and 24-3315 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. CHRISTOPHER TEXIDOR a/k/a Fats

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 24-3314 and 24-3315
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CHRISTOPHER TEXIDOR
a/k/a Fats,
Appellant
Appeal from the U.S. District Court, M.D.Pa.
Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
Nos. 1:20-cr-00286-001 & 1:23-cr-00052-002
Before: Porter, Freeman, and Chung, Circuit Judges
Argued: Oct. 22, 2025
Decided: Jan. 8, 2026
OPINION OF THE COURT
CHUNG, Circuit Judge. After a six-day trial, a jury convicted
Christopher Texidor of various drug and firearm offenses. In
a separate case, Texidor pleaded guilty to one count of wire
fraud. Texidor was sentenced on both cases to an aggregate
term of imprisonment of 292 months on the drug and firearm

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offenses and a concurrent term of 240 months’ imprisonment
on the wire fraud case. Texidor argues that the District Court
abused its discretion in failing to strike certain portions of the
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”); committed clear
error by applying a four-level leadership enhancement when
calculating his advisory range of imprisonment per the United
States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or U.S.S.G.);
abused its discretion by imposing an aggregate sentence of 292
months’ imprisonment for his conspiracy to distribute
marijuana conviction; and abused its discretion by imposing a
concurrent sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment for his wire
fraud conviction. We will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On November 4, 2020, Christopher Texidor and five co-
defendants were indicted on multiple counts relating to their
conduct as part of a drug trafficking organization in conspiring
to traffic nearly 3,000 kilograms of marijuana from California
to Pennsylvania through the United States Postal Service. The
organization used Texidor’s business, Fastlane Auto Sales,
LLC, as a cover for its operation and his residence as a physical
base to facilitate their activities. Intercepted phone calls
captured regular communications between (1) Texidor and
family members and friends whom he had enlisted to receive
parcels on behalf of the organization; (2) Texidor and drug
customers; and (3) Texidor and other co-conspirators, in which
Texidor discussed drop-offs and pickups of marijuana
shipments, sales, debts, payments due, and the location of

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various parcel shipments. Texidor and his co-conspirators also
established an account with Stamps.com to facilitate their
shipments.
In the fall of 2019, Texidor, along with other members of
the organization, observed that certain parcels were going
missing. Texidor and three of the co-conspirators implemented
a GPS tracking system for the parcels. Through the tracking
system, they eventually uncovered the identity and residence
of the person stealing the parcels, a postal employee named
D.H. Texidor and others then agreed to hire gunmen to
intimidate and threaten D.H. to stop him from stealing their
shipments. The gunmen conducted a drive-by shooting of
D.H.’s vehicle and reported to Texidor afterwards, leaving the
vehicle they used at Texidor’s home. Texidor later hid the
vehicle at his uncle’s residence. In the ensuing days, another
shooter conducted a drive-by shooting at a residence where
D.H. had been observed to stay. This was followed by a drive-
by shooting at a different residence. A few months later, two
masked men followed D.H. to a third residence and approached
him while brandishing firearms. D.H. ran, and the conspirators
took his truck, which contained a concealed firearm and
marijuana D.H. had taken from the post office earlier that
morning.
In May 2020, investigators executed a series of search
warrants at various locations affiliated with the group,
including Fastlane Auto Sales and Texidor’s residence. At the
Fast Lane Auto Sales location, law enforcement officers found

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marijuana, GPS tracking devices, a money counter, a vacuum
sealer, and mailing labels, consistent with parcels intercepted
by investigators. A0811–0816. Their search of Texidor’s
residence resulted in the recovery of $17,000 in a seat cushion,
two pistols registered to Texidor, GPS tracking devices,
marijuana, a vacuum sealer, and a digital scale.
On March 16, 2023, Texidor was charged in a superseding
indictment with multiple counts relating to his conspiring to
distribute, and distributing, marijuana; conspiring to distribute
cocaine; conspiring to use a firearm in furtherance of drug
trafficking; and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug
trafficking. After a 6-day jury trial, the jury convicted Texidor
on all counts except for the cocaine charge and the latter
firearm charge.
Texidor was also charged under a separate indictment with
three counts relating to his participation in a scheme to defraud
the United States Small Business Administration’s Paycheck
Protection Program (PPP). With respect to that scheme, on
May 3, 2021, while on pretrial release for his drug trafficking
charges, Texidor and others submitted applications containing
false representations to a third-party lender seeking funds from
the PPP program. As a result, Texidor and the other
participants each received approximately $20,000 in PPP
loans. Following his conviction at trial for the drug trafficking
offenses, Texidor pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud.
The other charges were dismissed.

