C. ROBERT H. SHUMAR, JR.; CHERYL A. SHUMAR, husband and wife v. the Estate of Sondra Spaugy

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 24-2373
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C. ROBERT H. SHUMAR, JR.; CHERYL A. SHUMAR, husband and wife,
Appellants
v.
THE ESTATE OF SONDRA SPAUGY; PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE;
WESTMORELAND COUNTY; EXCELA HEALTH WESTMORELAND HOSPITAL;
EXCELA HEALTH FRICK HOSPITAL
______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2:21-cv-01132)
District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 2, 2025
Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion filed: May 21, 2025)
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OPINION∗
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MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judge.
In this appeal, Appellant argues that Appellees violated his constitutional rights by
temporarily detaining him for a mental health evaluation without determining whether the
∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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allegations that lead to the detention were made by a responsible party. Because
Appellees had no independent obligation to investigate the allegations, and because the
allegations, as presented, facially justified the detention, we will affirm.
On August 28, 2019, Sandra Spaugy presented herself to Excela Health Frick
Hospital (“Excela”) and requested that a “302 Warrant be issued for” her former landlord,
Robert Shumar. J.A. 17.1 Spaugy represented to Excela and Westmoreland County
(collectively, “Defendants”) that over the preceding six months, Shumar was “acting
really strange.” J.A. 33. Spaugy stated that “he ha[d] become really bossy and
controlling,” turned off tenants’ water after 8:00 PM nightly, was involuntarily “messing”
himself, and “threatened to hide in . . . [a] preschool and . . . hold it hostage until
everyone meets his demands.” Id. Spaugy also represented that Shumar threatened her
life and was “using narcotics, alcohol, fent[a]n[y]l, [and] mushrooms” within the last
thirty days. J.A. 33–34.
Based on Spaugy’s representations, the Westmoreland County Mental Delegate
and a Registered Nurse with Excela authorized a 302 Warrant. The Pennsylvania State
Police promptly executed the Warrant. They placed Shumar in handcuffs and took him
to Westmoreland Hospital. The hospital released Shumar just after midnight the next
day, without performing a medical examination.
1 A warrant issued pursuant to 50 P A . STAT . AND CONS . STAT . ANN . § 7302, colloquially a
“302 Warrant,” is a creature of the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act. As relevant here, if
a 302 Warrant is issued, the State may temporarily detain an allegedly “severely mentally
disabled” individual for medical evaluation. Id.

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One month later, Westmoreland County filed a criminal complaint against Spaugy
alleging unsworn falsification to authorities.2 Specifically, the County alleged that
Spaugy made a “written false statement . . . for a 302 [Warrant]” against Shumar though
she knew her allegations not to be true. J.A. 22. Spaugy passed away before the charges
against her could be fully adjudicated.
Shumar sued Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 19833 alleging that the events that
transpired on August 28, 2019, violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court
dismissed the § 1983 claim, and Shumar appealed.4
On appeal, Shumar posits that Defendants had an obligation to assess whether
Spaugy was a “responsible party” under § 73025 such that they could lawfully credit her
2 The 302 Warrant Application that Spaugy signed and submitted conspicuously provided
that “any person who purposefully provides any false information when completing this
form may be subject to criminal prosecution.” J.A. 39.
3 Shumar brought six claims against Defendants either individually or collectively; only
one claim, Shumar’s § 1983 claim, was federal. After Defendants moved to dismiss, the
District Court dismissed Shumar’s § 1983 claim and declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Shumar’s state-law claims.
4 We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss. Kalu v.
Spaulding, 113 F.4th 311, 324 (3d Cir. 2024) (citing Doe v. Univ. of Scis., 961 F.3d 203,
208 (3d Cir. 2020)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
5 For a 302 Warrant to issue there must be a “written application by a physician or other
responsible party setting forth facts constituting reasonable grounds to believe a person is
severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment.” 50 P A . STAT . AND
CONS . STAT . ANN . § 7302. (emphasis added). If this threshold requirement is met, “the
county administrator may issue a warrant requiring a person authorized by him, or any

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representations before moving forward with the 302 Warrant process against Shumar.
Opening Br. 11. According to Shumar, the District Court committed reversible error by
ignoring Defendants’ failure to perform their § 7302 “function as gatekeepers.” Id. But
so long as a 302 Warrant applicant “appear[s] responsible,” medical officials and county
administrators do not have an independent obligation to investigate a 302 Warrant
applicant’s representations beyond ensuring that those representations facially justify the
Warrant’s execution. Doby v. DeCrescenzo, 171 F.3d 858, 872 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Because
the [§] 7302 procedures exist to respond to emergency cases, it is reasonable for the
county delegate . . . to issue [302 W]arrants without independent investigation.”). This
Court has held that this is constitutionally appropriate in the context of a 302 Warrant
because “[t]he statutory requirement that the individual appear ‘responsible’ and the
warning on the application form that false statements can subject a petitioner to criminal
prosecution are sufficient safeguards . . . to assure the reliability of information
communicated to the delegate.” Id.
Here, Spaugy presented herself to Excela and, under penalty of perjury,
represented to Defendants that Shumar was “messing” himself, “threatened to hide in . . .
[a] preschool and . . . hold it hostage until everyone meets his demands,” and threatened
to kill her. J.A. 33. These allegations facially suggest that Shumar both had an inability
to care for himself and he posed an imminent threat of violence to others. That Spaugy
powered past the threat of criminal prosecution to effectuate her lies—a prosecution
peace officer, to take such person to the facility specified in the warrant” without
traditional due process. Id.

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which ultimately came to pass—is regrettable. But, as a legal matter, Defendants do not
bear the blame for Spaugy’s wrongdoing. Thus, we will affirm the District Court’s
judgment.

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