In re: Milton Thomas Milton Thomas v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA and THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA

1
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD
CIRCUIT
No. 24-1861
IN RE: MILTON THOMAS
_____________________________
MILTON THOMAS,
Appellant
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA and THE SCHOOL DISTRICT
OF PHILADELPHIA
_____________________________
Appeal from the U.S. District Court, E.D. Pa.
Judge Joel H. Slomsky, No. 2:21-cv-01725
Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and BOVE, Circuit Judges
Argued Jan. 28, 2026; Decided Jun. 9, 2026
_____________________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
BOVE, Circuit Judge. Milton Thomas has capably
represented himself since 2004 in this roller coaster of a
bankruptcy. In the third appeal to this Court arising out of
those proceedings, Thomas argues that the Bankruptcy Court
erred by denying his motion for civil contempt against the City
of Philadelphia and a related party. He is correct.

-- 1 of 23 --

2
After Thomas spent years working to resolve his debts,
the Bankruptcy Court issued a discharge order. The finality of
a discharge is one of the historic cornerstones of the consumer
bankruptcy process. The City violated Thomas’s discharge by
seeking to collect on liens relating to one of his properties. We
previously described those debt-collection efforts as a
“dereliction.” Thomas v. City of Philadelphia, 759 F. App’x
110, 112 (3d Cir. 2019).1 The District Court also took a dim
view. See id. at 111. These proceedings have not assuaged
those concerns.
What makes this appeal a close call is that in 2013, years
after the discharge, the Bankruptcy Court issued a sua sponte
ruling relating to a separate property, which wrongly indicated
that Thomas had failed to provide the City with constitutionally
adequate notice of his bankruptcy plan. We have already held
that the Bankruptcy Court’s narrow alternative ruling is not
entitled to preclusive effect with respect to the two different
properties now at issue. See Thomas v. City of Philadelphia,
682 F. App’x 174, 177-78 (3d Cir. 2017). The City tells us
nevertheless that it relied on the Bankruptcy Court’s
constitutional surplusage when initiating debt-collection
litigation relating to those different properties in state court.
Civil contempt is not appropriate when there is an
objective, fair ground supporting the violator’s position. The
City’s arguments, however, do not clear that threshold based
on the unique facts of this case. The Bankruptcy Court was
wrong in 2013, and the City’s attempts to suggest otherwise
fail. In fact, the City had extensive actual notice of Thomas’s
1 Unless otherwise indicated, case quotations omit all internal
citations, quotation marks, footnotes, alterations, and
subsequent history.

-- 2 of 23 --

3
bankruptcy case, including notice of the confirmation hearing,
the confirmation order, and the discharge order. In addition to
actual notice, the City participated selectively by filing claims
as a creditor but skipping key parts of the proceedings. The
evidence of the City’s actual notice is so strong that there was
no reasonable basis for the City to argue that a due process
violation excused compliance with the discharge. Tellingly,
the City made no such argument until after the Bankruptcy
Court’s 2013 sua sponte ruling.
Just as significant to the contempt analysis as the City’s
actual notice, if not more so, is the fact that the City improperly
tried to extend the 2013 ruling to different properties. We do
not here suggest that civil contempt sanctions would be
appropriate where a litigant reasonably relies on a judicial
decision. But that is not what the City did. The City decided
on its own that the Bankruptcy Court’s narrow alternative
reasoning applied to other properties too. In doing so, the City
violated well-established law by resorting to a self-help
violation of the discharge order years after it became final. See,
e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628,
637 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc).
Because of the City’s actual notice and inappropriate
unilateral extension of the 2013 ruling, which was wrong as a
matter of law, civil contempt sanctions are warranted.
Accordingly, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand
for evaluation of the scope of the City’s violation and
calculation of damages based on the City’s contempt.
I.
These proceedings have spanned more than two
decades. Below we summarize the pertinent facts relating to

