PETER J. CRESCI, Individually; JOHN DOES 1-3; XYZ CORPS 1-5 v. TIMOTHY J. MCNAMARA, Individually

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 25-2305
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PETER J. CRESCI, Individually;
JOHN DOES 1-3; XYZ CORPS 1-5
v.
TIMOTHY J. MCNAMARA, Individually;
CHARLES CENTINARO, Individually;
JOHN DOES 1-5; JANE DOES 1-3; ABC CORP 1-3
Peter J. Cresci,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 2:18-cv-16207)
District Judge: Honorable Esther Salas
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 21, 2026
Before: RESTREPO, BIBAS and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: August 19, 2026)
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OPINION*
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.

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FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Peter Cresci sued Timothy McNamara and Charles Centinaro, alleging violations
of his statutory and constitutional rights under New Jersey and federal law. The District
Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. We will affirm.1
Although Cresci did not oppose dismissal, the District Court correctly analyzed
the merits of the complaint.2 Even an unopposed motion to dismiss should not be granted
unless the complaint fails to state a claim.3 However, by declining to file an opposition to
the motion to dismiss in the District Court, Cresci has forfeited all of his arguments on
appeal.4 We nevertheless review the District Court’s decision de novo,5 assessing the
merits of the complaint in light of controlling law.
Cresci makes one argument that we address despite his forfeiture: he asserts that
the District Court erred because it did not vacate the orders the Honorable Evelyn Padin
entered before granting his motion to recuse. We may address forfeited arguments in
“extraordinary circumstances,” including when “failure to consider the argument would
lead to a miscarriage of justice or undermine confidence in the judicial system.”6 If a
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal questions),
1343 (civil rights actions). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (final decisions
of district courts).
2 Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991).
3 Id.
4 In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 67 F.4th 118, 135 (3d Cir. 2023).
5 Abramowski v. Nuvei Corp., 166 F.4th 391, 393 n.2 (3d Cir. 2026).
6 United States v. Andrews, 681 F.3d 509, 532 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

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judge who should recuse entered a substantive order, there could be a miscarriage of
justice or a loss of confidence in the judiciary.7 There is no such danger here, however,
because our law requires only that “[o]nce a judge has disqualified [her]self, . . . she may
enter no further orders in the case.”8 Cresci contends that our opinion in Moody v.
Simmons “can be read broadly ‘to [require] vacat[ur of] the orders of a judge who acted
when [she] should have recused.”9 But in Moody, the district judge entered several
substantive orders after expressing the intent to recuse and before the case was assigned
to a different judge.10 Here, Judge Padin entered no further orders after granting the
motion to recuse, so Moody is inapposite.
Turning to the sufficiency of the complaint, Cresci asserts claims stemming from
McNamara and Centinaro’s performance of their jobs as employees of the New Jersey
Office of Attorney Ethics. Because the claims are based on both federal and state law,
federal and New Jersey immunity law apply.11 Federal “[q]uasi-judicial absolute
immunity attaches when a public official’s role is functionally comparable to that of a
judge.”12 “It is clear beyond doubt that the New Jersey Supreme Court considers its bar
7 See Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 16 (2016) (“Both the appearance and
reality of impartial justice are necessary to the public legitimacy of judicial
pronouncements and thus to the rule of law itself.”).
8 Moody v. Simmons, 858 F.2d 137, 143 (3d Cir. 1988).
9 Appellant’s Br. 9 (quoting Moody, 858 F.2d at 143).
10 Moody, 858 F.2d at 143.
11 See El v. City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 334 n.3 (3d Cir. 2020).
12 Dotzel v. Ashbridge, 438 F.3d 320, 325 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation modified).

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disciplinary proceedings as judicial in nature,”13 so the defendants are absolutely immune
from federal claims brought for their participation in ethics proceedings. They are
similarly immune from state claims, because New Jersey law provides that “[m]embers
of the Office of Attorney Ethics . . . shall be absolutely immune from suit, whether legal
or equitable in nature, based on their respective conduct in performing their official
duties.”14
The only possible basis for liability, then, is conduct outside the ethics
proceedings. Any discernible allegations about such conduct were, as the District Court
correctly concluded, conclusory and lacking in the specificity required to “nudge[]
[Cresci’s] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible.”15 For instance, the
complaint alleged that McNamara and Centinaro committed “acts . . . beyond the bounds
of” their “lawful authority,” that they “fil[ed] frivolous complaints with state agencies,
third party agencies, [and] courts,” and that they “interfer[ed] with [Cresci’s] professional
contracts; . . . governmental responsibilities; . . . [and] clients.”16 However, the complaint
neither explains what the relevant acts were nor describes the frivolous complaints or the
interference. The complaint alleges that the defendants “caused [Cresci] to be detained,”
13 Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 433–
34 (1982) (citation modified).
14 N.J. Ct. R. 1:20-7(e).
15 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
16 App. 340, 342.

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but does not state when or where the detention occurred or who detained him.17
Conclusory allegations like these fail to state a claim.18
For all these reasons, we will affirm.
17 App. 348; see also id. at 350.
18 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (dismissal cannot be avoided through “labels and
conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”).

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