Christian James Lauria v. C.O. LIEB, Allegheny County Jail, Individual

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 24-1461
_____________
CHRISTIAN JAMES LAURIA,
Appellant
v.
C.O. LIEB, Allegheny County Jail, Individual and Official
Capacity; C.O. CARR, Allegheny County Jail, Individual and
Official Capacity; C.O. FORSICKA, Allegheny County Jail,
Individual and Official Capacity; ALLEGHENY COUNTY
JAIL; C.O. RICH GERBER
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No. 2:22-cv-00486)
District Judge: Honorable Maureen P. Kelly
_____________
Argued: February 26, 2025
Before: RESTREPO, MONTGOMERY-REEVES and
SCIRICA, Circuit Judges.

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(Filed: September 12, 2025)
Jonathan Gibson [ARGUED]
Christine A. Monta
Devi M. Rao
Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center
501 H Street NE, Suite 275
Washington, DC 20002
Counsel for Appellant
J. Alfred Bacharach [ARGUED]
Allegheny County Law Department
445 Fort Pitt Boulevard, 3rd Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Appellees
_________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge
Appellant Christian James Lauria is an incarcerated
litigant who brought suit against the Allegheny County Jail and
several of its corrections officers for excessive force and
deliberate indifference. Lauria proceeded pro se before the
District Court and struggled in opposing a motion for summary
judgment filed by Appellees. Appellees, who argued that
Lauria had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as
required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, supported their

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motion for summary judgment with an affidavit attesting that
prison records contained no evidence of a grievance filed by
Lauria. Though Lauria alleged that he had submitted a
grievance form through the slot in his cell door, he failed to
make this allegation in the form of an affidavit or sworn
pleading. The District Court concluded that it was barred from
considering Lauria’s unsworn allegations and granted
summary judgment in favor of Appellees on exhaustion
grounds.
The District Court was correct to conclude that Lauria’s
unsworn allegations could not create an issue of material fact,
as we held in United States ex rel. Doe v. Heart Sol., PC, 923
F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2019). But the District Court saw Doe’s
holding as even more expansive, barring it from considering
Lauria’s unsworn allegations in any respect at summary
judgment. This application of Doe was erroneous: our holding
in Doe does not bar courts from considering unsworn
allegations when determining the propriety of an order
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e).
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order granting
summary judgment and remand for further consideration
consistent with this opinion.
I. Background
On March 18, 2021, Lauria was booked into the
Allegheny County Jail as a pre-trial detainee. Lauria alleges
that three corrections officers—Officer Daniel Lieb, Sergeant
Richard Gerber, and officer David Forsicka—assaulted him
that same morning, fracturing his orbital bone. Lauria alleges
that he was then “not given proper medical attention, and [was]
unlawfully put in a restraint chair for 11 hours.” AA37.

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Appellees contend that their use of force was justified,
since Lauria “threw [playing] cards at Officer Lieb” and
“moved toward” him. AB002. Appellees also contend that
Lauria was “seen by medical personnel” shortly after the use
of force and that he was placed in a restraint chair for “4.5
hours,” not the 11 hours claimed by Lauria. AB003–04.
Lauria filed his original complaint against Appellees on
March 22, 2022. In this complaint, Lauria alleged that he filed
a grievance after the purported assault but “never got a reply.”
AA23. An identical allegation appears in Lauria’s amended
complaint, filed on May 2, 2023.
On March 10, 2023, at the start of discovery, Lauria
filed his first petition to appoint counsel, wherein he alleged
that he does not “speak the Legal Jargin [sic]” and was having
trouble “obtain[ing] certain information,” including his
medical records. AA28. The District Court denied this
petition on March 23, 2023, finding that neither “the difficulty
of the legal issues involved” in the case nor Lauria’s
“[in]ability to present his case” justified appointment of
counsel. AA30.
After discovery, both Lauria and Appellees moved for
summary judgment. Appellees argued that summary judgment
should be granted in their favor because Lauria failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies. In support, they
submitted a declaration from Deputy Warden Blythe Toma,
who swore that: (1) inmate grievances are “scanned into
OnBase, a searchable computer database” when submitted; and
(2) Toma had searched OnBase and found no grievances filed
by Lauria between March 18, 2021 and May 20, 2021. AB036.

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In his opposition to Appellees’ motion for summary
judgment, Lauria reiterated his claim that he submitted a
grievance shortly after the 2021 alleged assault. Lauria alleged
that he “put the [g]rievance in the door slot,” after which “c/os
were responsible for putting the [g]rievance in ‘[t]he
[g]rievance [b]ox.’” AA42. Lauria alleged that he “couldn[’]t
physically put it in the [g]rievance box because [he] was in
segregated housing” and “could only put all paperwork in the
door slot.” AA45.
On October 31, 2023, Lauria filed a second petition to
appoint counsel, once again on the basis that he does not “speak
Legal Jargin [sic].” AA46. The District Court again denied
this motion, finding that “there is nothing that Plaintiff is
required to do in the prosecution of his claims” because fact
discovery was completed and the parties’ motions for summary
judgment were fully briefed. AA49.
On February 6, 2024, the District Court granted
summary judgment in favor of Appellees. The District Court
found “no evidence that Plaintiff exhausted available
administrative remedies”; though Lauria alleged he had
submitted a grievance in his original complaint, amended
complaint, and opposition brief, these submissions were “not
made under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1746
and therefore may not be considered by the Court.” AA13–14.
The District Court therefore granted summary judgment “in
favor of all Defendants as to all claims asserted by Plaintiff.”
AA15. Lauria appealed.