-- 3 of 23 --

4
(A) the 2005 confirmation of Thomas’s bankruptcy plan and
2009 discharge order; (B) Thomas’s efforts to rely on the
discharge to ward off post-discharge debt-collection efforts
relating to a property not at issue in this appeal, which resulted
in the Bankruptcy Court’s 2013 sua sponte ruling that the City
did not receive constitutionally adequate notice of the
confirmation; (C) similar debt-collection litigation relating to
the two properties at issue in this appeal, which included a
remand from this Court on the basis that the 2013 ruling was
not preclusive; (D) the District Court’s finding on remand that
the City had violated the discharge order, which resulted in a
second remand from this Court because only the Bankruptcy
Court had jurisdiction to address Thomas’s contempt
allegations in the first instance; and (E) the contempt
proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court that led us to this point.
A.
Thomas commenced the Chapter 13 bankruptcy process
in January 2004. His initial filings included a proposed
bankruptcy plan as well as schedules disclosing liens on three
properties, which we will reference based on the numbers
associated with the properties’ addresses: the 1251 Property,
the 1618 Property, and the 1620 Property. For each Property,
Thomas identified the City as a creditor with a claim secured
by the property in question.
Generally speaking, secured liens like the ones Thomas
disclosed in 2004 are not affected by a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
unless the debtor takes affirmative steps to resolve them. See,
e.g., In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., 679 F.3d 132, 144-45 (3d
Cir. 2012). Thomas tried to do so through a lawful procedure
known as “lien stripping.” Id. at 144. He did this in two
phases.

-- 4 of 23 --

5
In phase one, on June 17, 2004, Thomas filed, among
other things, amended schedules, an amended bankruptcy plan,
and a cramdown motion relating to the 1618 and 1620
Properties. The purpose of the motion was to “cram” the value
of the City’s secured claims “down” to match the fair market
value of the Properties. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 1322(b),
1325(a)(5)(B). Thomas certified that he mailed the cramdown
motion and a separate notice document to the City’s Municipal
Services Building. The notice informed the City that Thomas
had filed a “Motion to cra[m]down . . . Reducing the value of
your claim,” and that there was a hearing scheduled for August
19, 2004. SA31-32. The notice also warned the City: “Your
rights may be affected. You should read these papers carefully
and discuss them with your attorney . . . .” SA31.
On July 17, 2004, with the cramdown motion still
pending, Thomas submitted proof of claims on behalf of the
City relating to the 1251 and 1618 Properties. Thomas
indicated that the City had claims on both Properties based on
unpaid taxes and other bills, and that both claims were secured
by the Properties. Thomas certified that he mailed the claim
relating to the 1251 Property to the City’s Municipal Services
Building.
The City filed a separate claim relating to the 1618
Property. The signature on the City’s claim is dated July 20,
2004, but the document’s electronic stamp from the
Bankruptcy Court’s online filing system is dated August 26,
2004. The City’s claim indicated that Thomas owed almost
$20,000 in taxes.
The City did not appear at the August 19, 2004 hearing
on Thomas’s cramdown motion or otherwise oppose the
motion. The Bankruptcy Court granted the motion on August

-- 5 of 23 --

6
26, 2004. Based on that ruling, Thomas’s debts to the City
were bifurcated into secured and unsecured components.
In phase two of the lien-stripping strategy, Thomas
persuaded the Chapter 13 Trustee and the Bankruptcy Court
that he could resolve his debts through a payment plan that
covered the City’s secured claims and “stripped” the
remaining, unsecured portions of the liens. As part of that
process, Thomas filed amended bankruptcy plans in September
and November 2004. There is no evidence that he served the
plans on the City.
On January 11, 2005, the Bankruptcy Court scheduled
the final confirmation hearing for later that month. The court
mailed the scheduling order to the City at the Municipal
Services Building and the City’s Law Department. Following
the hearing, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed Thomas’s third
amended bankruptcy plan on February 22, 2005. The court
mailed the confirmation order to the City at the same two
locations.
Thomas paid more than $23,000 pursuant to the
confirmation order. The Bankruptcy Court issued a discharge
order on September 3, 2009. The clerk mailed copies of the
discharge order to the City. There was no appeal of the
discharge order.
B.
Unbeknownst to Thomas, the City had transferred some
of the liens on the 1251 Property prior to the Chapter 13
proceedings. In late 2005, while Thomas was making
payments pursuant to the confirmed plan, a bank filed a
petition seeking a sheriff’s sale of the 1251 Property in

