Emmanuel Tyree Holliday v. CENTURION MEDICAL /D.O.C. Company

ALD-129 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 25-2886
___________
EMMANUEL TYREE HOLLIDAY,
Appellant
v.
CENTURION MEDICAL /D.O.C. Company;
KOLAWOLE AKIN BYO, The Warden of this Jail;
CHRISTIN CLAUDIO, Health Services Admin/Medical
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-01310)
District Judge: Honorable Colm F. Connolly
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect,
Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 7, 2026
Before: SHWARTZ, FREEMAN, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed May 20, 2026 )
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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Emmanuel Holliday, a former Delaware state pretrial detainee proceeding pro se
and in forma pauperis, appeals from District Court orders dismissing his claims against
two defendants, granting summary judgment in favor of the two remaining defendants,
and denying his motion to appoint counsel. For the following reasons, we will summarily
affirm.
I.
Holliday filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several
defendants: (1) Christine Claudio, a Health Services Administrator; (2) Christine Onofrio,
a Consult Coordinator; (3) Centurion Medical/D.O.C. Company (“Centurion Medical”);
and (4) Warden Kolawole Akinbyo (“Warden Akinbyo”). Holliday alleged that the
defendants violated his constitutional rights while he was in Delaware state prison as a
pretrial detainee. Specifically, Holliday claimed that the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his shoulder pain because they did not order an MRI or schedule medical
consultations with orthopedic surgeons in a timely manner.
The District Court sua sponte dismissed without prejudice Holliday’s claims
against Centurion Medical and Warden Akinbyo. Claudio and Onofrio then moved for
summary judgment, arguing that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether
they intentionally acted with deliberate indifference to Holliday’s medical needs or
otherwise violated his constitutional rights. The District Court granted that motion.
Holliday appealed.
II.

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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(4)
(“The notice of appeal encompasses all orders that, for purposes of appeal, merge into the
designated judgment or appealable order.”). We exercise de novo review over the
District Court’s order sua sponte dismissing Centurion Medical and Warden Akinbyo for
failure to state a claim. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We
also exercise plenary review over the District Court’s summary judgment decision in
favor of the defendants. See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d
Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is
sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We may
summarily affirm on any basis supported by the record if the appeal fails to present a
substantial question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per
curiam); see 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4.
III.
The District Court properly dismissed Holliday’s claims against Centurion
Medical and Warden Akinbyo for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). While pro se pleadings should be liberally construed and held to less
stringent standards than those prepared by attorneys, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976), pro se litigants “still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to
support a claim,” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir.

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2013). Even liberally construed, Holliday’s complaint failed to assert “that there was a
relevant [Centurion Medical] policy or custom, and that the policy caused the
constitutional violation . . . allege[d].” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d
575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs. of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)). Similarly, Holliday’s complaint against Warden Akinbyo did
not make out a plausible claim. Non-medical prison employees like Warden Akinbyo
cannot be held liable for deliberate indifference “absent a reason to believe (or actual
knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a
prisoner.” See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). Holliday alleged he
complained to Warden Akinbyo once about his shoulder pain, but prison administrators
cannot be deliberately indifferent “simply because they failed to respond directly to the
medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by the prison doctor.”
See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the warden of a
state correctional facility and State Commissioner for Corrections could not be
considered deliberately indifferent merely because they did not respond to multiple letters
from the prisoner).
Furthermore, the District Court properly granted Onofrio and Claudio’s summary
judgment motion. Holliday argued that the delay in providing him with medical care and
scheduling outside medical consultations with two orthopedic surgeons constituted
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Onofrio and Claudio did not dispute
that Holliday’s shoulder pain constituted a serious medical need. They argued, however,
that they were not deliberately indifferent.

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Onofrio, the Consult Coordinator, was responsible for scheduling medical
appointments for inmates at the direction of prison medical providers who submitted
consultation requests. In Holliday’s case, Onofrio was required to search for in-network
orthopedic specialists during the COVID-19 pandemic, when providers were reluctant to
accept non-emergent cases. Onofrio’s role was “mostly administrative,” although she
also “provide[d] very limited clinical care, such as heart monitoring.” As the Health
Services Administrator, Claudio’s “solely administrative” role included overseeing the
Consult Coordinator; she did not “provide any clinical care or otherwise treat the
incarcerated persons.”
On February 22, 2021, Onofrio and Claudio received a prison medical provider’s
request for an MRI of Holliday’s shoulder. That request was not marked “emergent,” and
Onofrio scheduled the test for March 23, 2021. The MRI results prompted a medical
provider to submit a consultation request on March 24, 2021, for Holliday to see an
orthopedic surgeon. Onofrio arranged for Holliday to meet with that orthopedic surgeon
on April 23, 2021. That surgeon recommended that Holliday be examined by a more
qualified surgeon who specialized in trauma-related orthopedic surgery. Consequently,
on April 26, 2021, a medical provider submitted a consultation request for Holliday to see
an orthopedic trauma surgeon. That same day, Onofrio began searching state-wide for an
orthopedic trauma surgeon who would accept Holliday as a patient.
During the six months following the consultation request, Onofrio “followed up
weekly with various practitioners, contacts, and open sources” for an orthopedic trauma
surgeon who would accept Holliday’s case. On October 26, 2021, Onofrio located an

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out-of-state orthopedic trauma surgeon, Dr. James Krieg, who was willing to meet with
Holliday for a consultation on November 16, 2021. At that appointment, Dr. Krieg
examined Holliday but “declined to participate further in [Holliday’s] care,” advising that
Holliday needed a shoulder specialist and that “Dr. Krieg could do nothing for
[Holliday].” On December 17, 2021, the prison medical director approved a request for
Holliday to be seen by a shoulder specialist. Onofrio began a search, but Holliday was
released on January 26, 2022, before a specialist could be located.
Even assuming Onofrio and Claudio were medical officials responsible for his
care, Holliday failed to present any evidence, other than his own allegations, from which
a reasonable factfinder could determine that they intentionally delayed providing him
with medical treatment for his left shoulder pain. Additionally, there is no evidence that
Onofrio or Claudio had any reason to believe or actual knowledge that any of the doctors
Holliday saw were mistreating him. See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236. Holliday’s speculative
allegations are insufficient to allow his deliberate indifference claims to survive summary
judgment. See Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[A]n inference
based upon a speculation or conjecture does not create a material factual dispute
sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” (quoting Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914
F.2d 360, 382 n.12 (3d Cir. 1990))). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Holliday, as we must, he has failed to show a genuine issue of material fact that would

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enable his deliberate indifference claims to survive summary judgment. Accordingly, the
District Court properly granted Onofrio and Claudio’s summary judgment motion.1
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude this appeal does not present a substantial
question. Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
1 To the extent that Holliday challenges the denial of his motion for appointment of
counsel, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request. Tabron v.
Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993).

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