United States of America v. William Manderville

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 24-1641
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
WILLIAM MANDERVILLE,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(District Court No. 3:23-cr-00901-001)
District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on May 28, 2026
Before: HARDIMAN, AMBRO, and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: August 13, 2026)
___________
OPINION∗
____________
∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
William Manderville appeals his conviction and sentence for conspiring to
distribute and distributing methamphetamine and heroin. We will affirm.
I1
Manderville pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of
methamphetamine and 100 grams or more of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and
to distributing 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and 100 grams or more of heroin
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Because the parties agreed that a
sentence between 60 to 84 months’ imprisonment would be reasonable, they promised
not to appeal a sentence within that range. But after determining that Manderville’s
Guidelines range was 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment, the District Court imposed a
sentence of 108 months’ imprisonment. Manderville timely appealed.2
1 We include only those facts necessary to decide this appeal. For a more fulsome
description, see United States v. Manderville, 2025 WL 1604505 (3d Cir. June 6, 2025)
(determining that original counsel’s brief filed under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), was inadequate, discharging counsel, and directing the appointment of new
counsel).
2 Like his first lawyer, Manderville’s current counsel filed an Anders brief and Anders
motion to withdraw. Current counsel identified, but did not argue, issues of arguable
merit. Based on our consideration of those filings, we “believe[d] there [might] be issues
of arguable merit” and ordered briefing from the parties to address the merits of “whether
the Government at sentencing breached the plea agreement, whether the defendant
entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, and any additional issues counsel
determine[d] to be of arguable merit on further review, including on consideration of
Appellant's informal brief.” ECF No. 64. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 743; 3d Cir. L.A.R.
109.2(a) (2011).
We therefore denied current counsel’s Anders motion to withdraw and this appeal
has moved beyond the Anders construct. We will address the matters argued in the
supplemental briefing filed by Manderville’s current counsel and exercise our discretion

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II3
Manderville argues, for the first time on appeal, that the Government’s advocacy
at sentencing violated the terms of the plea agreement. We are not convinced the
Government violated the plea agreement, but even if it did, the District Court’s error in
failing to so find would not have been clear or obvious. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b);
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).
In determining if there was a breach of a plea agreement, explicit or implicit, we
consider “the parties’ reasonable understanding of the agreement,” and whether the
challenged conduct was consistent with it. United States v. Williams, 510 F.3d 416, 425
(3d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Hodge, 412 F.3d 479, 485 (3d Cir. 2005)).
Relying on our decisions in United States v. Davis, 105 F. 4th 541 (3d Cir. 2024),
and United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998), Manderville argues that
the Government breached the agreement because, when advocating for a sentence:
• it “poison[ed] the well,” Reply Br. 4, by not starting with mitigating factors
but instead observing at the outset that trafficking in drugs is a scourge on
New Jersey and trafficking in drugs imposes immense suffering on its
victims, including the same type of drugs involved in this case, and by
following with statements “focus[ing] the court’s attention on Manderville’s
criminal history” and that his previous sentences did not deter his criminal
conduct, Manderville Br. 9; and
to address the challenge raised in Manderville’s pro se brief—filed on permission after
counsel filed the Anders brief—that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. We
will not address Manderville’s various arguments about his trial counsel’s performance,
however, because we leave such issues for collateral review. See United States v.
Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271–72 (3d Cir. 2003).
3 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

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• it ended with a “pitch” for a significant sentence at the top of the range
without specifying whether it meant the parties’ stipulated range or the
Guidelines range, Reply Br. 4.
Manderville notes that the Court imposed a sentence above the stipulated range and
mentioned that the Government emphasized: (1) the nature of the drug trafficking crimes,
its impact on New Jersey, and the harm caused to victims; and (2) Manderville’s criminal
history and lack of successful deterrence. Manderville also takes issue with the
Government’s use of the term “significant” when suggesting a sentence to the Court.
Manderville Br. 12.
First, in considering the record, Manderville’s argument that the Government
failed to specify in its closing pitch to which range it was referring goes nowhere. At the
outset, the Government specified it was “requesting a downward variance to the top of
the stipulated range that the parties have agreed to in the plea agreement.” App. 58. And,
the Court said it understood the parties were seeking a sentence in the range of 5 years’
and 7 years’ imprisonment.
Second, in Davis and Nolan-Cooper, the prosecution over-emphasized the
defendant’s reprehensible conduct and either neglected mitigating factors in support of
the lower sentence or actively argued against them. And unlike in Nolan-Cooper, here the
plea agreement permitted the Government to provide “the full nature and extent of
Manderville’s activities and relevant conduct.” App. 22 (emphasis added). So it would
not have been “obvious” or “clear,” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, to the Court that the
Government breached the agreement by discussing the harm caused by drug trafficking
and Manderville’s recidivism. And contrary to Manderville’s contention that the

