Livia M. Scotto v. Wells Fargo & Co

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 25-2858
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LIVIA M. SCOTTO
v.
WELLS FARGO & CO;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
doing business as STUDENT AID GOV.;
AGENCY COUNSEL OF RECORD, FILED HERETOFORE,
WITH SUMMONS SUBPOENA; U.S. TREASURY SERVICES;
WYNDAM; ARR; BARCLAYS BANK PLC; BARCLAYS DE;
CITIBANK, N.A.; SMITH GAMBRELL RUSSELL INT; ECMC;
ZIONS BANK; UNION BANK TRUST; ASAP BANK; NELNET;
WILLIAM MUNN MICHAEL; DUNLAP; UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII;
MAUI COMMUNITY COLLEGE; JOHATHAN BEATTY TRUST;
AON MEN RA II RE; BERMUDA; VIRGIN IS; CAYMAN; MIAMI, FL;
STATE FARM FLORIDA INSURANCE CO.;
WINTER HAVEN FLORIDA; I. AON NORTH AMERICA; CONYER;
STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANIES HAWAII; AON;
TOKIO MARINE INSURANCE GROUP;
PENTAGON FEDERAL CREDIT UNION; NCUA; BANK OF HAWAII;
CREDIT SUISSE; BARCLAYS DE;
COUNTY OF MAUI CORPORATION COUNSEL,
AND ALL OTHER ADDITIONAL DEFENDANTS FILED THEREFORE
AND COUNSEL OF RECORD
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-03117)
District Judge: Honorable Wendy Beetlestone
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 13, 2026

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Before: BIBAS, CHUNG, and BOVE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 14, 2026)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Pro se Appellant Livia M. Scotto appeals from the dismissal of her civil complaint
with prejudice. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the District Court’s
judgment.
In June 2025, Scotto filed a complaint alleging “fraudulent and deceptive
corporate agency,” “Quasi contract fraud, illegality collections, fraud, duress [and]
Liability cul[p]ability.” It named more than 25 defendants including Citibank, the United
States Department of Education, and Tokio Marine Insurance Group. The District Court
granted Scotto’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), screened the complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and dismissed it for failing to comply with the
pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. The dismissal was without
prejudice and with leave to amend to properly identify all defendants and state the basis
for her claims against each of them.
Scotto filed an amended complaint, as well as a motion to recuse the District Court
judge and an emergency motion for the appointment of counsel. The District Court
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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denied the motions, noting that they “d[id] not contain a parsable statement of facts and
legal authorities.” ECF No. 13 at 1 n.1. In her amended complaint, Scotto named the
following defendants in the caption: Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo Active Cash Visa
Signature Card, Maimonides Medical Center, Wells Fargo Cash Back Visa Signature
Card, Barclays, Ally, Visa, State Farm Insurance Co., and the Mars Corporation. Also,
within the amended complaint, she named as defendants numerous other businesses and
individuals. Scotto claimed diversity and federal question jurisdiction, but listed non-
existent federal statutes as the basis for the latter.
Scotto alleged that there were “various illegal electronic funds transfers [and] cash
advances on cards, accounts,” and that, sometime between 2012 and 2015, “without our
knowledge accounts were used with cloned cards.” ECF No. 9 at 4. She listed a series of
illegal transactions: “bank fraud unauthorized charges,” “credit card accounts opened by
Bank employees,” “identity theft,” “data breach,” “denial of wire transfers,” “loans
diverted,” and “denial of investigatory fraud in unauthorized use of service accounts.” Id.
Scotto alleged that there was a “denial of credit charge back on sixteen different Visa
signature cards,” an “EU grant loan diverted over $670,970,” and the “denial of bank
funds to beneficiary [account] with trustee account embezzled by bank employees.” Id.
She sought relief for “economic harms” and “assault.” Id. at 5.
By order entered September 8, 2025, the District Court dismissed the amended
complaint with prejudice for failing to comply with Rule 8. It concluded that Scotto’s
allegations in the amended complaint were “incomprehensible,” and that “[n]o defendant
could reasonably be expected to respond to her allegations because they are confused,

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ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible allegations.” ECF No. 14 at 1, 5. Scotto
timely appealed from that order.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a dismissal for
failure to comply with Rule 8 for abuse of discretion. See In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig.,
90 F.3d 696, 702 (3d Cir. 1996). To survive dismissal, the complaint “must not be so
undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is
contemplated by Rule 8.” Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir.
2008) (quoting marks and citation omitted).
Scotto’s complaint, even when liberally construed, fails to comply with Rule 8.
See Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019) (recognizing that “a court
must make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from the inadvertent
forfeiture of important rights due merely to their lack of legal training”). “Rule 8
imposes minimal burdens on the plaintiff at the pleading stage,” requiring only “a short
and plain statement of the claim[s]” and the grounds for jurisdiction. Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Its purpose is to ensure that pleadings include the
requisite who, what, and why, that is, to “give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty.
Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (citation omitted).
As to the “who,” the pleadings must “identif[y] discrete defendants.” Garrett, 938
F.3d at 93 (citation omitted). Although Scotto named various defendants, she did not
allege which of those defendants are responsible for the alleged harm; in other words, she
did not allege who did what. And as for the what, Scotto largely named a list of allegedly

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illegal transactions, but did not assert any facts to support a cause of action. She alleged
in a conclusory fashion that “our” bank accounts were “used with cloned cards,” and that
there were “illegal electronic funds transfers”; however, she did not tie those transactions
to a specific defendant. As the District Court concluded, the complaint was too vague to
reasonably expect the defendants to respond.
Thus, because the complaint did not pass Rule 8 muster, the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing it. And because the District Court gave Scotto leave to
amend the initial complaint while identifying the initial complaint’s deficiencies, and
Scotto responded by filing an entirely new complaint that named different defendants and
was equally as deficient as the first, dismissal with prejudice was proper. See Jones v.
Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver and Transp. Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019)
(affirming dismissal with prejudice where the plaintiff had “already had two chances to
tell his story”).
Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.1
1 Scotto’s pending motions are denied.

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