Terrance Brunson v. Judge John J. Whelan

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 26-1103
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TERRANCE BRUNSON,
Appellant
v.
JUDGE JOHN J. WHELAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
DELAWARE COUNTY SHERIFF, IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
PF HILLSIDE MANOR LP; CHAIM PURETZ GEN PTR
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(E.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-07361)
District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 28, 2026
Before: BIBAS, CHUNG, and BOVE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 29, 2026)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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Pro se appellant Terrance Brunson appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of
his complaint and the denial of his requests for injunctive relief. For the reasons that
follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
In August 2024, Brunson’s landlord initiated eviction proceedings against Brunson
in the Delaware County Magisterial District Court, and judgment was entered in favor of
his landlord that same month. Brunson appealed the judgment and has alleged that his
civil rights were somehow violated when his landlord filed a complaint with a claim for
ejectment as part of that appeal.1
In November 2025, after a non-jury trial in the Court of Common Pleas, Brunson
was ordered to vacate the property within 45 days. Brunson appealed that decision to the
Pennsylvania Superior Court.2
While his Superior Court appeal was still pending, Brunson initiated the
underlying federal action in the District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking: (1)
injunctive relief preventing the execution of the state court’s November 2025 order or an
eviction on any other basis; and (2) declaratory relief voiding the November 2025 order
and announcing that the trial court violated his civil rights because the matter should have
been stayed based on his interpretation of the state court’s April 2025 order. Brunson has
1 After a tenant appeals a judgment from a magisterial district court, the landlord is
required to file a complaint in the court of common pleas, see 246 Pa. Code § 1004(B),
and “the proceeding on appeal shall be conducted de novo in accordance with the Rules
of Civil Procedure that would be applicable if the action was initially commenced in the
court of common pleas,” § 1007.
2 Brunson filed several motions seeking an emergency stay from the Pennsylvania
Superior Court in November and December 2025, but those motions were denied.

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argued that in April 2025, the Court of Common Pleas stayed the August 2024 judgment
while his appeal was pending, which should have prevented the trial from occurring. He
has also contended that he filed a motion challenging the court’s jurisdiction that was
never addressed.3 After granting Brunson leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the District
Court screened his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismissed it for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Brunson timely appealed.4
We will affirm.5 The District Court appropriately dismissed Brunson’s claims and
requests for injunctive relief based on his allegations that his due process rights were
violated during the state court eviction proceedings. Brunson’s arguments center on
conclusory allegations of fraud and mischaracterizations of state court orders. The state
court dockets show that Brunson had many opportunities to raise challenges to his
eviction proceedings in state court — and did so, repeatedly. The fact that Brunson’s
arguments were unsuccessful, or that he disagrees with the way the state court handled
3 The state court docket reveals that the Court of Common Pleas denied several motions
where Brunson raised jurisdictional arguments, and the Court ultimately ordered Brunson
not to file additional motions. Brunson filed dozens of repetitive motions during the
course of that proceeding.
4 Brunson’s appeal to the Superior Court has since been quashed. On appeal to this
Court, Bruson sought emergency relief, which we denied. To the extent that Brunson
raises new allegations or arguments in his appellate brief, we cannot consider them for
the first time on appeal. See Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel Highlands, 705 F.3d 80,
88 n.12 (3d Cir. 2013).
5 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the
dismissal of Brunson’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220,
223 (3d Cir. 2000).

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his case, does not amount to a due process violation.6 See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”) (citation modified). The
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brunson leave to amend as futile
under the circumstances of this case. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103,
106 (3d Cir. 2002).
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
6 To the extent that Brunson sought review and rejection of the state court judgment, his
claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See T. M. v. Univ. of Maryland Med.
Sys. Corp., No. 25-197, 2026 WL 1751823, at *7 (U.S. June 18, 2026). However, we
understand him to have primarily alleged an independent constitutional injury, which
falls outside the scope of that doctrine. See Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 172–73 (3d Cir. 2010).

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