that is before us today. Williams argued that his 2013 sentence
was a “new judgment,” so his second-in-time federal habeas
petition challenging it was not barred as second or successive
under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). App. 1551 (relying on Magwood v.
Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010)). A magistrate judge disagreed,
viewing the updated sentence not as a true resentencing but
rather a “modification … somewhat akin to correction of a
clerical error in a judgment.” App. 1557. The magistrate rec-
ommended dismissing the petition as second or successive, and
the District Court did so.
Williams did not ask our Court to review that decision.
Instead, he twice asked our Court for leave to file another sec-
ond or successive petition, filed a third federal habeas petition,
and applied for a certificate of appealability regarding his third
petition; all were denied.
In 2022, eight years after his 2013 federal habeas petition
was dismissed as second or successive, Williams moved to
reopen that dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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60(b)(1), rehashing his earlier claim that the judge had “mis-
takenly” refused to treat his 2013 resentencing as a new judg-
ment under Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010). App.
1564. But (b)(1) has a one-year time limit, dooming his claim.
See R. 60(c)(1). So the magistrate judge charitably recharacter-
ized his motion as under (b)(6)’s catchall for “any other reason
that justifies relief,” which has a more forgiving time limit. R.
60(b)(6), (c)(1). Then the magistrate judge concluded, and the
District Court agreed, that the 2013 resentencing was not a new
sentence because it did not affect the legality of the original
one. We granted a certificate of appealability.
II. OUR NEW PROCEDURAL RULING
IS NOT ENOUGH TO REOPEN THE CASE
Rule 60(b) is a narrow exception to finality. It lets a party
move for relief from a judgment based on five enumerated
grounds: mistake, new evidence, fraud, voidness, or satisfac-
tion of the judgment. R. 60(b)(1)–(5). If none of those catego-
ries fits, there is an equitable catchall at the end of the Rule:
“any other reason that justifies relief.” R. 60(b)(6). Instead of
the one-year time limit for motions based on the first three
grounds, 60(b)(6) motions need only “be made within a rea-
sonable time.” R. 60(c)(1). We review the denial of a 60(b)
motion for abuse of discretion. Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 118
(3d Cir. 2014).
In 2010, before Williams’s latest sentence, the Supreme
Court ruled that a resentencing on all counts generates a new
judgment. So even if the defendant challenged the prior judg-
ment in a federal habeas petition, a new habeas petition chal-
lenging the new judgment does not count as second or

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successive. Magwood, 561 U.S. at 341–42. Four years ago, our
Court applied Magwood, holding that a renewed habeas peti-
tion after resentencing does not count as a second or successive
challenge to any of the convictions for which he was resen-
tenced. Lesko v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 34 F.4th 211, 225 (3d
Cir. 2022). Williams claims that this holding qualifies as a “rea-
son that justifies relief,” casting his sentence adjustment as
akin to a Magwood resentencing. R. 60(b)(6). But our new pro-
cedural decision alone does not warrant 60(b) reopening, and
there is no need to remand.
A. A change in case law alone is not enough of an
extraordinary circumstance to warrant reopening
Because Rule 60(b) is an exception to the ordinary finality
of judgments, we police its bounds with care. Its first five cat-
egories specify substantive requirements, and its first three are
cabined by a one-year time limit.
To get around those subject-matter and time limits, litigants
are tempted to invoke Rule 60(b)(6)’s catchall. But catchalls
are not unlimited—they are cabined by a couple of interpretive
canons. First, there is the ejusdem generis canon: After the list
of specifics, the catchall implicitly requires circumstances sim-
ilar to those listed. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 199 (2012). Second,
there is the presumption against superfluity. Id. at 174. Reading
60(b)(6) broadly would swallow up (b)(1) through (5) and gut
the one-year time limit where it applies (in subparts (1)–(3)).
Rather than redundant, “[t]hese provisions are mutually exclu-
sive.” Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380,
393 (1993). In other words, (b)(6) applies only if (b)(1) through