-- 6 of 23 --

7
Philadelphia County’s Court of Common Pleas. Thomas
notified the bank of the Bankruptcy Court’s confirmation
order, and the bank convinced the state court to hold the
proceedings in abeyance until after the discharge order in 2009.
Following the discharge, the bank resumed the collection
process.
In 2012, Thomas challenged the bank’s efforts by
initiating a lawsuit against several parties, including the City
and a different bank that had taken possession of the liens on
the 1251 Property. The City argued in a motion to dismiss that
the federal Tax Injunction Act and Pennsylvania’s Municipal
Claims and Tax Liens Act barred the relief Thomas sought.
The City did not claim that it lacked notice of the bankruptcy
or make any arguments sounding in due process. In response,
the District Court construed Thomas’s suit as a motion to
reopen the bankruptcy proceedings and transferred the matter
to the Bankruptcy Court.
In an adversarial proceeding relating to Thomas’s
Chapter 13 case, the Bankruptcy Court construed Thomas’s
claims against the City as alleging violations of the
confirmation order. The City largely rested on the dismissal
motion that it filed with the District Court. There was no
mention of notice or due process.
In a 2013 ruling, the Bankruptcy Court sided with the
City and the other defendants. The court’s principal holding
was that the operative bankruptcy plan did not provide for the
discharge of some of the liens on the 1251 Property.
Consequently, the court held, the liens passed through the
bankruptcy unaffected. The Bankruptcy Court also asserted
that the City “cannot be bound by the Confirmed Plan due to
lack of notice” under the Due Process Clause. In re Thomas,

-- 7 of 23 --

8
497 B.R. 188, 206 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013). Thomas failed to
perfect an appeal of that ruling.
C.
Beginning in 2014, the City commenced collection
actions in Philadelphia County relating to the 1618 and 1620
Properties. In 2015, the state court appointed a sequestrator to
collect rents relating to the 1618 Property and authorized a
sheriff’s sale of the 1620 Property. The 1620 Property was sold
to a third party in July 2015.
Thomas sued in federal court again. He sought
injunctive relief and damages relating to alleged violations of
the 2009 discharge order. Without actually contending that
there was a lack of notice, the City argued that claim preclusion
applied to the Bankruptcy Court’s 2013 notice ruling. The
District Court disposed of Thomas’s allegations on that basis.
We vacated the District Court’s decision. Claim
preclusion did not apply because Thomas’s claims relating to
the 1618 and 1620 Properties were not identical to the ones the
Bankruptcy Court resolved prior to the discharge order relating
to the 1251 Property. Issue preclusion did not apply because,
among other reasons, Thomas was not given a fair opportunity
to litigate notice in the prior proceedings. We therefore
remanded the case so that the notice issue could be addressed
on the merits in the context of Thomas’s pending claims
relating to the 1618 and 1620 Properties.
D.
On remand, the City admitted at a July 2017 status
conference that it had notice of the bankruptcy. The City also

-- 8 of 23 --

9
informed the District Court that, in June 2015, a sheriff’s sale
on the 1618 Property had been stayed and the 1620 Property
had been sold. Following the conference, the City moved for
judgment on the pleadings based on the argument that there is
no private cause of action for alleged violations of the
bankruptcy discharge. As before, the City did not press the due
process issue that the Bankruptcy Court had raised sua sponte
in 2013.
In August 2017, the District Court held an evidentiary
hearing on Thomas’s pending claims. The parties stipulated
that the City had notice of the 2004 bankruptcy proceedings.
In light of that stipulation, at the suggestion of the District
Court, the City agreed to dismiss the state-court collection
action relating to the 1618 Property. The City refused to yield
with respect to the 1620 Property based on arguments relating
to post-confirmation unpaid taxes. Following the hearing, the
District Court denied the City’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings and held the City in civil contempt for violating the
discharge order.
We vacated the District Court’s contempt judgment on
jurisdictional grounds and remanded. See Thomas, 759 F.
App’x at 112. In doing so, we explained that any remedy for
the City’s “dereliction” had to come from the Bankruptcy
Court. Id.
E.
Following the second remand, the District Court
transferred the matter back to the Bankruptcy Court, which
addressed Thomas’s contempt allegations in a new adversarial
proceeding. In a motion for summary judgment, the City once
again conceded that it had general notice of the bankruptcy

