Louis G. Dover v. John Doe, Supervisor

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 25-2075
LOUIS G. DOVER,
Appellant
v.
JOHN DOE, SUPERVISOR; SARAH COTHREN; DAVID TERAN
_____________________________
Appeal from the U.S. District Court, E.D. Pa.
Judge Nitza I. Quinones Alejandro, No. 2:25-cv-01631
Before: BIBAS, CHUNG, and BOVE, Circuit Judges
Submitted Feb. 20, 2026; Decided Mar. 3, 2026
_____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION*
PER CURIAM. Plaintiff Louis Dover, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, sued
Rangers from the National Park Service after he was stopped and searched in Independence
National Historic Park. Plaintiff alleged that Rangers violated his Fourth Amendment
rights and sought relief under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).1 The District Court dismissed his Complaint. We will
affirm.
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding
precedent.
1 Unless otherwise indicated, case quotations omit all internal citations, quotation marks,
footnotes, alterations, and subsequent history.

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Plaintiff alleged that two Rangers from the National Park Service stopped him and
performed a physical search in the Park early on the morning of October 23, 2024.
According to Plaintiff, the Rangers used “deception and coercion” and touched him “in a
place and manner which was not appropriate.” Compl. ¶¶ 21, 29. Plaintiff asserted in the
Complaint that the search was based on “pretext” and unsupported by “actual verifiable
evidence,” Compl. ¶ 26, but he alleged elsewhere in the same pleading that the Rangers
had “specific, credible information” to “justify the search.” Compl. ¶ 17.
The National Park Service is part of the Department of the Interior. About a month
after the search, Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance with the Department of the
Interior’s Office of Inspector General. The grievance was not resolved in Plaintiff’s favor.
Plaintiff then sued the two Rangers and their supervisor in federal court. The District Court
screened the Complaint for failure to state a claim and dismissed with prejudice. See D.
Ct. Dkt. 5 at 8. Plaintiff timely appealed.
The District Court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1291. We accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true and
review the District Court’s dismissal de novo. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d
236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
The District Court reasoned that Plaintiff’s allegations were materially
distinguishable from Bivens, and that the alternative remedial structure to address claims
of wrongdoing by Rangers is a “special factor” that prevents courts from recognizing a
Bivens action in this setting. D. Ct. Dkt. 5 at 6-7. Because the existence of “special factors”

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that counsel against extending Bivens is an adequate basis to affirm, we limit our discussion
to that issue.
“Any special factor—even one—suffices to foreclose a new Bivens cause of action.”
Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197, 207 (3d Cir. 2024). An “alternative remedial
structure” is a “quintessential special factor.” Id. at 208. With respect to misconduct claims
against Rangers, the grievance process through the Office of Inspector General at the
Department of the Interior is such a structure. Plaintiff acknowledged in the Complaint
that he had availed himself of that process. Plaintiff argues on appeal that the process was
inadequate. We have explained, however, that the alternative remedial structure does not
need to be “as effective as an individual damages remedy” in order to foreclose a Bivens
claim. Id.; see also Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 493 (2022).
The National Park Service also maintains an Office of Professional Responsibility
to investigate claims against employees. This Office of Professional Responsibility accepts
complaints from the public. While we do not know if Plaintiff submitted a complaint to
that Office, what matters for purposes of this analysis is that the alternative remedial
structure “is available” to him. Fisher, 115 F.4th at 208. The National Park Service’s
Office of Professional Responsibility meets that test and provides an additional “alternative
remedial structure” that forecloses a Bivens action in this case.
Under established precedent in this Circuit, existing alternative remedial structures
for addressing claims against National Park Service personnel required that Plaintiff’s
action be dismissed. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the
Complaint on that basis.

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