James Mosley v. BRIAN YOUNG, Epic Solutions Settlement Manager On Appeal from the United States…

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 24-1658
___________
JAMES MOSLEY,
Appellant
v.
BRIAN YOUNG, Epic Solutions Settlement Manager
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-24-cv-00504)
District Judge: Honorable Mia R. Perez
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 20, 2024
Before: JORDAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 27, 2024)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant James Mosley appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his
complaint. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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2
In February 2024, Mosley filed a complaint in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Mosley's sparse complaint alleged that Appellee
Brian Young acted as a class-action settlement administrator, that Mosley received a
check for $8.52 from a class-action settlement that Mosley was unable to cash, and that
Young somehow breached the class action settlement agreement by providing improper
notice to Mosley.1 Mosley asserted that the District Court had diversity jurisdiction over
his claims, because he was a citizen of Pennsylvania and Young was a citizen of Oregon.2
Mosley sought “redress in the amount of $25 million due to breach of settlement
agreement and the check of $8.52 [that] has been forfeited wrongfully.” See ECF No. 2 at
5. The District Court liberally construed Mosley’s complaint as raising a breach-of-
contract claim, and it sua sponte dismissed the complaint without prejudice for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Mosley timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over a dismissal of a complaint
without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and our review is plenary. See
1 It is unclear how the notice was improper, or how it breached a contract. Mosley
possibly alleged that he was unable to cash his settlement check due to some defect in
Young’s notice of the settlement agreement. Alternatively, Mosley might have alleged
that Young failed to provide Mosley with an opportunity to opt out of the class-action
settlement.
2 The District Court observed that Mosley raised both federal claims and similar state
claims in a prior lawsuit against Young and two other defendants. See ECF No. 5, at 2
n.3; see also Mosley v. Bank of Am., No. 23-2497, 2024 WL 224336 (3d Cir. Jan. 22,
2024) (affirming District Court’s dismissal of complaint). In this second lawsuit, Mosley
does not mention federal claims, and he omits the defendant that shared his Pennsylvania
citizenship.

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3
G.W. v. Ringwood Bd. of Educ., 28 F.4th 465, 468 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2022); Pa. Fam. Inst.,
Inc. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156, 162 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
A district court has diversity jurisdiction if (1) there is complete diversity of
citizenship amongst the parties, and (2) the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Peace Church Risk Retention Grp. v. Johnson Controls Fire Prot.
LP, 49 F.4th 866, 870 (3d Cir. 2022). The party that invokes diversity jurisdiction has
“the burden to prove, by the preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000.” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Stevens & Ricci Inc., 835 F.3d
388, 395 (3d Cir. 2016). Usually, the amount in controversy is based on good faith
allegations in the plaintiff's complaint, and dismissal is warranted only if it “appear[s] to
a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.” See id.
(quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938)).
We see no error in the District Court’s finding that there was no basis for diversity
jurisdiction.3 Mosley’s breach-of-contract claim is brought under Pennsylvania state law.
Under Pennsylvania state law, a party injured by a contractual breach is not entitled to
recover anything beyond compensation for the loss that he has sustained. See Vinculum,
Inc. v. Goli Techs., LLC, 310 A.3d 231, 249-50 (Pa. 2024). Thus, if Mosley were to
3 Mosley’s sole argument on appeal is that the District Court erred because it did not find
that Young is a citizen of Oregon and Mosley is a citizen of Pennsylvania. However, the
District Court did not reject Mosley’s citizenship allegations; it instead narrowly focused
on Mosley’s inability to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement.

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4
prevail in his breach-of-contract claim, he would be entitled to damages that put him as
close as possible to the position that he would have been in if there had been no breach.
See id. If Mosley’s request for $25 million was a demand for punitive damages, then that
request fails, because punitive damages cannot be recovered under Pennsylvania state law
in an action based solely on breach of contract. See Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors Am.,
Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 402 (3d Cir. 2004). Construed liberally, none of Mosley’s allegations
support a conclusion that he would have been entitled to more than $8.52 in
compensatory damages, assuming the alleged breach of contract occurred. Therefore,
based on well-established principles of Pennsylvania contract law and the vague
allegations in Mosley’s complaint, Mosley has alleged an amount in controversy of
$8.52—not the more than $75,000 required for diversity jurisdiction, and certainly not
the $25 million demanded.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

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