-- 9 of 23 --

10
prior to entry of the discharge order. The City also
acknowledged that it had filed two proofs of claim prior to that
order. The City nevertheless argued that contempt was
inappropriate because the confirmed plan was not binding due
to lack of notice, the City had reasonably relied on the
Bankruptcy Court’s 2013 sua sponte notice ruling, and certain
of the liens passed through the bankruptcy unaffected.
The Bankruptcy Court credited each of the City’s
arguments and declined to hold the City in contempt. See In re
Thomas, 626 B.R. 804, 808 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2021). The
District Court affirmed. See Thomas v. City of Philadelphia,
658 B.R. 104, 115-16 (E.D. Pa. 2024). Thomas timely
appealed.
II.
The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 157(b) and 1334(b). The District Court had
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291. We
review the Bankruptcy Court’s factual findings for clear error
and conduct de novo review of legal conclusions. In re Smith,
102 F.4th 643, 650 n.13 (3d Cir. 2024).
III.
Thomas met his burden under the traditional standards
governing compensatory civil contempt with respect to the
1618 Property. The narrow alternative constitutional ruling in
the Bankruptcy Court’s 2013 decision was wrong. The City
has never defended that ruling with evidence. Nor could it.
Because the City had actual notice of the discharge order and
opportunities to challenge it, there was no fair ground for the

-- 10 of 23 --

11
City to try to extend the ruling beyond the 1251 Property to
which it applied. The City’s approach ignored our case law
prohibiting self-help. That strategy was anathema to the
historic and important function of the discharge, as well as to
the finality that is crucial to the operation of the Bankruptcy
Code. All that remains to be done on remand is develop an
evidentiary record to facilitate determinations regarding the
scope of the City’s violation and the calculation of appropriate
compensatory damages relating to the 1618 Property.
We reach a different conclusion with respect to the 1620
Property. Thomas presented no evidence that he met his
payment obligations under the confirmation order with respect
to that Property, and therefore failed to meet his burden of
establishing that the City violated the injunction. The gap in
proof left the City with an objectively reasonable argument that
the injunction did not apply to that debt. Therefore, civil
contempt is not appropriate as to the 1620 Property.
A.
Discharge orders are too important to the modern
bankruptcy process to be casually ignored by creditors. The
concept of discharging debts dates back hundreds of years. See
4 Anne, c.17, § 7 (1705). At English common law, the
discharge was a means of making “full amends” to debtors for
the “rigor and severity” of bankruptcy practice at the time,
which required debtors to make disclosures “upon pain of
death.” 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England 482 (1768). Bankruptcy practice in the United States
has become less severe over time, at least in some ways, but

-- 11 of 23 --

12
Congress provided for a debtor’s discharge in each version of
the bankruptcy code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 524, 1328.2
The teeth of a discharge order is an injunction that
prohibits efforts to collect debts within the order’s scope. See
11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2)-(3). Courts have the authority, and an
obligation, to enforce these injunctions. See id. § 105(a). This
includes the imposition of coercive and compensatory
contempt sanctions based on the “traditional standards in
equity practice for determining when a party may be held in
civil contempt for violating an injunction.” Taggart v.
Lorenzen, 587 U.S. 554, 561 (2019); see also Judiciary Act of
1789, Pub. L. No. 1-20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83 (1789); 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 282 (1768)
(“For laws, without a competent authority to secure their
administration from disobedience and contempt, would be vain
and nugatory.”).
These traditional standards require the proponent of a
civil-contempt motion to establish three elements by clear and
convincing evidence: “(1) that a valid order of the court
existed; (2) that the defendants had knowledge of the order;
and (3) that the defendants disobeyed the order.” Marshak v.
Treadwell, 595 F.3d 478, 485 (3d Cir. 2009). Where a debtor
alleges that a creditor violated a discharge order, the third civil-
contempt element requires the debtor to demonstrate that there
2 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act of 1800, Pub. L. No. 6-19, § 34, 2
Stat. 19, 30-31 (1800); Bankruptcy Act of 1841, Pub. L. No.
27-9, § 4, 5 Stat. 440, 443 (1841); Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
Pub. L. No. 55-541, § 14, 30 Stat. 544, 550 (1898); Act of Oct.
19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-467, § 3, 84 Stat. 990, 991 (1970);
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 524,
92 Stat. 2549, 2592 (1978).

