United States of America v. Randar Vasquez Munoz

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 24-2918
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RANDAR VASQUEZ MUNOZ,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands
(D.C. No. 3:21-cr-00001-002)
District Judge: Honorable Robert A. Molloy
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Argued on April 29, 2025
Before: RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and McKEE, Circuit
Judges
(Opinion filed: January 6, 2026)
Joseph A. DiRuzzo, III [ARGUED]
Margulis Gelfand DiRuzzo & Lambson
500 E Broward Boulevard
Suite 900
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33394
Counsel for Appellant

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Delia L. Smith
Adam Sleeper [ARGUED]
Office of the United States Attorney
5500 Veterans Drive
United States Courthouse, Suite 260
St. Thomas, VI 00802
Counsel for Appellee
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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FREEMAN, Circuit Judge.
Randar Vasquez Munoz appeals his conviction for a
drug offense while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm
the judgment.
I
In November 2020, a United States Coast Guard cutter
intercepted a vessel in international waters approximately 115
nautical miles from Isla Malpelo, Colombia. The vessel
attempted to evade the Coast Guard at high speed before being
stopped through interdiction measures. Coast Guard
authorities boarded the vessel and found three occupants: two
Costa Rican nationals (including Munoz) and a Colombian
national. They also found eleven bales of suspected drugs,
which later were confirmed to contain 383 kilograms of
cocaine.
The vessel flew no flag and had no registration
documents, hull markings, or other indicia of its nationality.
All three occupants claimed to be the master of the vessel, but
none made a verbal claim of nationality for the vessel in
response to a request from Coast Guard authorities. As a result,
the Coast Guard deemed the vessel subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States.

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Based on the events described above, a grand jury
returned an indictment charging Munoz with two offenses
under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”):
(1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled
substance while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States1; and (2) possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute while on board a vessel subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States and aiding and abetting.2
Munoz moved to dismiss the indictment on several
grounds. As relevant to this appeal, he argued that the MDLEA
is unconstitutional and that the United States failed to establish
its jurisdiction over the vessel. He requested an evidentiary
hearing regarding the jurisdictional challenge, but the District
Court denied the motion without a hearing. Munoz then
entered a conditional guilty plea. In a written plea agreement,
he agreed to the facts recounted above, pleaded guilty to Count
1 of the indictment, and preserved his right to appeal certain
issues, including the denial of his motion to dismiss. After
sentencing, the government dismissed Count 2 of the
indictment, as agreed upon in the plea agreement. Munoz
timely appealed.
II3
Munoz argues that (1) the MDLEA, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 70501–70508, is unconstitutional, and (2) the District Court
was required to hold an evidentiary hearing on his
jurisdictional challenge. Neither argument is availing.
A
Under the MDLEA, it is unlawful to possess controlled
substances with the intent to distribute, or to conspire to do so,
1 46 U.S.C. §§ 70502(c)(1)(A), 70503(a)(1), 70504(b)(2) &
70506(a), (b).
2 46 U.S.C. §§ 70502(c)(1)(A), 70503(a)(1), 70504(b)(2) &
70506(a); 18 U.S.C. § 2.
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 48 U.S.C.
§ 1612(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

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“on board a covered vessel.” 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1),
70506(b). The MDLEA defines “covered vessel” to include
any “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” Id.
§ 70503(e)(1). And it defines a “vessel subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States” to include any “vessel
without nationality.” Id. § 70502(c)(1)(A).
A “vessel without nationality” includes any “vessel
aboard which the master or individual in charge fails, on
request of an officer of the United States authorized to enforce
applicable provisions of United States law, to make a claim of
nationality or registry for that vessel.” Id. § 70502(d)(1)(B).
There are only three ways in which the master or individual in
charge of a vessel may make a claim of nationality or registry
for the vessel. That person may (1) possess on board the vessel
and produce appropriate documents evidencing the vessel’s
nationality, (2) fly the flag of the vessel’s nation, or (3) make
“a verbal claim of nationality or registry.” Id. § 70502(e).
By its terms, the MDLEA extends to acts “committed
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Id.
§ 70503(b). Additionally, it provides that “[j]urisdiction of the
United States with respect to a vessel subject to this chapter is
not an element of an offense. Jurisdictional issues arising
under this chapter are preliminary questions of law to be
determined solely by the trial judge.” Id. § 70504(a).
B
Munoz argues that the MDLEA exceeds Congress’s
authority under the Felonies Clause of the United States
Constitution. We exercise plenary review of this constitutional
challenge. Gov’t of V.I. v. Steven, 134 F.3d 526, 527 (3d Cir.
1998). Federal statutes are presumptively constitutional and
will be invalidated “only upon a plain showing that Congress
has exceeded its constitutional bounds.” United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000).
The Felonies Clause is contained within Article I,
Section 8, Clause 10 of the United States Constitution, which
in its entirety is known as the “Define and Punish Clause.” See
United States v. Alarcon Sanchez, 972 F.3d 156, 166–67 (2d
Cir. 2020). The Define and Punish Clause states: “Congress