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(5) would not. BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 605 U.S. 204,
211 (2025). Likewise, the (b)(6) catchall cannot be used to
bring claims that belong under other parts of the federal rules.
One cannot “repackage tardy Rule 59(e) motions [to alter or
amend a judgment] based on legal errors.” Kemp v. United
States, 596 U.S. 528, 538 (2022). Nor can one use (b)(6) to
cover a motion that “is in substance a successive habeas peti-
tion.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 531 (2005).
The upshot is that “Rule 60(b)(6) is available only in nar-
row circumstances”; its standard is “stringent” and “very
strict.” BLOM Bank SAL, 605 U.S. at 211, 213, 214. To prevail,
the movant must show “extraordinary circumstances where,
without such relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship would
occur.” Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir.
1993).
Rule 60(b)(6) is “equitable and case-dependent.” Cox, 757
F.3d at 115. To apply it, “a district court must consider the full
measure of any properly presented facts and circumstances
attendant to the movant’s request.” Id. at 122. Relevant factors
may include the type and effect of any change in law, the merits
of the underlying claim for relief, the age of the conviction, the
movant’s diligence, the movant’s actual innocence, and the
existence of a death sentence. Id. at 124–26; Satterfield v. Dist.
Att’y Phila., 872 F.3d 152, 164 (3d Cir. 2017) (innocence).
We have acknowledged that a change in law may be one
such factor. Cox, 757 F.3d at 124; Satterfield, 872 F.3d at 161.
Even though a change in law is relevant, the Supreme Court
has left open whether such a change, unaccompanied by other
equitable factors, can justify 60(b)(6) relief on its own. See

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Polites v. United States, 364 U.S. 426, 433 (1960); see also
Kemp, 596 U.S. at 540 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Yet we
have never held that a change in law, without other supporting
equitable factors, sufficed. See Bracey v. Superintendent Rock-
view SCI, 986 F.3d 274, 296–97 (3d Cir. 2021) (remanding in
part because habeas court had denied movant’s request to hold
hearing and develop record and had refused to consider under-
lying merits at all); Cox, 757 F.3d at 126 (remanding in part to
consider death sentence and merits); Satterfield, 872 F.3d at
162 (remanding in part to consider meritorious claim). Indeed,
we have stressed “that intervening changes in the law rarely
justify relief from final judgments under 60(b)(6).” Cox, 757
F.3d at 121 (emphasis in original). That is on top of the reality
that extraordinary “circumstances will rarely occur in the habeas
context.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535.
New procedural rules rarely apply retroactively in criminal
(or habeas) cases. They do so only in narrow circumstances.
Sometimes, a new rule creates a right to engage in “private indi-
vidual conduct,” placing that conduct beyond the reach of crim-
inal law. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (plurality
opinion); see also Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 272
(2021); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (new constitutional rules
made retroactive by the Supreme Court). When that happens,
the retroactivity bar falls away. And the ordinary rule for civil
cases is that new decisions apply only to pending cases, not
closed ones. See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S.
749, 758–59 (1995).
Though Rule 60(b)(6) opens a wee crack in that rule against
retroactivity, it does not license an end-run around it. Similarly,
the First Step Act’s compassionate-release provision requires

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“extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a reduced sen-
tence. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). There, as here, “extraordi-
nary” is “not so flexible as to encompass any consideration.”
Rutherford v. United States, 608 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 1320,
1332 (2026). For instance, a nonretroactive change in sentenc-
ing law does not warrant compassionate release. Id. at 1331.
So too, an actual-innocence argument is not an extraordinary
and compelling reason to reduce a sentence, but is reserved for
habeas corpus. Fernandez v. United States, 608 U.S. ___, 146
S. Ct. 1292, 1304 (2026); see Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531 (holding
that it is improper to use a Rule 60(b)(6) motion to request relief
that is “in substance” or “at least similar enough” to a habeas
petition).
We have previously held, over a dissent, that a new decision
can count as one factor supporting a petitioner’s showing of
“extraordinary circumstances” even if it falls outside the nar-
row retroactivity exception. Bracey, 986 F.3d at 295 & n.18.
But it cannot suffice as the dispositive factor, amounting to
extraordinary circumstances all on its own, unless it falls
within a retroactivity exception. Rather, a Rule 60(b)(6) movant
must show that the new precedent is “accompanied by appro-
priate equitable circumstances” that collectively rise to that
demanding standard. Satterfield, 872 F.3d at 161.
B. Unless the movant proffers supporting facts, no
remand is required
Instead of weighing the equitable Cox factors, the District
Court jumped straight to the meat of Williams’s Lesko argu-
ment against finding his petition was barred as second or suc-
cessive. And the magistrate judge merely gestured at them.