-- 12 of 23 --

13
was “no fair ground of doubt as to whether the order barred the
creditor’s conduct.” Taggart, 587 U.S. at 557; Fox v. Cap. Co.,
96 F.2d 684, 686 (3d Cir. 1938); see also Sugar v. Burnett, 130
F.4th 358, 374 (4th Cir. 2025) (applying Taggart to Chapter 13
discharge order). The standard is “generally an objective one.”
Taggart, 587 U.S. at 561. Subjective good faith is of
exceedingly limited relevance. See id. at 561-62; FTC v. Lane
Labs-USA, Inc., 624 F.3d 575, 590 n.18 (3d Cir. 2010); Robin
Woods Inc. v. Woods, 28 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1994).
B.
Thomas met his burden on the first and second elements
of civil contempt. The Bankruptcy Court’s discharge order was
a “valid order” that applied to the City, and the City “had
knowledge of the [discharge] order.” Marshak, 595 F.3d at
486. The City’s contemporaneous notice of the confirmation
and discharge orders afforded it multiple opportunities to make
a timely due-process claim. Having squandered that
opportunity, the City was not free to disregard the application
of the discharge to the 1618 Property in state-court proceedings
and then collaterally attack the injunction in response to
Thomas’s contempt allegations. In addition to that procedural
error, the City’s actual notice of the injunction and other court
filings, coupled with selective participation in the bankruptcy,
renders its constitutional arguments meritless.
1.
In 2019, we remanded this case so that the Bankruptcy
Court could determine whether there would be “any remedy
for the City’s dereliction.” Thomas, 759 F. App’x at 112. In
the fresh contempt proceeding that followed, the City argued
that the discharge order did not apply to the 1618 and 1620

-- 13 of 23 --

14
Properties because it did not receive due process in the
bankruptcy. The City’s constitutional attack was procedurally
defective.
With few exceptions that are not relevant here, we have
essentially forbidden a litigant from violating a final injunction
and then challenging the injunction’s validity in the resulting
contempt proceedings. See Marshak, 595 F.3d at 486; see also
Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 871 (3d Cir. 1990).
This “long-standing rule” favors recourse to the courts over the
City’s flawed self-help approach. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S.
56, 69 (1948); see also Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 364-65
(1929).
In this context, “strong policy reasons” support the
general prohibition on collateral attacks as a defense to civil
contempt. Halderman, 673 F.2d at 637. Requiring the party
subject to the injunction to bring a legal challenge before
intentionally violating the final order ensures notice to other
interested parties, adversarial testing, and a fair opportunity for
unbiased judicial resolution. See id. Discouraging post-
judgment collateral attacks also mitigates the “prospect of
perpetual relitigation” of an injunction. Id. That consideration
is particularly compelling in this case based on the significance
of the discharge procedure and the finality maxim that
“anchors bankruptcy law.” In re Smith, 102 F.4th at 655; In re
Fesq, 153 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[I]f courts should
relax provisions of the law and facilitate the assertion of old
claims against discharged and reorganized debtors, the policy
of the law would be defeated.”). Therefore, under the unique
circumstances presented—including the City’s timely, actual
notice of the confirmation and the discharge—the City was
foreclosed from collaterally attacking the final § 524(a)
injunction in Thomas’s contempt proceedings.

-- 14 of 23 --

15
2.
Because of the City’s actual notice, the City’s
constitutional challenge to the discharge order was also
meritless. See United States Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559
U.S. 260, 272 (2010).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to “person[s].” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The
Bankruptcy Court took for granted that this provision covers a
municipal corporation like the City, which is a subdivision of
the Commonwealth. See Grazier ex rel. White v. City of
Philadelphia, 328 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 2003). The Clause’s
reach in this case is not as obvious to us. See Pennsylvania v.
Riley, 84 F.3d 125, 130 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996); see also South
Dakota v. DOI, 665 F.3d 986, 990 n.4 (8th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Cardinal Mine Supply, Inc., 916 F.2d 1087, 1090 (6th
Cir. 1990). We have no doubt, however, that the City received
all of the notice that any “person” was due under the
Constitution.
The Constitution “requires ‘notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections.’” Wright v. Owens
Corning, 679 F.3d 101, 108 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Mullane v.
Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
Constitutional due process is not governed by the thicket of
statutory provisions and rules that establish procedural notice
requirements in bankruptcy proceedings. See Espinosa, 559
U.S. at 272. There are no bright-line rules.
The City conceded in the Bankruptcy Court, the District
Court, and this Court that it was aware of the “pendency of the