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Texidor’s drug trafficking and wire fraud convictions were
considered together for sentencing purposes. The District
Court calculated Texidor’s Guidelines range at 292 to 365
months after finding a total offense level of 40 and criminal
history category of I. Texidor objected to references in the PSR
to cocaine and cocaine trafficking given that he was acquitted
of the single cocaine charge in the Superseding Indictment,
objected to the District Court’s imposition of a four-level
leadership enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), and
argued for a downward variance. With respect to his request
for a downward variance, Texidor pointed to the potential
rescheduling of marijuana to a Schedule III controlled
substance and in particular the Department of Justice’s Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking on May 16, 2024 proposing the DEA
reclassify marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule III.
The District Court struck one reference to cocaine in the
PSR, overruled Texidor’s objections to the remaining cocaine
references, and overruled Texidor’s objections to the
leadership enhancement. Declining to vary from the
Guidelines range of imprisonment, it sentenced Texidor to 292
months’ imprisonment, which consisted of: 292 months’
imprisonment for conspiring to distribute marijuana, 240
months’ imprisonment on the other drug-related counts as well
as the firearm count, 60 months’ imprisonment for possession
with intent to distribute marijuana, and 240 months’
imprisonment for wire fraud. All sentences were to run
concurrently. Texidor now appeals.

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the District Court’s interpretation of the
Guidelines de novo, United States v. Seibert, 971 F.3d 396, 399
(3d Cir. 2020), its “application of the Guidelines to facts for
abuse of discretion,” and its factual findings for clear error,
United States v. Tupone, 442 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2006).
However, when the Guidelines set forth a “predominantly fact-
driven test,” as is the case for the organizer or leader
enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), we apply clear
error review to the District Court’s determination and will
conclude that the District Court “abused its discretion in
applying the enhancement based on a particular set of facts
only if those facts were clearly erroneous.” United States v.
Thung Van Huynh, 884 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation
omitted). We review procedural and substantive
reasonableness challenges for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009). For
challenges to the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we
will affirm “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have
imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the
reasons the district court provided.” Id. at 568.
III. ANALYSIS1
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. §
3742(a).

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On appeal, Texidor raises the same acquitted-conduct
and leadership-enhancement challenges he raised at
sentencing. He also contends that the District Court abused its
discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable aggregate
sentence of 292 months’ imprisonment for the marijuana
trafficking charges, and a substantively unreasonable sentence
of 240 months’ imprisonment for wire fraud.
A. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by
Declining to Strike from the PSR Allegations
Regarding Cocaine
Texidor contends that, given his acquittal at Count Two
charging him with conspiring to distribute cocaine, the District
Court procedurally erred by declining to strike from the PSR
certain references to cocaine and considering the cocaine
allegations during sentencing despite the recent addition of
subsection (c) to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. Opening Br. 15–20.
1. U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.3(c) and 1B1.4
Subsection (c) of § 1B1.3, titled “Acquitted Conduct,” was
recently added to the Guidelines and went into effect on
November 1, 2024. It provides that, for purposes of
determining a defendant’s Guidelines range, “[r]elevant
conduct does not include conduct for which the defendant was
criminally charged and acquitted in federal court, unless such
conduct also establishes, in whole or in part, the instant offense
of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c) (2024).

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Section 1B1.4 predates § 1B1.3(c) and also applies to
acquitted conduct. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148,
152–53 (1997) (per curiam). It states that “[i]n determining the
sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether a
departure from the guidelines is warranted, the court may
consider, without limitation, any information concerning the
background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless
otherwise prohibited by law.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4 (2023).2
Section 1B1.4 implements 18 U.S.C. § 3661. That statute
states that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person
convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may
receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an
appropriate sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3661. Prior to the addition
of § 1B1.3(c), the Supreme Court affirmed that, in accord with
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4 and 18 U.S.C. § 3661, “a jury’s verdict of
acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from
considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long
as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the
evidence.” Watts, 519 U.S. at 157. See also United States v.
Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705, 735–36 (3d Cir. 2013) (relying on
Watts to conclude that the district court’s consideration of
acquitted conduct in sentencing the defendant was proper
where the court found it was proven by a preponderance of the
2 Section 1B1.4 was amended on November 1, 2025, but we
consider the language that was in effect at the time of
sentencing. United States v. Omoruyi, 260 F.3d 291, 297 (3d
Cir. 2001).

