Kerian N. Pelenah v. University of Pennsylvania Health Systems

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 26-1422
__________
KERIAN N. PELENAH,
Appellant
v.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA HEALTH SYSTEMS
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-02972)
District Judge: Honorable Mary Kay Costello
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 8, 2026
Before: MATEY, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 16, 2026)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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Kerian N. Pelenah, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the
District Court’s order dismissing his complaint with prejudice. For the following reasons,
we will affirm.
In June 2025, Pelenah filed a complaint in the District Court against his former
employer, University of Pennsylvania Health Systems (“Penn Health”). Pelenah brought
claims of discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17. The District Court granted
Pelenah permission to proceed IFP and subsequently dismissed the complaint without
prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), advising that “merely checking boxes on
the [complaint] form and attaching exhibits is not sufficient to allege plausible claims[.]”
ECF 5 at 9 n.2.
Pelenah filed an amended complaint, and the District Court again dismissed his
claims, explaining that is insufficient to state a claim for relief. ECF 9 at 3. The District
Court also granted Pelenah 30 days to file an amended complaint that “complie[d] with
the [c]ourt’s directives and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” See id. Pelenah filed a
second amended complaint, which the District Court determined failed to cure the
deficiencies of the first two. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, and
Pelenah timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise de novo review over
the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

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We agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Pelenah’s complaint. Pelenah, who
is originally from Liberia, purports to bring claims pursuant to Title VII, which
“proscribe[s] discrimination in employment based on several personal characteristics”
including race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. E.E.O.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 778
F.3d 444, 448-49 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). Although Pelenah
initially checked the national-origin box on the complaint form, he later clarified—
repeatedly—that national origin was not the basis for his claims.1 Because his pleadings
did not allege that he suffered adverse action because of his national origin, or
membership in any other protected class, Pelenah failed to state a Title VII discrimination
claim. See Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that
the “central focus” of a prima facie discrimination claim is whether the employer is
treating employees less favorably than others because of their protected characteristics).
Similarly, Pelenah failed to state a plausible claim for discrimination under a hostile work
environment theory, as he did not present any factual allegations showing that Penn
Health was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” See Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citation modified) (analyzing a Title VII
1 Pelenah did not argue in his initial complaint that the alleged discrimination and hostile
work environment were based on his membership in a protected class. Indeed, his second
amended complaint states that “[c]hecking national origin as the basis for discrimination
in my initial complaint was a genuine error. Had my national origin been the basis for
retaliation, I would have explained further[.]” See ECF 10-1 at 1. Moreover, Pelenah
explains in his appellate brief that his amended complaint “clarif[ied] that [he] was
retaliated against not based on [his] national origin, but for complaining of harassment
and discrimination by [his] supervisor to the Human Resource Department.” C.A. Doc. 6
at 2.

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hostile work environment claim). Pelenah makes vague references to discrimination and
harassment in his second amended complaint, but he did not provide any specific
examples of the alleged discriminatory treatment. See Kengerski v. Harper, 6 F.4th 531,
537 (3d Cir. 2021) (“To succeed on [a hostile-work-environment claim], a plaintiff needs
to show that the environment was actually hostile, i.e., that the offensive conduct at work
was either ‘severe’ or ‘pervasive.’” (citation modified)).
Further, Pelenah’s retaliation claim failed because his pleadings do not plausibly
allege that he engaged in a “protected activity” within the meaning of Title VII. See
Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing requirements for
a Title VII retaliation claim). Pelenah’s complaints to his employer did not concern
discrimination or harassment based on a protected class; rather, he complained about
“written warnings (adverse action) that had become a pattern and retaliatory tactic
employed by the management team following a series of email exchanges in which [he]
had been critical of the [ ] team’s actions regarding perceived scheduling errors and
attendance issues.”2 ECF 10-1 at 5. And a complaint to Human Resources “about unfair
treatment in general” does not constitute protected conduct when it does “not specifically
complain about [protected class] discrimination.” See Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68
F.3d 694, 701-02 (3d Cir. 1995).
2 In his EEOC charge, Pelenah identified “retaliation” as the basis for his discrimination.
See ECF 1 at 40. He also stated that he was “critical of practices . . . concerning how
others performed their duties,” and indicates that, as a result of said criticism, he received
disciplinary notices for absenteeism, lateness, and failure to follow procedure, and was
eventually fired. Id.

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On appeal, Pelenah argues that the District Court erred because his filing of a
complaint with human resources was “based on a ‘reasonable, good-faith belief’ that the
practice complained of was unlawful[,] [which] is essentially a protected activity[.]” C.A.
Doc. 6 at 4. Not so. While an employee may prevail on a claim for retaliation even where
the underlying conduct complained of was not unlawful under Title VII, they must
demonstrate an objectively reasonable, good-faith belief that the activity is unlawful
under that statute. See Clark Cnty. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (per curiam)
(rejecting retaliation claim where “no reasonable person could have believed” that the
underlying conduct “violated Title VII’s standard” for discrimination). In his second
amended complaint, Pelenah avers that he filed his HR complaint because of “written
warnings” regarding purported scheduling errors and attendance disputes, ECF 10-1 at 5,
but he does not state, or even imply, that he reasonably believed his employer’s conduct
violated Title VII. See Barber, 68 F.3d at 702 (holding that a letter to an employer’s
Human Resources Department was not protected activity because it neither “explicitly or
implicitly” alleged that a protected characteristic was the basis for the adverse
employment action); see also Kelly v. Howard I. Shapiro & Assocs. Consulting Eng’rs,
P.C., 716 F.3d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“A plaintiff’s belief . . . is not
reasonable simply because he or she complains of something that appears to be
discrimination in some form.”).
Finally, we agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Pelenah’s complaint
without another opportunity for amendment. The “District Court has discretion to deny a
plaintiff leave to amend where the plaintiff was put on notice as to the deficiencies in his

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complaint, but chose not to resolve them.” Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. LLC,
305 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Here, the District Court’s prior orders
dismissing Pelenah’s complaint without prejudice explained how he could properly plead
his claims, yet he still failed to do so. Therefore, the District Court properly determined
that further amendment would be futile. See Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver &
Transp. Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that a district court did not
abuse its discretion when it denied leave to amend after providing two opportunities for
amendment).
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

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