Nita Patel v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA On Appeal from the United States District Court for the…

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 23-2418
____________
NITA PATEL,
Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 2:17-cv-07485)
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
____________
No. 23-2795
____________
KIRTISH N. PATEL,
Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________

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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 2:18-cv-14628)
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 8, 2025
Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and FREEMAN, Circuit
Judges.
(Filed: October 17, 2025)
Mark E. Cedrone
Aubrey C. Emrich
Saxton & Stump
123 S Broad Street
Suite 2800
Philadelphia, PA 19109
Isabelle Young
Saxton & Stump
151 Meeting Street
Suite 400
Charleston, SC 29401
Counsel for Appellant Nita Patel in No. 23-2418
Kirtish N. Patel
14 Harvest Way
Denvile, NJ 07834

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Pro se Appellant in No. 23-2795
Mark E. Coyne
Steven G. Sanders
Office of United States Attorney for the
District of New Jersey
970 Broad Street
Room 700
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Appellee in Nos. 23-2418 & 23-2795
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that the
Sixth Amendment requires criminal defense lawyers to advise
non-citizen clients of the immigration consequences of their
guilty pleas. 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010). In these habeas appeals,
Nita Patel and her husband, Kirtish Patel, ask us to extend
Padilla from the immigration context to civil liability under the
False Claims Act. We decline to do so. And even if we were to
hold otherwise, retroactive relief would be unavailable to the
Patels. See Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 276 (2021). We

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will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I
A
Nita and Kirtish Patel operated Biosound Medical
Services Inc. and Heart Solution P.C. Both companies offered
mobile diagnostic test services, such as echocardiograms,
ultrasounds, and nerve conduction studies to diagnose serious
health conditions at a physician’s office. To receive
reimbursement for those services, Medicare required the
companies to have a licensed subspecialist physician on staff
to supervise and interpret tests performed in a particular
subspecialty.
In 2006, the companies applied to Medicare for
approval to do neurological diagnostic testing. Kirtish falsely
represented to Medicare that a licensed neurologist would
supervise the diagnostic tests. Relying on that falsehood,
Medicare approved both companies as providers of
neurological diagnostic testing. Starting in 2008, Kirtish—who
did not have a medical license or degree—wrote the diagnostic
reports, and Nita affixed a forged signature of a physician. This
scheme was profitable, earning the Patels at least
$4,386,133.75 (of which $1,668,954.95 came from Medicare).
B
In 2014, “Jane Doe,” a former employee of the
companies, filed a sealed qui tam action in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey. Doe alleged that
the Patels had perpetrated a healthcare fraud scheme and
asserted a claim under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729

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et seq.
Soon after Doe filed the qui tam action, the Patels were
arrested on a criminal complaint charging them with
conspiring to commit healthcare fraud. The Patels retained
separate defense counsel, and each of them agreed to plead
guilty to one count of healthcare fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1347.
In exchange, the Government agreed not to file more criminal
charges based on the scheme against the couple. Although the
parties disputed the exact amount of money the scheme
generated, the Patels agreed that it was at least $4,386,133.75.
And they acknowledged that they were subject to restitution
and criminal forfeiture. Of particular importance to these
appeals, the plea agreements were “reached without regard to
any civil or administrative matters that may be pending or
commenced in the future against” the Patels. App. 175, 184.
Nor did the agreements “prohibit the United States . . . or any
third party from initiating or prosecuting any civil or
administrative proceeding against” them. Id.
In November 2015, the Patels pleaded guilty. Nita and
Kirtish were later sentenced to 78 months’ and 100 months’
imprisonment, respectively, followed by three years of
supervised release. The District Court also imposed identical
restitution obligations and forfeiture judgments against the
Patels in the amount of $4,803,875.40.
The day after the Patels pleaded guilty, the Government
intervened in Doe’s qui tam action and filed a complaint
asserting, among other things, claims under the False Claims
Act. The Government later moved for summary judgment,
arguing that the Patels were collaterally estopped from denying
liability because of the stipulations in their plea agreements and
the admissions they made in their guilty plea colloquies. The