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evidence).
To date, only the Eighth Circuit has addressed whether
§ 1B1.3(c) forecloses a sentencing court’s consideration of
acquitted conduct when addressing sentencing issues other
than the determination of the Guidelines range term of
imprisonment. See United States v. Ware, 141 F.4th 970, 974
n.2 (8th Cir. 2025). In Ware, the Eighth Circuit stated in a
footnote that § 1B1.3(c) “does not prohibit a court from
considering acquitted conduct when analyzing the factors from
§ 3553(a).” Id.
We agree. As a matter of first impression, we conclude that
§ 1B1.3(c) does not preclude courts from considering acquitted
conduct when analyzing the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
and determining whether and where to impose a sentence
within or outside of the Guidelines range. Section 1B1.3(c) by
its text limits only what a court can consider as “relevant
conduct” when calculating the Guidelines range. Our
interpretation is consistent with the directive of § 3661 that
“[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning
the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted
of an offense which a court of the United States may receive
and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate
sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3661; see also Watts, 519 U.S. at 151–
52. It is also consistent with the Guideline implementing
§ 3661. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4; Watts, 519 U.S. at 152. As
§ 1B1.3(c)’s plain text does not limit the consideration of
acquitted conduct in contexts other than calculating the

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Guidelines range, acquitted conduct may still be considered
when determining the appropriate sentence, per 18 U.S.C. §
3661 and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4.
2. Texidor’s Acquitted Conduct
Turning to whether the District Court improperly
considered Texidor’s acquitted conduct, the sentencing
transcript contains no indication that the District Court relied
on cocaine-related conduct when calculating Texidor’s
Guidelines range. See generally A1122–65. The District
Court reiterated several times that its resolution of Texidor’s
objection to the PSR’s cocaine references “d[id] not impact the
guidelines calculation,” because § 1B1.3(c) “precluded [it]
from considering information regarding cocaine or cocaine
trafficking for purposes of determining relevant conduct as it
relates to the calculation of the guideline range.” A1125-26,
A1129.
Furthermore, the record does not reflect that the District
Court considered the acquitted conduct in any aspect of
Texidor’s sentencing. While the District Court noted that
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4 and 18 U.S.C. § 3661 allowed it to consider
the cocaine-related conduct as background information “for the
purposes of selecting the appropriate sentence within or
outside the guideline range,” A1129, it did not reference any
cocaine-related conduct during its consideration of the §
3553(a) factors or in announcing its ultimate sentencing

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decision. See A1150–57.3
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by
Applying a Four-Level Increase in Offense Level for
Leadership Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a)
Section 3B1.1(a) of the Guidelines imposes a four-level
increase “[i]f the defendant was an organizer or leader of a
criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was
otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). As we stated in
United States v. Adair, “an ‘organizer’ is a person who
generates a coherent functional structure for coordinated
criminal activity,” and “a ‘leader’ is a person with high-level
directive power or influence over criminal activity.” 38 F.4th
341, 354 (3d Cir. 2022); see id. (concluding that “the terms
‘organizer’ and ‘leader’ are not genuinely ambiguous” and thus
“[t]he common ordinary meanings of those terms at the time of
promulgation together with the structure and purpose of §
3B1.1 lead to contextually appropriate definitions of those
terms”).
3 Texidor argues in the alternative that the District Court
abused its discretion by considering the PSR’s references to
cocaine without first finding such allegations proven by a
preponderance of evidence. We need not address this
argument because, to the extent there was any error, it was
harmless. As explained above, the record does not reflect that
the District Court considered the acquitted conduct in crafting
Texidor’s sentence.

