Karlester Young v. KIP HALLMAN, President of Wellpath Holdings

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 24-1920
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KARLESTER YOUNG,
Appellant
v.
KIP HALLMAN, President of Wellpath Holdings; PAUL NOEL, Chief Medical
Director; JOHN OR JANE DOE, Chief Assistant Medical Director; JOHN OR JANE
DOE HEPATITIS C TREATMENT COMMITTEE; BRITNAY HUNER; ANTHONY
LITIZIO; S. O’NEILL; MONIQUE SAVAGE; JEANNE DE FRANGESCO; CORINA
CAMPOS; STEPHAN KAMINSKI; VANESSA AMOAH OTI-AKENTEN; JAMIE
SORBER; THOMAS PANDURN; D. VARNER; KERI MOORE; JORGE DOMINICS;
JOHN E. WETZEL, GEORGE LITTLE, Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections, in their individual and official capacities; WELLPATH HOLDINGS, LLC
(Wellpath); PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, in their official
capacities
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-00268)
District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 7, 2026
Before: BIBAS, CHUNG, and BOVE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed April 13, 2026)

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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Appellant Karlester Young, a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding pro se and in
forma pauperis, appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint.
Medical Appellees1 have also filed a motion to dismiss that is before this Court. For the
following reasons, the motion is granted, we dismiss the claims against those defendants,
and we will otherwise affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I.
Young was diagnosed with the Hepatitis C virus (“HCV”) for the first time within
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) in 2012. In the years since, his
regular blood tests have consistently shown an undetectable viral load of HCV—meaning
he is considered cured, and no longer has chronic HCV. Young’s complaint arises from
the DOC’s refusal, per those test results, to treat his HCV with direct-acting antiviral
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1 Young filed suit against several contract medical providers, the DOC, numerous DOC
employees, Wellpath Holdings, LLC—the corporate healthcare provider at SCI-
Phoenix—and several of its employees. Wellpath and its named employees constitute the
“Medical Appellees.”

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drugs (DAADs), which are the recommended treatment for patients with chronic HCV.2
After filing his complaint, Young requested and was appointed counsel, who later
withdrew. Prior to and following counsel’s withdrawal, all named defendants filed
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Young was not appointed new counsel and
proceeded pro se. On January 29, 2024, the District Court granted all pending motions to
dismiss. Young timely filed two post-judgment motions, which the District Court denied.
Young timely appealed.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of a District Court’s
decision to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is plenary,
see Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 2016), and we review denials of
2 Young refers to the standards for treatment of HCV set by the Center for Disease
Control and American Association for the Study of Liver Diseases (“AASLD”) in his
filings. See ECF 3 at 27-29. He argues that the DOC’s policy does not meet these
standards because they recommend administering DAADs to anyone with chronic HCV.
However, according to those same standards, because he has an undetectable viral load,
Young does not currently have chronic HCV and is considered cured. See AASLD &
Infectious Diseases Society of America, When and in Whom to Initiate HCV Therapy
(2022), https://www.hcvguidelines.org/evaluate/when-whom; see also In re Burlington
Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that courts may
consider “a document integral to or explicitly relief upon in the complaint” at the motion
to dismiss stage) (internal quotations omitted). Any confusion about whether Young has
active HCV today may stem from the fact that HCV antibody tests only show whether a
patient has ever been infected—the follow-up RNA test is used to determine whether an
active infection requiring treatment exists by assessing viral load. See AASLD &
Infectious Diseases Society of America, HCV Testing and Linkage to Care (2022),
https://www.hcvguidelines.org/evaluate/testing-and-linkage.

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motions for leave to amend for abuse of discretion. See Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc.,
662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011). We “accept all factual allegations as true and construe
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Curry, 835 F.3d at 337.
Because Young is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings liberally. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, pro se litigants still
must “abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). To present an issue for review, a
litigant’s opening brief must include, among other things, a statement of the issues, the
legal argument explaining why the district court decided the issues incorrectly, and the
facts and legal authorities supporting that argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a). Thus, an
appellant’s failure to raise an issue in the opening brief, even when proceeding pro se,
renders it forfeited. See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016).
In his complaint, Young raised claims for alleged violations of his rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, Eighth Amendment, Fifth Amendment,
and Fourth Amendment. He also raised state law negligence and medical malpractice
claims. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the District Court erred in
considering evidence outside the scope of the pleadings; (2) the dismissal of his Eighth
Amendment claims; and (3) the District Court’s denial of leave to amend.
III.

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Before turning to the merits of Young’s appeal, we must first address Medical
Appellees’ motion to dismiss. This appeal was stayed in December after Wellpath
entered bankruptcy proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. § 362. Medical Appellees now move to
dismiss all claims against them, arguing that because Young did not opt out of the third-
party release of claims in bankruptcy court by July 30, 2025, he is enjoined from taking
any action, including the commencement, further prosecution of, or collection efforts
against Medical Appellees. This is consistent with the language of the First Amended
Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Wellpath Holdings, Inc. and Certain of its
Debtor Affiliates. Young neither responded to the motion to dismiss nor addressed it in
his reply brief. However, even if he had opposed the motion, the Bankruptcy Plan
provides that the bankruptcy court retains jurisdiction over any issue with respect to the
third-party releases. Thus, unless the bankruptcy court rules otherwise, Young is enjoined
from pursuing this litigation against Medical Appellees. The motion to dismiss is granted.
IV.
Young argues that the District Court erred by considering evidence outside the
scope of the pleadings in evaluating the motions to dismiss. The gist of his argument
appears to be that the District Court improperly relied on the fact that Young has been
told repeatedly by DOC medical staff that he has an undetectable viral load.
While Young challenges the dismissal of his Eighth Amendment claims for a
variety of reasons, we discern no error in that ruling and agree with the District Court that

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the defendants’ refusal to administer DAADs to Young does not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. To state an Eighth
Amendment claim against prison officials for failure to provide basic medical treatment,
Young must plausibly allege “(1) that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to [his]
medical needs and (2) that those needs were serious.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192,
197 (3d Cir. 1999).
Even assuming the physical symptoms Young is experiencing amount to a serious
medical need absent a chronic HCV diagnosis, he has not plausibly alleged defendants’
deliberate indifference. To the extent Young alleges any of the defendants are responsible
for refusing to treat him, the defendants’ refusal to provide Young’s preferred treatment
does not meet the relevant standard. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir.
2004) (explaining that “mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” is
insufficient for establishing deliberate indifference) (quoting Monmouth Cnty. Corr.
Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987)). And there are no
indications that the DOC has otherwise refused to assess or treat these symptoms. Indeed,
Young states that, after being told he would not be treated for HCV, he was encouraged
to sign up for sick call if he felt ill. That Young may have been dissatisfied with the
course of treatment he received is insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim. See White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990).
Therefore, the District Court properly dismissed these claims.

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Finally, Young challenges the District Court’s denial of his request for leave to
amend his complaint. Considering the foregoing, it would be futile to grant Young leave
to amend his complaint.3 The District Court therefore did not abuse its discretion in
denying the request. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir.
2002).
Accordingly, we grant the Medical Appellees’ motion to dismiss and dismiss the
appeal as to them, and otherwise we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
3 We also note that, at the outset of the case, Young was granted an extension of time to
move for leave to amend. However, instead of filing an amended complaint, Young
opposed the motions to dismiss.

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