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II. Discussion1
A. Consideration of Unsworn Allegations
In granting summary judgment, the District Court relied
in large part on our holding in Doe. As the District Court
described it, Doe “clearly stated that ‘while an unsworn
statement may be considered on summary judgment, an
unsworn statement that has not been made under penalty of
perjury cannot.’” AA14 (quoting Doe, 923 F.3d at 315). The
District Court concluded that Doe required it to entirely
disregard any unsworn statements when evaluating the parties’
summary judgment motions: it found that it “cannot consider
the unsworn statements related to exhaustion as part of its
summary judgment analysis.” AA15.
This articulation of our ruling in Doe improperly
expands the scope of our holding in a small yet significant way.
In Doe, we held that statements that are “both unsworn and not
given under the penalty of perjury” are “insufficient to create
an issue of fact on summary judgment.” Doe, 923 F.3d at 315.
This much is plainly true, and nothing in our holding today
disturbs that rule. But our holding in Doe does not compel
1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
the District Court’s summary judgment decision “anew,”
“applying the same standard [the District Court] must apply.”
Huber v. Simon’s Agency, Inc., 84 F.4th 132, 144 (3d Cir.
2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). The District Court
was tasked with “grant[ing] summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

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courts to completely disregard unsworn statements when
assessing the propriety of summary judgment: such statements
may inform a court’s decision pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(e) to issue appropriate orders when “a party fails
to properly support an assertion of fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Courts possess discretion to allow litigants to address errors in
their summary judgment materials, including by allowing
additional time for the resubmission of unsworn allegations in
supplemental affidavits. See Gordon v. Watson, 622 F.2d 120,
123 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[D]istrict court[s] ha[ve] ample
discretion to call upon the parties to remedy the defects [in
summary judgment materials], by submitting supplemental
affidavits or otherwise.”); Nick’s Garage, Inc. v. Progressive
Cas. Ins. Co., 875 F.3d 107, 116 n.4 (2d Cir. 2017); Jaxon v.
Circle K Corp., 773 F.2d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir. 1985). In
determining whether to exercise this discretion, courts are
permitted to consider the totality of the allegations made, both
sworn and unsworn.
Here, the District Court could not have considered
Lauria’s unsworn allegations when determining whether
genuine disputes remained as to any material fact. But it
remained entitled to consider Lauria’s unsworn allegations as
a potential reason to delay its summary judgment ruling and
grant Lauria “an opportunity to properly support” his
allegations or “issue any other appropriate order” pursuant to
Rule 56(e). Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(1), (4). Given that Lauria’s
failure to submit an appropriate affidavit appeared to be the
product of a pro se litigant’s ignorance of procedural rules—
and had not been objected to by Appellees in their summary
judgment briefing—the District Court may well have exercised

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its discretion in this way had it not erroneously concluded that
Doe barred it from doing so.2
B. Harmless Error
Appellees contend that even if the District Court erred
in its summary judgment ruling, that error was harmless
because Lauria’s exhaustion allegations were “defeat[ed]” by
his failure to produce a “pink copy” of his grievance—a copy
of the form meant to be retained by a prisoner—as “evidence
that he submitted” one. Appellees’ Br. at 15.
2 Much of the parties’ briefing is dedicated to the separate
issue of whether the District Court erred in not providing
affirmative notice of the procedural rules of summary
judgment to Lauria. Most circuits have adopted some version
of the notice requirement Lauria seeks: the Second, Fourth,
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have each
recognized a notice requirement for pro se incarcerated
litigants facing summary judgment. See generally Irby v.
New York City Transit Auth., 262 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 2001);
Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Ninety Three Firearms, 330 F.3d 414 (6th Cir.
2003); Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1982); Rand
v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Brown v.
Shinbaum, 828 F.2d 707 (11th Cir. 1987); Hudson v. Hardy,
412 F.2d 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Others, namely the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits, have rejected such a rule. See Martin v.
Harrison Cnty. Jail, 975 F.2d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1992); Beck
v. Skon, 253 F.3d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 2001). Because we
conclude that the District Court erred in its application of
Doe, we do not reach this issue.

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Appellees’ argument is unavailing. “In considering a
motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make
credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the
evidence.” Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247
(3d Cir. 2004). Even “a single, non-conclusory affidavit . . .
when based on personal knowledge and directed at a material
issue, is sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Lupyan v.
Corinthian Colleges Inc., 761 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2014).
Lauria could have carried this burden even without a pink copy
of his grievance form by submitting an affidavit or sworn
pleading alleging that he had submitted a grievance form. See,
e.g., Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2018)
(finding a plaintiff had adequately alleged exhaustion through
“sworn deposition testimony”). Accordingly, the District
Court’s error was not harmless.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the
District Court’s order granting summary judgment and remand
for further consideration consistent with this opinion.

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