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The District Court’s finding that Texidor was a leader and
organizer under § 3B1.1 was not clearly erroneous. Texidor
recruited individuals, including family members, to receive
marijuana shipments and organized their receipt of said
shipments; provided both his residential and business premises
to the organization for the purpose of operating the enterprise
and concealing their drug trafficking activities; regularly
coordinated drop-offs and pickups of marijuana shipments; and
communicated with other members about drug sales to
customers, parcels held by USPS, and debts and payments due.
Texidor also helped organize the group’s efforts to track the
marijuana shipments through GPS trackers, identify the
suspected thief, and violently intimidate and threaten D.H.
Over the course of executing that violent intimidation strategy,
other members of the organization reported to Texidor. This
included the perpetrators of a drive-by shooting of D.H.’s car
and residence, who reported to Texidor and left the vehicle
they used at Texidor’s home. Texidor subsequently transferred
it to the home of his uncle, a person whom Texidor had
recruited to the conspiracy. With respect to § 3B1.1(a)’s
participant requirement, the District Court did not clearly err
when it found that Texidor’s criminal activity involved “25
different addresses and 15 different individuals … [who]
receiv[ed] the packages from California,” and that Texidor
directed, among others, “his co-defendant, Jonathan Cobaugh,
in all aspects of the drug trafficking organization,” and “his
uncle, who was not indicted[,] … to receive and track
marijuana shipments.” A1137.

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Texidor relies on our decision in United States v. Belletiere
to argue that, like the defendant there, Texidor “never
exercised control of [the other participants’] resale or
distribution network,” and that the other participants involved
in the conspiracy were not “answerable” to him. Opening Br.
12; see 971 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1992). However, unlike the
individuals in Belletiere, the participants in Texidor’s criminal
enterprise were not mere “suppliers” or “customers” of the
marijuana, Belletiere, 971 F.2d at 970, and the criminal activity
in Texidor’s case did not merely consist of a “series of
unrelated drug sales,” id. at 971. Rather, the participants were
individuals, including family members, whom Texidor
recruited to receive marijuana shipments on the main
conspirators’ behalf, individuals for whom he provided his
business premises for the purpose of organizing and concealing
their drug trafficking activities; individuals with whom he
communicated regularly to organize the organization’s
activities; and individuals with whom he schemed to engage in
threats and violence against D.H., some of whom answered to
Texidor afterwards. In sum, it was not clear error for the
District Court to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that Texidor was an organizer and leader of a criminal activity
involving five or more participants under § 3B1.1(a).

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C. Texidor’s Aggregate Sentence of 292 Months’
Imprisonment in the Marijuana Trafficking Case is
Substantively Reasonable
Texidor also argues on appeal that his total sentence of 292
months’ imprisonment in the drug and firearm conspiracy case
is substantively unreasonable. We disagree.
After calculating the Guidelines range and ruling on
Texidor’s objections, the District Court examined the §
3553(a) factors at length and provided a detailed explanation
of why it determined that a bottom-of-the-guidelines-range
sentence of 292 months’ imprisonment was appropriate. The
District Court relied on (1) the duration of the criminal activity;
(2) the total quantity of marijuana trafficked, “an astonishing
amount . . . [of] nearly 3,000 kilograms[;]” (3) Texidor’s and
his co-conspirators’ use of threats and violence in furtherance
of their criminal enterprise; and, (4) Texidor’s separate
criminal conduct of PPP fraud that he committed while on
pretrial release. A1151–53.
To support his challenge, Texidor mainly argues that the
Department of Justice may eventually reclassify marijuana as
a Schedule I controlled substance to a Schedule III controlled
substance. Opening Br. 20–23. But it was not an abuse of
discretion for the District Court to impose a sentence that was
guided by the current classification of marijuana as a Schedule
I controlled substance when it sentenced Texidor in December
2024. Moreover, the District Court explained that Texidor’s
case “wasn’t just marijuana trafficking, which is serious

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enough,” but involved the use of “tracking devices, firearms,
and violence to protect [the organization’s] operation.”
A1151. Indeed, as the District Court explained, the 292-month
aggregate sentence was driven in significant part by the
specific offense characteristics leading to an additional ten
levels in Texidor’s criminal offense level, including Texidor’s
leadership and organization of the criminal activity, possession
of a dangerous weapon, use of violence or credible threats of
violence, and maintenance of a drug-involved premises. For
these reasons, the District Court’s sentence was not one that
“no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed” on the
facts of this case. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.
D. Pursuant to the Concurrent Sentence Doctrine, We
Decline to Review Texidor’s Challenge to His
Sentence on the Wire Fraud Charge
Last, Texidor argues that the District Court’s sentence of
240 months’ imprisonment for the wire fraud charge was
substantively unreasonable. We exercise our discretion
pursuant to the concurrent sentence doctrine and decline to
review this challenge.
Under the concurrent sentence doctrine, courts may
exercise their discretion not to resolve legal issues on one or
more counts when any outcome on those count(s) will not
change the overall time a defendant will serve. This occurs
when a sentence on at least one count of conviction is of equal
or greater length to the challenged count, runs concurrently,
and will survive. See United States v. McKie, 112 F.3d 626,

