Jack William Morgan v. Warden of Usp-Allenwood

241508np-pdfCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit29 de jan. de 2025

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 24-1508
__________
JACK WILLIAM MORGAN,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN OF USP-ALLENWOOD
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-00094)
District Judge: Honorable Karoline Mehalchick
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 29, 2025
Before: RESTREPO, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 29, 2025)
___________
OPINION*
___________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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PER CURIAM
Federal prisoner Jack Morgan appeals pro se from the decision of the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (“the MDPA”) dismissing
his habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We will affirm that judgment.
I.
Morgan is serving a life sentence imposed by the United States District Court for
the District of Nevada (“the DNV”) in 2018. In 2022, the Federal Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) charged him with possessing a dangerous weapon after a knife was found in his
cell. Shortly thereafter, he appeared before a Discipline Hearing Officer (“DHO”), who
sustained the charge and imposed the following sanctions: 90 days of disciplinary
segregation, a $120 fine, and loss of commissary, mattress, and phone privileges for 90
days.
In January 2024, at which point Morgan was incarcerated at a federal prison in the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, he filed a pro se habeas petition in the MDPA pursuant
to § 2241. The petition claimed that a prison official had planted the knife in Morgan’s
cell because he (Morgan) had refused to reenter the general prison population. Based on
this claim, Morgan sought to have the disciplinary incident report and the fine expunged
from his prison record, and for the prison official to be disciplined.
The BOP opposed the petition, arguing that the MDPA “lacks § 2241 jurisdiction
and cannot decide Morgan’s claim because the DHO did not impose the sanctioned loss
of good conduct time.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 8, at 1. Thereafter, on March 5, 2024, the

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District Court dismissed the petition, stating that “Morgan fails to set forth a cognizable
due process claim as the disciplinary sanctions he received do not implicate any liberty
interests that are protected by the Due Process Clause.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 9, at 2. This
timely appeal followed.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).1
We exercise plenary review over the MDPA’s legal conclusions and review its factual
findings for clear error. See Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d
Cir. 2002) (per curiam). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. See
Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
Section 2241 gives a district court jurisdiction over “the petition of a federal
prisoner who is [attacking] not the validity but the execution of his sentence.” Cardona v.
Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2012). Although a constitutional challenge to prison
disciplinary proceedings that result in the loss of good-conduct-time credits qualifies as
an attack on the execution of the prisoner’s sentence (because that sanction can affect the
sentence’s duration), see Queen v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008) (per
curiam), no such sanction is at issue in Morgan’s case. Furthermore, none of the
sanctions that Morgan did receive contradict the terms of the sentencing court’s
1 Morgan does not need a certificate of appealability to proceed with this appeal. See
United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc), abrogated on
other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012).

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judgment. Accordingly, the MDPA did not err in dismissing Morgan’s § 2241 petition.
See Cardona, 681 F.3d at 537 (“In order to challenge the execution of his sentence under
§ 2241, Cardona would need to allege that [the] BOP’s conduct was somehow
inconsistent with a command or recommendation in the sentencing judgment.”).
In view of the above, we will affirm the District Court’s Judgment.2
2 On September 20, 2024, this Court denied Morgan’s motion for appointment of counsel
on appeal. To the extent that his appellate brief once again requests appointment of
counsel, that request is denied.

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