-- 15 of 23 --

16
action” prior to entry of the discharge order. Mullane, 339 U.S.
at 314. The City’s concessions of actual notice were
unavoidable. The Bankruptcy Court’s docket sheet
demonstrates attempts to mail at least 11 filings to the City.
Among those filings were Thomas’s claim forms, scheduling
orders relating to Thomas’s cramdown motion and
confirmation hearings, the confirmation order, and the
discharge order.3 Notice of the final confirmation hearing, the
confirmation order, and the discharge were each mailed to the
City’s preferred service address at the Law Department.
The City’s actual notice of the confirmation and
discharge, which it did not deny in the Bankruptcy Court,
provided adequate opportunities to bring a timely
constitutional challenge to either or both of those orders. See
Halderman, 673 F.2d at 637 (“[I]t cannot be said that this is a
case in which no other route to appellate review except self-
help was available to the contemnors.”). The City filed no such
challenges. At no point prior to the Bankruptcy Court’s 2013
ruling did the City suggest any problems with notice or
Thomas’s service. For example, the claim forms filed by the
City in 2004 and 2006 had a box for the City to indicate that it
3 The 11 mailings were: (1) notice of the first creditors’
meeting; (2) the Bankruptcy Court’s initial dismissal of
Thomas’s petition; (3) the Trustee’s motion to reinstate the
proceedings; (4) the Bankruptcy Court’s reinstatement order;
(5) Thomas’s proof of claim relating to the 1251 Property;
(6) Thomas’s cramdown motion, which specifically identified
the 1618 and 1620 Properties; (7) a notice of the hearing on
Thomas’s cramdown motion; (8-9) two scheduling orders
relating to the confirmation hearing; (10) the confirmation
order; and (11) the discharge order.

-- 16 of 23 --

17
had “never received any notices from the bankruptcy court in
this case.” SA40, 42. The City did not check that box on either
form. The selective participation in the proceedings
demonstrated by the City’s own filings largely dooms the
suggestion that notice was constitutionally defective. See In re
Congoleum Corp., 149 F.4th 318, 333 (3d Cir. 2025).
On appeal, the City focuses much of its defense on
notice of Thomas’s cramdown motion and the Bankruptcy
Court’s ruling on that motion. Not a good strategy. The
operative document in the contempt proceedings was the
discharge order rather than earlier filings in the bankruptcy. To
the extent the cramdown motion is relevant, the City
“acknowledge[d]” in the Bankruptcy Court—and fails to
persuasively dispute here—that “it had notice of the
Cramdown Motion and did not respond to it.” In re Thomas,
626 B.R. at 816 n.11. Thomas mailed a notice of the hearing
on the cramdown motion to the Municipal Services Building,
but the City did not show up.
Likewise, the Bankruptcy Court used understated terms
to correctly point out that, “having received notice of an
upcoming confirmation hearing, the City could (and maybe
should have) have taken steps to ascertain what was in the
proposed plan.” In re Thomas, 626 B.R. at 820-21. The City
sat out the confirmation hearing too. See In re Szostek, 886
F.2d 1405, 1413 (3d Cir. 1989) (“The general rule is that the
acceptance of the plan by a secured creditor can be inferred by
the absence of an objection.”). The City “was not entitled to
stick its head in the sand and pretend it would not lose any
rights by not participating in the proceedings.” In re Pence,
905 F.2d 1107, 1109 (7th Cir. 1990). It “ha[d] notice that its
claim[s] might be affected and ignored the ensuing

