William J. Chaffin, Jr. v. WARDEN OF ALLENWOOD FCI MEDIUM On Appeal from the United States District Court for…

BLD-109 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 23-1345
___________
WILLIAM J. CHAFFIN, JR.,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN OF ALLENWOOD FCI MEDIUM
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 4-22-cv-01242)
District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect and
on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 18, 2024
Before: BIBAS, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion: May 2, 2024)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.

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William J. Chaffin, Jr., a federal prisoner who is proceeding pro se, appeals from
an order dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The
Government has moved for summary affirmance. For the following reasons, we grant the
Government’s motion and will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
Chaffin pleaded guilty to charges involving cocaine distribution in 2017. He was
deemed to be a career offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and was
sentenced to 180 months of imprisonment. He did not challenge the judgment on appeal
or in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
In 2022, Chaffin, who was confined at FCI Allenwood, filed a petition pursuant to
§ 2241 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. He
argued that his “prior convictions do not qualify him as a career offender” under Mathis
v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016), and Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254
(2013). (ECF 1, at 6 of 10.) The District Court dismissed the § 2241 petition for lack of
jurisdiction. Chaffin appealed.1
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In reviewing the District
Court’s dismissal of Chaffin’s § 2241 petition, we exercise plenary review over its legal
conclusions and review any factual findings for clear error. See Cradle v. United States
ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). We may summarily affirm
1 Chaffin did not file his notice of appeal within 60 days of the entry of the District
Court’s order, as he was required to do under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
4(a)(1)(B). But this appeal is nevertheless timely because the District Court subsequently
granted Chaffin’s request to reopen the time to appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6).

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a District Court’s decision “on any basis supported by the record” if the appeal fails to
present a substantial question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011)
(per curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
“Motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by which
federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or sentences[.]” Okereke v. United
States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). Chaffin instead sought to proceed under
§ 2241. But, under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (also known as the saving clause), the District
Court could not entertain his § 2241 petition unless “it . . . appear[ed] that the remedy by
[§ 2255] motion [was] inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [his] detention.”
While Chaffin’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court clarified that “the saving clause
preserves recourse to § 2241 in cases where unusual circumstances make it impossible or
impracticable to seek relief in the sentencing court, as well as for challenges to detention
other than collateral attacks on a sentence.” Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465, 478 (2023).
Those unusual circumstances are absent from Chaffin’s collateral attack on his sentence.
Id. at 504 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (providing examples of such circumstances).
Therefore, Chaffin cannot bring his claims under § 2241. And this is true even if he faces
procedural or other obstacles to bringing his claim in a first § 2255 motion. See Cradle,
290 F.3d at 539; cf. Voneida v. Johnson, 88 F.4th 233, 235 (3d Cir. 2023) (explaining
that Jones “established that the limitations on second or successive motions set forth in 28
U.S.C. § 2255(h) do not make § 2255 ‘inadequate or ineffective’ such that a prisoner
must pursue a remedy under § 2241”).

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For these reasons, the District Court properly dismissed Chaffin’s § 2241 petition
for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion and will
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.

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