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District Court agreed and granted the Government summary
judgment on its claims under the False Claims Act. The District
Court trebled the Medicare loss of $1,688,954.95 to
$5,006,864.85 in damages, plus civil monetary penalties of
$2,750,000, for a total of $7,756,864.85. Nita appealed, and we
affirmed that judgment as it pertained to her liability under the
False Claims Act. See United States ex rel. Doe v. Heart Sol.,
PC, 923 F.3d 308, 319–20 (3d Cir. 2019). The parties agreed
to stay all efforts to enforce the False Claims Act judgment
during the pendency of this litigation.
C
In 2017, Nita moved to vacate her criminal sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Nita claimed she was unaware of the
qui tam action before pleading guilty and her attorney never
advised her of the possibility of such civil liability. Nita
contended that had she known that her guilty plea could
collaterally estop a challenge to her liability in the qui tam
action, she would not have pleaded guilty under the agreement.
The District Court denied Nita’s § 2255 motion. The
Court reasoned that even if defense counsel erred by failing to
advise Nita about her potential civil liability, her guilty plea
was still knowing and voluntary. In fact, Nita acknowledged
during her change of plea hearing that the plea agreement did
not preclude the Government from initiating and prosecuting a
civil action against her. Referencing defense counsel’s pre-plea
correspondence with the Patels, the District Court noted that
“there [was] evidence the Patels were considering a global
resolution during plea negotiations.” Patel v. United States,
2022 WL 17850147, at *18 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2022) (citation
modified). The Court held that Nita’s § 2255 motion failed
“because counsel’s performance was not objectively

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unreasonable under the circumstances as they existed before
the plea hearing.” Id. at *19.
Kirtish also moved to vacate his sentence under 28
U.S.C. § 2255. Like his wife, Kirtish alleged that his lawyer
did not advise him that his guilty plea admissions “would have
the collateral consequence of estopping him from contesting
any claims against him” in the qui tam action. App. 391. Kirtish
asserted that had he known about this potential civil liability,
he would not have pleaded guilty under the agreement.
The District Court denied Kirtish’s § 2255 motion,
reasoning that he was told that the plea agreement did not
preclude the Government from initiating a civil action based
on the same criminal conduct against him. The District Court
then held that defense counsel’s alleged failure to advise
Kirtish of his potential civil liability was not ineffective
assistance of counsel.
In 2023, Nita moved to alter or amend the judgment on
her § 2255 motion. She argued that she was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing because defense counsel rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to advise her of the
potential civil liability. Kirtish raised the same arguments in a
pro se motion. The District Court denied both motions.
The Patels timely appealed. A panel of this Court
granted the Patels a certificate of appealability limited to the
claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
advise them that their guilty pleas could have collateral
estoppel consequences in the qui tam action. Nita completed
her term of supervised release in January 2025, and Kirtish will
complete his term of supervised release in November.

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II1
To begin, we consider whether Nita’s appeal is moot
because she has completed her term of supervised release.
Article III of the Constitution limits the “judicial
Power” to “Cases” or “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
“For a case or controversy to exist, a petitioner, throughout
each stage of the litigation, must have suffered, or be
threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Abreu
v. Superintendent Smithfield SCI, 971 F.3d 403, 406 (3d Cir.
2020) (citation modified). So “a habeas corpus petition
generally becomes moot when a prisoner is released from
custody because the petitioner has received the relief sought.”
Id. “Once the convict’s sentence has expired, however, some
concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended
incarceration or parole—some ‘collateral consequence’ of the
conviction—must exist if the suit is to be maintained.” Spencer
v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). “We must address the issue of
collateral consequences in terms of the likelihood that a
favorable decision would redress the injury or wrong.” Abreu,
971 F.3d at 406 (citation modified).
Nita argues that this appeal is not moot because the
judgment from the qui tam action is a continuing collateral
consequence of her conviction. We agree. The District Court
relied on the collateral estoppel effects of the Patels’ guilty
pleas to enter judgment in the qui tam action. And a favorable
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255
and 2241(a). We review the District Court’s legal conclusions
de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v.
Hill, 98 F.4th 473, 478 n.1 (3d Cir. 2024).

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decision here would permit Nita to reopen that civil judgment.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) (providing that “the court may
relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment”
when “it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed
or vacated”). So Nita’s appeal is not moot because the civil
judgment is a continuing collateral consequence from her
conviction that could be redressed if she were to prevail. We
therefore exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and
2253(a).
III
Turning to the merits, the Patels argue that their
attorneys provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing
to advise them that liability under the False Claims Act could
follow from their guilty pleas for healthcare fraud. We
disagree.
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.
The right to counsel extends to all “critical stages of a criminal
proceeding, including when [the defendant] enters a guilty
plea.” Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 363 (2017) (citation
modified). So defense counsel must “inform a defendant of the
advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement and the
attendant statutory and constitutional rights that a guilty plea
would forgo.” Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50–51
(1995).
The “right to counsel is the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 US. 759,
771 n.14 (1970) (emphasis added). To show ineffective
assistance of counsel in the context of a guilty plea, a petitioner