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shall have Power . . . To define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the
Law of Nations.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
The Supreme Court has construed the Define and
Punish Clause to provide Congress with three distinct powers:
(1) to define and punish piracies under the “Piracies Clause”;
(2) to define and punish felonies committed on the high seas
under the “Felonies Clause”; and (3) to define and punish
offenses against the Law of Nations under the “Offenses
Clause.” See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153,
158–59 (1820) (“The power given to Congress is not merely to
define and punish piracies[] . . . [T]he power is also given ‘to
define and punish felonies on the high seas, and offences
against the law of nations.’” (citation modified)); id. at 159
(distinguishing between “felonies on the high seas” and
“offences against the law of nations,” and observing that
neither category was well defined at the founding); see also
United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1248–49
(11th Cir. 2012) (discussing the three distinct grants of power
contained in the Define and Punish Clause). Congress used the
second of these powers—the power granted to it under the
Felonies Clause—to enact the MDLEA.
Munoz contends that the Felonies Clause incorporates
international law, and he argues that international law is
incompatible with the MDLEA. But his premise is belied by
the Constitution’s text. While the Offenses Clause refers to
international law (i.e., the Law of Nations), the Felonies Clause
does not. See Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 159; see also United
States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 825–26 (11th Cir. 2024)
(explaining that the Offenses Clause is limited by international
law but the Felonies Clause is not), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct.
2706 (2025). So Munoz’s challenge does not overcome the
presumption of validity that attaches to the MDLEA as an act
of Congress.
C
Munoz also argues that the District Court erred by
failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion to dismiss
the indictment for lack of MDLEA jurisdiction. We review
orders denying evidentiary hearings for abuse of discretion.

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See United States v. Hines, 628 F.3d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 2010)
(addressing an order denying an evidentiary hearing on a
motion to suppress evidence); United States v. Mitchell-
Hunter, 663 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 2011) (applying the abuse-
of-discretion standard to address whether a challenge to
MDLEA jurisdiction required an evidentiary hearing). There
was no abuse of discretion here.
The parties stipulated to all the facts material to the
District Court’s ruling on MDLEA jurisdiction, and they
included those stipulated facts in the plea agreement.4 The
only dispute was the legal significance of the stipulated facts.
But an evidentiary hearing resolves factual disputes, not legal
ones. See Hines, 628 F.3d at 105 (stating that an evidentiary
hearing is necessary only to when “there are disputed issues of
material fact that will affect the outcome of the motion”); see
also Mitchell-Hunter, 663 F.3d at 53 (requiring defendants to
make “a sufficient threshold showing that material facts were
in doubt or dispute” to get an evidentiary hearing on a
challenge to jurisdiction under the MDLEA (citation
modified)).
The stipulated facts make plain that no one aboard the
vessel took any of the actions necessary to claim nationality or
registry for the vessel. See 46 U.S.C. § 70502(e) (requiring
claims to be made by producing appropriate documents, flying
the flag of the vessel’s nation, or making a verbal claim).
4 Munoz contends that the question of whether a vessel is
“subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” under 46
U.S.C. § 70503(e)(1) implicates the District Court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. We need not wade into this issue that has
split our sister circuits. Compare United States v. Prado, 933
F.3d 121, 132–51 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that the MDLEA’s
jurisdictional requirements do not implicate subject matter
jurisdiction), United States v. Gonzalez, 311 F.3d 440, 442–44
(1st Cir. 2002) (same), with United States v. Miranda, 780 F.3d
1185, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that the MDLEA’s
jurisdictional requirements act as a limitation on subject matter
jurisdiction), United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1105–06
(11th Cir. 2002) (same), United States v. Bustos-Useche, 273
F.3d 622, 626 (5th Cir. 2001) (same).

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Because no one made such a claim, it is impossible that the
“master or individual in charge” of the vessel did so upon the
Coast Guard’s request. See id. § 70502(d)(1)(B). That made
the vessel a “vessel without nationality” under section
70502(d)(1)(B) of the MDLEA. And a “vessel without
nationality” is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
under section 70502(c)(1)(A) of the MDLEA. No hearing was
necessary.5
* * *
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the
judgment.
5 Munoz also argues that the District Court needed an
evidentiary hearing to assess whether the vessel was a “vessel
without nationality” under section 70502(d)(1)(C) of the
MDLEA. That is not so, as the vessel was without nationality
under section 70502(d)(1)(B) of the MDLEA. In any event,
section 70502(d)(1)(C) applies to “a vessel aboard which the
master or individual in charge makes a claim of registry and
for which the claimed nation of registry does not affirmatively
and unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its nationality.”
46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C) (emphasis added). Because no one
made a claim of registry for the vessel, this provision is
inapplicable to Munoz’s case.

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