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628 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997). The rationale of this doctrine is that it
“preserves valuable and limited judicial resources for deciding
those cases which might actually result in practical changes for
the litigants.” Duka v. United States, 27 F.4th 189, 194 (3d
Cir. 2022). In other words, “there is no use expending the
limited resources of the litigants and the judiciary reviewing a
conviction where, regardless of the outcome, the defendant
will remain subject to the same sentence.” Id.; see also United
States v. Charles, 932 F.3d 153, 158 (4th Cir. 2019) (noting
that “the concurrent sentence doctrine rests on the same
rationale underlying harmless-error review”).
The concurrent sentence doctrine is not always applicable,
and even when it is, a court’s exercise of its discretion to apply
it is not always appropriate. As established in Ray v. United
States, the concurrent sentence doctrine is generally
unavailable when a defendant challenges a conviction on direct
review. See Duka, 27 F.4th at 195–96 (discussing Ray v.
United States, 481 U.S. 736 (1987) (per curiam)); see also
United States v. Ross, 801 F.3d 374, 382 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Ray
establishes that, when a court orders a defendant to pay a
special assessment for each of several counts of conviction, the
sentences are not concurrent and the ‘concurrent sentence’
doctrine cannot be used to avoid appellate review of each count
of conviction.”). However, courts have “continued to regularly
apply the [concurrent sentence doctrine] in direct appeals
where a defendant challenges only the length of one concurrent
sentence, rather than the legality of a conviction underlying
that sentence.” Kassir v. United States, 3 F.4th 556, 562 (2d

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Cir. 2021); see also United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213,
1293–94 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Harris, 695 F.3d
1125, 1139 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Ray’s holding, however, does
not eliminate the applicability of the doctrine in cases where a
defendant challenges only the length of his sentence ...”).
Even in such contexts though, courts have declined to
exercise their discretion under the concurrent sentence doctrine
when the defendant would suffer “unique cognizable collateral
consequences” from the court’s decision not to address the
legality of the challenged sentence or conviction. Duka, 27
F.4th at 196 (3d Cir. 2022); see also United States v. Lampley,
573 F.2d 783, 788 (3d Cir. 1978) (“[The concurrent sentence
doctrine] should not be applied where there is a significant risk
of greater adverse collateral consequences from multiple
convictions.”). Our case law explains that the risk of collateral
consequences must be “significant” to preclude the doctrine’s
application, Lampley, 573 F.2d at 788, but we have not added
color to when a risk meets that standard. Following our sister
circuits, we clarify that such risk must be “concrete” and “non-
speculative.” Ruiz v. United States, 990 F.3d 1025, 1031 (7th
Cir. 2021). In contrast, when the risk of collateral
consequences is speculative, courts may exercise their
discretion and apply the concurrent sentence doctrine. See
United States v. Sherifi, 107 F.4th 309, 317 (4th Cir. 2024)
(application of concurrent sentence doctrine is appropriate
when it can be “foreseen with reasonable certainty” that a
defendant will “suffer no adverse collateral consequences”
from its application (citation omitted)); United States v.

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Charles, 932 F.3d 153, 160 (4th Cir. 2019) (discussing
application of the doctrine when there is “no substantial
possibility” that an adverse collateral consequence would
result (citation omitted)); Eason v. United States, 912 F.3d
1122, 1124 (8th Cir. 2019) (affirming that “speculative
consequences” do not preclude application of the concurrent
sentence doctrine (citation omitted)).
Here, we have rejected Texidor’s challenge to his aggregate
sentence of 292 months’ imprisonment for his marijuana
trafficking convictions. Accordingly, this concurrent sentence
will survive any challenge to the length of his wire fraud
sentence. Texidor argues that we should not apply the
concurrent sentence doctrine because marijuana may be
reclassified from a Schedule I to a Schedule III controlled
substance. He asserts that applying the concurrent sentence
doctrine will subject him to the risk “of losing out on the
benefits of likely marijuana reforms,” principally in the form
of a lower Guidelines range on his marijuana counts. Opening
Br. 25. Texidor reasons that this would, in turn, lower the total
Guidelines range applicable to all of his counts of conviction,
including for his wire fraud conviction.
We conclude that the collateral consequences Texidor
urges are too speculative to preclude application of the
concurrent sentence doctrine. Although a recent executive
order directs that marijuana be rescheduled as a Schedule III

