United States of America v. Mohamed A. Awad

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 24-2474
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MOHAMED A. AWAD,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 3:23-cr-00946-001)
District Judge: Hon. Michael A. Shipp
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 10, 2025
Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 15, 2025)
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OPINION*
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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PORTER, Circuit Judge.
Mohamed Awad fraudulently obtained loans that the government made available
to small businesses through the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act.
Awad received $2,410,140 based on numerous falsified applications, transferred the
money to his own accounts, including to some abroad, and withdrew significant amounts
of cash. Awad pleaded guilty to wire fraud and money laundering in accordance with a
plea agreement. The District Court sentenced Awad to 36 months’ imprisonment with
three years’ supervised release and ordered restitution.
Awad appealed. His counsel motioned to withdraw and submitted a brief in
support pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Awad did not file a pro se
brief. The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
When counsel seeks to withdraw under Anders, we ask two questions:
“(1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled [Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2’s]
requirements; and (2) whether an independent review of the record presents any
nonfrivolous issues.” United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).
Complying with Local Appellate Rule 109.2 requires counsel “(1) to satisfy the court that
counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues, and (2) to
explain why the issues are frivolous.” Id. (citing United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778,
780 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Counsel’s Anders brief does both. It correctly notes that because Awad’s case was
resolved by plea agreement, the only bases for appeal are the validity of the guilty plea

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and the legality of the sentence. With respect to Awad’s guilty plea, counsel
demonstrates, with appropriate citations to the transcript of Awad’s plea hearing, that
Awad’s plea comported with the dictates of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and
the Constitution. As for Awad’s sentence, counsel demonstrates, again with appropriate
citations to the transcript of Awad’s sentencing, that the District Court complied with the
requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, imposed a sentence below the
statutory maximum, and followed the three-step process for sentencing articulated in
United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). Counsel also explains that
because the District Court imposed a sentence of less than 51 months’ imprisonment, the
appellate waiver in Awad’s plea agreement bars challenge to his sentence, which was
below the Guidelines range. Counsel’s brief accordingly reflects a comprehensive and
conscientious examination of the record, and it sufficiently explains why this case
presents no non-frivolous issues. Our independent review of the record confirms that
contention.
We will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the District Court’s
judgment.

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