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must demonstrate (1) the lawyer’s performance was
unreasonable under prevailing professional norms; and
(2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
errors, [the petitioner] would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 59 (1985); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 694 (1984).
Before 2010, state courts and the lower federal courts
overwhelmingly had held that the Sixth Amendment required
that criminal defense lawyers advise their clients only of a
guilty plea’s direct, rather than collateral consequences. See
Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 350 & n.7 (2013)
(collecting cases). Direct consequences “relate[] to the length
or nature of [a] sentence,” Kincade v. United States, 559 F.2d
906, 909 (3d Cir. 1977), namely, the maximum prison term and
any fines for a charged offense. United States v. Salmon, 944
F.2d 1106, 1130 (3d Cir. 1991). Collateral consequences have
been described as results of a plea that are not “automatic,”
Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir.
1973), or are beyond the sentencing court’s control,
“contingent upon action taken by an individual or individuals
… such as another governmental agency or the defendant
himself.” United States v. Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 965 (9th
Cir. 2000). Thus, we have held collateral consequences to
include a conviction’s effect on parole eligibility, Meyers v.
Gillis, 93 F.3d 1147, 1153-54 (3d Cir. 1996), on sentencing for
a later offense, United States v. Rengifo, 832 F.3d 220, 223 (3d
Cir. 2016), and on voting rights, United States v. Cariola, 323
F.2d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 1963). See also United States v.
Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 382 (4th Cir. 2012) (employment
benefits); Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d 781, 782 (5th Cir. 1975)
(loss of driver’s license); United States v. King, 618 F.2d 550,

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552-53 (9th Cir. 1980) (civil tax liability). As of 2010, all ten
federal appellate courts to explicitly consider the question had
concluded that counsel’s failure to advise a client about a guilty
plea’s collateral consequences was “never [considered] a
violation of the Sixth Amendment.” Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 350
(citation modified).
Neither our Court nor the Supreme Court has directly
addressed whether it is appropriate for courts to categorically
distinguish between direct and collateral consequences for
purposes of defense counsel’s Sixth Amendment obligations.
Instead, in Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court addressed
a more specific question and announced a new rule: that the
Sixth Amendment requires “that counsel must inform her
client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation.” 559 U.S.
at 374. Prior to Padilla, many lower courts had classified
deportation as a collateral consequence. See, e.g., Broomes v.
Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Fry,
322 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Gonzalez, 202
F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2000). But in Padilla, the Supreme Court
explained that it need not address whether the “distinction
between direct and collateral consequences [should] define the
scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance’
required under Strickland,” id. at 365, because the “collateral
versus direct distinction [was] ill suited to evaluating a
Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation,”
id. at 366. That was because deportation is “a particularly
severe penalty” and “intimately related to the criminal
process.” Id. at 365 (citation modified). According to the
Court, the law had “enmeshed criminal convictions and the
penalty of deportation for nearly a century.” Id. at 365–66.
“[I]mportantly, recent changes in . . . immigration law ha[d]
made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of

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noncitizen offenders.” Id. at 366. Because of these
developments, it was “uniquely difficult to classify
[deportation] as either a direct or a collateral consequence.” Id.
The Supreme Court therefore held “that advice regarding
deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel,” and Strickland applied. Id.
The Patels do not argue that civil liability under the
False Claims Act is somehow a direct consequence of pleading
guilty. Instead, they read Padilla to establish a broader
proposition about collateral consequences. In their view,
Padilla held “that the constitutional necessity of advising a
criminal defendant on the potential consequences of the plea
turns on (1) the degree to which the conviction and potential
penalty are intertwined, and (2) the severity of the penalty.”
Patel Br. 21. Not so. In fact, Padilla’s holding was limited to
requiring “counsel [to] inform her client whether his plea
carries a risk of deportation,” and it did not apply generally to
collateral consequences. 559 U.S. at 374. As one of our sister
courts aptly stated: “Padilla is rife with indications that the
Supreme Court meant to limit its scope to the context of
deportation only.” United States v. Reeves, 695 F.3d 637, 640
(7th Cir. 2012). We read Padilla the same way. It did not
disturb the lower courts’ rules about whether the Sixth
Amendment requires attorneys to inform their clients of a
conviction’s collateral consequences. Instead, it announced
that those courts’ rules are inapplicable to one specific
consequence: deportation. Thus, the Patels’ ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is not governed by Padilla.2
2 The Patels argue that the Second Circuit’s decision in
Farhane v. United States, 121 F.4th 353 (2d Cir. 2024) (en
banc), supports their argument. That decision held that