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controlled substance,4 the risk Texidor complains of—“losing
out on the benefits” of that rescheduling in the form of a
reduced Guidelines range—remains speculative, as the
Guidelines already treat unspecified Schedule III substances
and marijuana the same for purposes of determining offense
level. See generally U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (2024).5 Thus,
4 See Increasing Medical Marijuana and Cannabidiol Research
(accessed Dec. 18, 2025), https://perma.cc/7DBT-W8ZX.
5 Section 2D1.1(c) defines the term “Converted Drug Weight”
as “a nominal reference designation … [used] to determine the
offense level for controlled substances that are not specifically
referenced in the Drug Quantity Table or when combining
differing controlled substances.” See 2D1.1(c), Notes to Drug
Quantity Table (K). “Converted Drug Weight” replaced the
term “marijuana equivalency” and reflects the Sentencing
Commission’s estimation of how harmful a controlled
substance is as compared to marijuana. See U.S.S.G. Amend.
808 (effective Nov. 1, 2018) (changing language from
“marihuana equivalency” to “converted drug weight,” but not
changing conversion rate). For those Schedule III substances
not specifically listed in the Drug Quantity Tables (such as
heroin and fentanyl), the Drug Conversion Tables provide a
way to calculate the appropriate offense level by pegging the
offense level for the Schedule III substance to the marijuana
offense level. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), App. Note 8(d) (one
unit of Schedule III substance converts to one gram of
Converted Drug Weight); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 App. Note 8(d)
(2016) (one gram of schedule III substance is equivalent to one
gram of marijuana); see generally U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (setting

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rescheduling marijuana as a Schedule III substance will likely
have no impact on Texidor’s offense levels, as it is already the
same as the offense level for an unspecified Schedule III
substance. Furthermore, even if the United States Sentencing
Commission were to amend the Guidelines Drug Quantity or
Drug Conversion Tables (despite the fact that the Sentencing
Commission has already found it appropriate to treat marijuana
and unspecified Schedule III controlled substances the same),
any risk that Texidor cannot benefit from that change remains
uncertain. For instance, it is equally speculative that Texidor
would be unable to apply for resentencing pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c).6 In light of the foregoing, Texidor does not
assert the kind of non-speculative collateral consequence that
cautions against application of the concurrent sentence
doctrine. See Charles, 932 F.3d at 157 (rejecting the
defendant’s collateral consequences argument because,
“[w]hile the scenario posed by [the defendant] [is] technically
all offenses level the same for marijuana and “Converted Drug
Weight”). For example, the Table imposes an offense Level of
30 for both 1,000 to 3,000 kgs of marijuana and 1,000 to 3,000
kgs of an unspecified Schedule III controlled substance due to
the one-to-one conversion. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c).
6 See, e.g., U.S.S.G. Amends. 706, 711 (effective Nov. 1,
2007), Amend. 713 (effective Nov. 1, 2007) (making
Amendments 706 and 711 retroactive); U.S.S.G. Amend. 750
(effective Nov. 1, 2011), Amend. 759 (effective Nov. 1, 2011)
(making Amendment 750 retroactive); U.S.S.G. Amend. 782
(effective Nov. 1, 2014), Amend. 788 (effective Nov. 1, 2014)
(making Amendment 782 retroactive).

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possible, the factors that would have to line up to support such
a result make it implausible”). Accordingly, we apply the
concurrent sentence doctrine and decline to review Texidor’s
substantive reasonableness challenge to his wire fraud
sentence.
* * * * *
For these reasons, we will AFFIRM.
Counsel for Appellant
Craig E. Kauzlarich [Argued]
Abom & Kutulakis
Counsel for Appellee
Jeffery F. St. John [Argued]
Carlo D. Marchioli
Office of United States Attorney,
Middle District of Pennsylvania

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