Samuel Arribasplata -Marin v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA On Petition for Review from the Board of…

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 25-1296
SAMUEL A RRIBASPLATA -M ARIN ,
Petitioner
v.
A TTORNEY G ENERAL U NITED STATES OF A MERICA
_____________________________
On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals
Immigration Judge Nicole Lane, No. A243-011-366
Before: K RAUSE , MASCOTT , and FISHER , Circuit Judges
Submitted Mar. 13, 2026;
Decided Aug. 5, 2026
_____________________________
N ONPRECEDENTIAL O PINION*
K RAUSE , Circuit Judge. Petitioner Samuel Arribasplata-Marin seeks review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of his motion to reopen his immigration
proceedings, where he sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture. Because Arribasplata never submitted a timely petition for
review of his final order of removal, we cannot review the merits of that order. And
because Arribasplata did not overcome the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) adverse credibility
finding or allege an independent claim of changed country conditions, he did not meet the
standard for a motion to reopen. Accordingly, we will DENY the petition for review.
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding
precedent.

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I. D ISCUSSION1
A. Arribasplata Failed to File a Timely Petition for Review of His Removal
Order.
Arribasplata first challenges the merits of his removal order. But this challenge fails
for a simple reason: After the BIA affirmed, Arribasplata opted not to file a petition for
review and took no further action to challenge the validity of his order of removal. See
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (setting a 30-day deadline to file a petition for review of a final order
of removal). Instead, three months later, he filed a motion to reopen before the BIA, which
the BIA denied. Only then did Arribasplata petition us for review. So, while Arribasplata
argues that the IJ and BIA erred in denying him relief from removal, he cannot bootstrap
review of that decision into his petition for review of the denial of his motion to reopen.
See Siong v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 376 F.3d 1030, 1042 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“[B]ecause we are reviewing only the denial of [the petitioner’s] motion to reopen, we
cannot review the merits of [his] claim.”). As such, we consider no further Arribasplata’s
challenge to the merits of the IJ’s denial of relief, and the BIA’s affirmance of that denial,
and proceed to the motion to reopen.
B. The BIA’s Denial of the Motion to Reopen Was Not an Abuse of Discretion.
Arribasplata’s challenge to the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen also fails. We
review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Borges v.
Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005). This is a “highly deferential” standard,
1 We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal and the denial of a motion to
reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). See Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir.
2006).

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Alzaarir v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 639 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2011), and we may only say that
the BIA abused its discretion if a decision was “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law,”
Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation modified). When a petitioner
moves to reopen after the IJ and BIA previously denied a claim due to a lack of credibility,
he “must present previously unavailable evidence that is independent of the prior claim or
[which] refutes the validity and finality of the credibility determination in the prior
proceeding.” Matter of F-S-N-, 28 I & N. Dec. 1, 3 n.3 (B.I.A. 2020). Here, Arribasplata
fails to meet the high bar of showing that the BIA abused its discretion.
The BIA properly denied Arribasplata’s motion to reopen. When a petitioner seeks to
reopen based on “new” evidence, the motion “shall not be granted unless it appears to the
Board that [the] evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could
not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).
Here, Arribasplata did “not argue that his ex-wife’s affidavit was unavailable at the time
of his hearing.” A.R. 3-4. Regardless, the BIA addressed the merits of the affidavit,
reasonably determining that the “affidavit, which was created after an administratively
final adverse credibility finding against [Arribasplata]” did not undermine the rationale for
that credibility determination, as it did “not explain why [Arribasplata’s] testimony was
inconsistent with his application and statement, or why [his] testimony was evasive and
unresponsive.” A.R. 4. Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it determined that
the affidavit was insufficient to rehabilitate Arribasplata’s credibility.
Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in denying Arribasplata’s motion to reopen based
on changed circumstances in the country of removal. The evidence of changed country

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conditions that Arribasplata invoked constituted “the same source of harm that formed the
basis for his non-credible persecution claim,” A.R. 3-4—i.e., his fear that he would be
persecuted and tortured by the Tupac Amaru Revolution Movement—rather than an
independent claim, see F-S-N-, 28 I & N. at 3. As a result, Arribasplata needed to first
rebut the previous adverse credibility finding before he could introduce this evidence. See
id. (noting that a petitioner “must either overcome the prior determination or show that the
new claim is independent of the evidence that was found to be not credible”). Because
Arribasplata failed to rehabilitate his credibility and failed to show an independent claim
of changed country conditions, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying
Arribasplata’s motion to reopen.
II. C ONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will DENY Arribasplata’s petition for review.

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