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We join our sister circuits in holding that the Sixth
Amendment requires criminal defense lawyers to advise their
clients only of a guilty plea’s direct consequences, not its
collateral consequences. Therefore, we hold that defense
counsel’s failure to advise a client about the collateral
consequence of civil liability under the False Claims Act does
not violate the Sixth Amendment.3
IV
The Government argues in the alternative that even if
the Patels’ Sixth Amendment argument is correct, the non-
“defense counsel has a Sixth Amendment duty to advise a
naturalized citizen client that entering a guilty plea exposes
him to a risk of denaturalization and deportation” under
Padilla. Id. at 363. Like Padilla, Farhane hinged on the fact
that “the risk of denaturalization” could lead to “deportation.”
Id. at 366. So it does not help the Patels’ cases, which have
nothing to do with immigration or citizenship.
3 Even if we were to adopt the Patels’ expansive interpretation
of Padilla, we would hold that Padilla does not extend to civil
liability arising under the False Claims Act. Unlike civil
liability, deportation is “a drastic measure” that is “at times the
equivalent of banishment or exile.” Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,
333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948). The Supreme Court opined in Padilla
that deportation “is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the
most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on
noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”
559 U.S. at 364 (footnote omitted). So even under the Patels’
own reading of Padilla, they have not shown that defense
counsel had to advise them of their potential civil liability.

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retroactivity doctrine of Teague v. Lane precludes their
requested relief.4 489 U.S. 288 (1989). We agree.
Ordinarily, when we “announce a ‘new rule,’ a person
whose conviction is already final may not benefit from the
decision in a habeas or similar proceeding.” Chaidez, 568 U.S.
at 347. Only a new substantive rule that “alter[s] the range of
conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes” applies
“retroactively on federal collateral review.” Edwards, 593 U.S.
at 276 (citation modified). “A case announces a new rule . . .
when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the
government” because “the result was not dictated by precedent
existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”
Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 347 (citation modified). And a holding is
not dictated by precedent “unless it would have been apparent
to all reasonable jurists.” Id. (citation modified). By contrast,
“a case does not announce a new rule[] when it is merely an
application of the principle that governed a prior decision to a
different set of facts.” Id. at 347–48 (citation modified).
The Supreme Court’s decision in Chaidez v. United
States is illustrative. There, the Court held that Padilla
recognized a new rule of constitutional law. Id. at 354. Before
Padilla was decided, many courts “had excluded advice about
collateral matters from the Sixth Amendment’s ambit.” Id. at
352. Padilla “rejected that categorical approach,” making “the
Strickland test operative” “when a criminal lawyer gives (or
4 The Patels argue that the Government forfeited this argument
by failing to raise it until now. Because “we may affirm the
District Court for any reason supported by the record,” the
Government’s argument is properly before us. United States v.
Rivera, 74 F.4th 134, 141 n.37 (3d Cir. 2023) (citation
modified).

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fails to give) advice about immigration consequences.” Id. at
353. So the Chaidez Court held that “Padilla’s holding that the
failure to advise about [the] non-criminal consequence [of
deportation] could violate the Sixth Amendment” was not
“apparent to all reasonable jurists prior to” Padilla. Id. at 354
(citation modified). As a result, habeas petitioners cannot
obtain retroactive relief under Padilla. Id. at 358.
According to the Patels, the non-retroactivity doctrine
does not apply because Padilla “already answered the question
of whether the Sixth Amendment has relevance to a lawyer’s
advice about matters not part of a criminal proceeding.” Reply
Br. 17. But as we have explained, the Patels misread Padilla’s
holding. Because Padilla’s holding was limited to deportation,
if we were to hold that the Sixth Amendment requires defense
counsel to advise a client about potential civil liability under
the False Claims Act, we would be recognizing a new rule of
constitutional law. Such a holding is not “dictated by precedent
existing at the time the” Patels’ “conviction[s] became final,”
so the non-retroactivity doctrine bars their requested relief.
Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 347 (citation modified); accord Plunk v.
Hobbs, 766 F.3d 760, 769 (8th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (holding
that an extension of Strickland to advice about parole eligibility
would create “a new rule of constitutional law, inapplicable on
collateral review”).5
5 Because we have held that the Patels failed to “state[] a
colorable claim for relief under Strickland,” we do not reach
their argument that the District Court was required to hold an
evidentiary hearing. United States v. Arrington, 13 F.4th 331,
334 (3d Cir. 2021).

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* * *
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s
judgment.

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