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Neither addressed whether there were “extraordinary circum-
stances” or “extreme and unexpected hardship.” Sawka, 989
F.2d at 140. Often, if a district court fails to weigh the Cox fac-
tors, we will remand to let it exercise its equitable discretion in
the first instance. Bracey, 986 F.3d at 296; Cox, 757 F.3d at
124. Yet “we may affirm the judgment on any grounds sup-
ported by the record, including those not reached by the Dis-
trict Court.” Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 309
(3d Cir. 2020). We will do so “if we can determine from the
record on appeal that a petitioner cannot show extraordinary
circumstances as a matter of law.” Bracey, 986 F.3d at 296.
Williams, “of course, bears the burden of establishing enti-
tlement to such equitable relief” by “properly present[ing] facts
and circumstances attendant to [his] request.” Cox, 757 F.3d at
122. He has not done so. His motion never mentions any hard-
ship, let alone extreme or unexpected ones. Nor did his habeas
petition or brief before this Court.
Nor does Williams cite any extraordinary circumstances
favoring relief. He does not press “a new constitutional rule or
right for criminal defendants” like those that trigger retroactiv-
ity. Id. at 124; see also Bracey, 986 F.3d at 296 (emphasizing
“the constitutional nature of that change in law”). He merely
claims a right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
§ 2244(b), relying on the Supreme Court’s interpretation in
Magwood and our holding in Lesko. But, as in Gonzalez, it is
“hardly extraordinary” that a court “arrived at a different [stat-
utory] interpretation.” 545 U.S. at 536.
Plus, Williams offered scant argument that he is likely to
succeed on the merits of his habeas claims or the balance of

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equitable factors. See Cox, 757 F.3d at 124. The claims he
wants to revive do not challenge his good-time credits. Rather,
five of the six claims in his habeas petition recycle challenges
to his underlying conviction that were already considered and
denied on the merits. The sixth claim, the only one that even
touches innocence, goes not to his underlying conviction but to
a prior 1991 conviction that was used to enhance his 2013 sen-
tence. But convicts “generally may not challenge [an] enhanced
sentence through a petition under § 2254 on the ground that the
prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained.” Lacka-
wanna Cnty. Dist. Att’y v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 404 (2001). In
any event, Williams did not address the merits of any of his
claims in his 60(b) motion, unlike in Bracey. Finally, he never
explained his lack of diligence or showed a death sentence. See
Cox, 757 F.3d at 125–26.
To be sure, Williams addressed some of the Cox factors on
appeal. But he did not raise them in his motion. And it is the
motion that matters, for “pro se litigants still must allege suffi-
cient facts … to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina,
Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing Rule
12(b)(6)). Without any “properly presented facts and circum-
stances,” the District Court has nothing to “liberally construe.”
Cox, 757 F.3d at 122 (first quotation); Higgs v. Att’y Gen. of
the U.S., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011), as amended (Sept.
19, 2011) (second quotation). Thus, this is the rare case where
remand would be futile. See Bracey, 986 F.3d at 296–97 &
n.19.
Williams filed his motion under Rule 60(b)(1). And that is
exactly what it was—a claim of “mistake” due to a new proce-
dural application of an old Supreme Court case, but an untimely

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one. Though the District Court acted out of an admirable solic-
itude for pro se litigants, construing his pro se habeas petition
liberally, courts should not recharacterize such petitions as fall-
ing under 60(b)(6). Williams’s petition alleged no exceptional
circumstances or extraordinary hardship. His only argument is
that the District Court got its Magwood analysis wrong, and
that Lesko confirmed its wrongness. It is simply a procedural
hook to seek reopening. Under 60(b)(6), that is insufficient as
a matter of law.
* * * * *
Williams has had many bites at the apple. Because he did
not properly present any facts showing extraordinary circum-
stances or extreme and unusual hardship, there is no need to
remand. The District Court properly denied his Rule 60(b) motion
to reopen the denial of his habeas petition; we will AFFIRM.
Counsel for Appellant
Samuel G. Saylor [Argued]
OFFICE OF FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER
Counsel for Appellee
Rusheen R. Petti [Argued]
ALLEGHENY COUNTY OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY

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