-- 17 of 23 --

18
proceedings to its peril.” In re Blendheim, 803 F.3d 477, 498
(9th Cir. 2015).
Now seeking to avoid that peril, the City contends that
a due process violation resulted from Thomas’s mailing of the
cramdown papers to the Municipal Services Building instead
of the City’s Law Department. In light of the evidence of
actual notice, including with respect to the cramdown motion,
this contention borders on disingenuous. See In re Medaglia,
52 F.3d 451, 455 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[I]t is well established that
due process is not offended by requiring a person with actual,
timely knowledge of an event that may affect a right to exercise
due diligence and take necessary steps to preserve that right.”).
Critically, the City offered no evidence to the Bankruptcy
Court—such as a sworn declaration setting forth facts—
demonstrating that the City did not actually receive any
particular documents.
The City also complains that Thomas sometimes used
what it says is the wrong street address for the Municipal
Services Building. The docket sheet reveals that the
Bankruptcy Court first used the allegedly incorrect address and
that the court continued to do so later in the proceedings. See
ECF No. 20 at 2, In re Thomas, No. 04-10175 (E.D. Pa. Bankr.
2004). Thomas’s use of an address deemed relevant by the
court was reasonably calculated to provide adequate notice
under the circumstances. And there is no question that the
Bankruptcy Court mailed notice of the confirmation hearing,
the confirmation order, and the discharge order to the Law
Department and to the street address for the Municipal Services
Building that the City does not dispute. So we reject the City’s
efforts to constitutionalize its street address.

-- 18 of 23 --

19
Having lost sight of the operative § 524(a) injunction
relevant to the contempt proceedings, the City’s next line of
defense is to adopt the Bankruptcy Court’s emphasis on
Thomas’s failure to mail copies of his bankruptcy plans to the
City. This approach fares no better. Our divided decision in In
re Mansaray-Ruffin does not support the Bankruptcy Court’s
incorporation of bankruptcy procedure into the Fourteenth
Amendment. See 530 F.3d 230 (3d Cir. 2008). Mansaray
involved distinctive circumstances not present in this case: a
dispute over the validity of a lien, rather than Thomas’s lien
stripping, secured by property that was the debtor’s homestead,
which is not true of the 1618 and 1620 Properties. Id. at 242-
43; see also In re Scarborough, 461 F.3d 406, 409-10 (3d Cir.
2006) (discussing 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)). Mansaray’s
holding is limited by those features and the adversarial-
proceeding procedures that they implicated. Any dicta in
Mansaray suggesting more generally that a violation of
bankruptcy procedures constitutes a per se due process
violation did not survive the Supreme Court’s decision in
Espinosa. See 559 U.S. at 272; see also In re Smith, 102 F.4th
at 656 (describing “our own precedent favoring finality over a
plan’s compliance with the Bankruptcy Code”); In re
Semcrude, L.P., 728 F.3d 314, 322-23 (3d Cir. 2013). In light
of all of the other forms of notice and selective participation by
the City, service defects relating to the bankruptcy plans did
not violate due process.
The older cases cited by the City are equally unavailing,
as they establish little more than the proposition that general
awareness of a bankruptcy, such as through publication notice,
did not satisfy the due process rights of certain creditors in
those cases. See City of New York v. New York, N. H. & H. R.
Co., 344 U.S. 293, 296 (1953). Because due process analysis

-- 19 of 23 --

20
is inherently fact specific, and this case is different, our
constitutional holding does not place the type of burden on
creditors that concerned the Harbor Tank panel. See 385 F.2d
at 115. The City (1) conceded general notice of the
bankruptcy; (2) selectively participated in the proceedings by
filing claims but failing to attend important hearings; and
(3) had actual notice of the confirmation and discharge orders
as well as other parts of the case. Based on those
considerations, we hold that there was no due process
violation.
C.
We now turn to the third contempt element, which
presents the closest question in the appeal. We hold that there
is no fair ground for doubt that the City “disobeyed the
[discharge] order” with respect to the 1618 Property. Marshak,
595 F.3d at 486; see also Taggart, 587 U.S. at 562. On the
other hand, Thomas failed to meet his burden of demonstrating
that a violation occurred as to the 1620 Property.
Starting with the 1618 Property, our contempt holding
is based on the collective force of four considerations. First,
the City had no reasonable basis to violate the discharge order
on the theory that a due process violation had occurred earlier
in the case. The evidence of the City’s actual notice dating
back to 2004 is overwhelming. Consistent with the weight of
the proof, the City did not even make constitutional arguments
until after the Bankruptcy Court did so on its own. And the
City’s “actual notice . . . . more than satisfied [its] due process
rights.” Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 272.
Second, even ignoring that the Bankruptcy Court’s
reasoning was incorrect, the narrow alternative ruling was an