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Government transgressed reasonable expectations under the agreement when it used the
term “significant” to advocate for a sentence at the top of the stipulated range—
imprisonment for 7 years as opposed to 5, it did so in the context of also emphasizing
important factors favorable to Manderville to support the high end of the parties’
stipulated range. Indeed, Manderville’s own counsel referred to the 5 years’ imprisonment
at the bottom of the stipulated range as a “very significant” one. App. 64. So the
Government’s reference to 7 years as significant, was not inconsistent with the stipulated
range.
Finally, in Davis we remarked that if “the prosecutor had pivoted” after presenting
the reprehensible conduct and the victim impact “and argued that despite the aggravating
factors, other considerations merited a low-end Guidelines sentence, that might have
sufficed to cure the breach.” 105 F.4th at 553. Here, the Government made such a pivot—
it emphasized Manderville’s “excellent behavior on pretrial release,” App. 59, explained
that Manderville now posed a lower risk of recidivism, and advocated for a sentence
substantially below the Guidelines range. In granting a significant downward variance,
the District Court acknowledged these mitigating factors urged by the Government.
The District Court: (1) acknowledged the Government’s argument at sentencing
“that the need for specific deterrence and concerns for recidivism [in Manderville’s case]
warrant a downward variance,” App. 73; (2) agreed with both parties that a downward
“variance [was] appropriate here,” App. 74; (3) recognized the province of the
prosecution and Manderville in assenting to their plea agreement, and emphasized—as
the plea agreement also made clear—that “sentencing belongs to [the] Court.” App. 75.

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Although the Court did not sentence Manderville as he preferred, it still considered the
agreement and the mitigating factors (as emphasized by the Government) to sentence him
to over 42 months below his Guidelines range.
In sum, even assuming there was an error, Manderville’s challenge that the
Government breached the plea agreement fails at Step Two of Olano. See Olano, 507
U.S. at 734.
III
We next briefly address Manderville’s pro se challenge to his conviction. Because
Manderville failed to raise in the District Court any of the arguments he raises before us
now, our review is again only for plain error. See United States v. Agarwal, 24 F.4th 886,
891 (3d Cir. 2022).
As stated in his pro se brief, Manderville contends that his plea was not knowing
and voluntary because, as he understood it and his counsel told him, once he pleaded
guilty, he had a “deal [for] no less than 5 years [and] no more than 7 years.” ECF No. 63
at 1. He explains that he would have “had [the] option to go another route” if he were not
guaranteed a sentence within that range but his counsel only told him after the Court
imposed the 108 months’ sentence that the Court could do that, contrary to his
understanding. Id.
Before the Court accepted Manderville’s change of plea, it confirmed that no
promises were made in exchange for his guilty plea other than those in the plea
agreement. In the agreement, the parties acknowledged: the actual sentence imposed was
“within the sole discretion of the sentencing judge,” App. 20; the parties’ agreement

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“cannot and does not bind the sentencing judge,” App. 22–23; and the parties’
“[s]tipulated [r]ange will not bind the [sentencing] [c]ourt,” App. 26. Manderville signed
that agreement and acknowledged that he understood that the District Court was not
bound by the stipulations.
Manderville has not shown a reasonable probability that, but for a plain error by
the District Court, he would not have pleaded guilty and as such that our confidence in
his conviction is undermined. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83
(2004).
* * *
For the stated reasons, we will affirm the judgment.

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