-- 20 of 23 --

21
inexcusably thin reed. As we pointed out before, the 2013
decision arose in the context of allegations relating to a
different property based on arguments that nobody had made.
See Thomas, 682 F. App’x at 177. Ironically, given the City’s
current position on notice, it was Thomas who “lacked a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in that [2013]
proceeding.” Id. The City crossed the line between arguably-
acceptable reliance on the court’s dicta and civil contempt by
trying to stretch the ruling to apply to the 1618 Property.
Third, the City’s unilateral extension of the ruling was
made worse by the fact that the City only pressed the due
process argument in court in response to Thomas’s contempt
allegations. Longstanding case law prohibited that kind of
collateral attack to an applicable and otherwise-final
injunction. See, e.g., Halderman, 673 F.2d at 637; see also
Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 190 (1922) (“It is for the court
of first instance to determine the question of the validity of the
law, and until its decision is reversed for error by orderly
review, . . . its orders based on its decision are to be respected,
and disobedience of them is contempt of its lawful authority, to
be punished.”).
Fourth, the City’s reliance on the Bankruptcy Court’s
2013 ruling is, at most, suggestive of subjective good faith.
That mindset is of no help to the City right now. See Taggart,
587 U.S. at 561. On remand, the City may seek to address
whether and to what extent good faith is relevant to the
calculation of damages. When the Supreme Court suggested
in Taggart that good faith can bear on the appropriate civil
contempt sanction, the Court cited a case that is more relevant
to coercing compliance than the compensation that Thomas
seeks. See id. at 562 (citing Young v. United States ex rel.
Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 801 (1987)). If good faith

-- 21 of 23 --

22
is relevant to compensatory contempt sanctions, which we do
not resolve in this opinion, and if the City proves that it acted
in good faith with evidence rather than unsworn claims in
briefs, it may still be hard for the court to ignore the way the
City’s lawyers repeatedly failed to substantiate the claimed
lack of notice and then immediately abandoned the
contemptuous debt-collection action when pressed by the
District Court in 2017. In any event, what matters in this
appeal is that good faith alone is not a meritorious response to
Thomas’s showing on the contempt elements. The City’s
violation of the discharge resulted from a conscious choice that
was “not technical or inadvertent.” Woods, 28 F.3d at 399; see
also Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Morris, 19 F.3d 142, 149 (3d Cir.
1994). Therefore, Thomas met his burden of establishing
contempt as to the 1618 Property.
We reach a different conclusion with respect to the 1620
Property, which illustrates the proper application of the “fair
ground of doubt” standard from Taggart. Although Thomas’s
confirmed plan addressed at least some of the City’s liens on
the 1620 Property, the Trustee’s pre-discharge report indicated
that Thomas did not make all of the payments required to strip
those liens. During the contempt proceedings, Thomas failed
to present any proof that the report was inaccurate or that he
made all of the necessary payments. In contrast to the
unreasonable justification proffered by the City for the
violation relating to the 1618 Property, Thomas’s evidentiary
deficiency left the City with an objectively reasonable
argument that seeking to collect debts relating to the 1620
Property did not violate the discharge order because those liens
passed through the bankruptcy unaffected. Thus, we agree
with the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court that Thomas

-- 22 of 23 --

23
is not entitled to contempt damages with respect to the 1620
Property.
IV.
In sum, we hold that the City had constitutionally
adequate notice of the bankruptcy proceedings, and that
Thomas established that the City engaged in civil contempt
with respect to the 1618 Property. This is an atypical case with
a peculiar procedural history, and our contempt holding is
confined to the facts at issue. Based on those facts, we will
affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand to the District Court
with instructions to remand to the Bankruptcy Court for
purposes of determining the scope of the violation and
calculating damages after developing an evidentiary record
consistent with the concerns raised in this opinion.
Appellant pro se
Milton Thomas, Sr. [Argued]
Counsel for Appellee
Jennifer MacNaughton
Adam R. Zurbriggen [Argued]
City of Philadelphia Law Department
Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae
Rodney S. Roberts, Jr.
Claire R. Cahill [Argued]
Williams & Connolly

-- 23 of 23 --