in Re: Jayden Martin; Sparkle Martin v. Med. Coll. Of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 883 3d Cir. 1991 . Second, the court alleviated…

HLD-020 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 26-1708
___________
IN RE: JAYDEN MARTIN; SPARKLE MARTIN,
Petitioners
____________________________________
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
(Related to D.N.J. Civ. No. 1:23-cv-21669)
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
July 2, 2026
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 24, 2026)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
Jayden and Sparkle Martin have filed a petition for a writ of mandamus directed to
their ongoing case in the District Court. We will deny their petition.
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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I.
Sparkle1 filed a complaint in New Jersey state court on behalf of herself and
purportedly on behalf of her son Jayden, who then was a minor but now is 18. Their
primary claim was that, when Sparkle tried to enroll Jayden in the Lenape Regional High
School, the School District refused to enroll him in violation of the McKinney-Vento
Homeless Assistance Act. Sparkle also purported to assert claims on behalf of herself
and Jayden (who has autism) under the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, the
Americans With Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act.
The defendants removed the complaint to federal court, and each side filed
dispositive motions. Sparkle also filed a motion for appointment of counsel. By opinion
and order entered August 14, 2024, the District Court addressed these motions in relevant
part as follows. (ECF Nos. 29 &30.) First, the court held that Sparkle could not litigate
claims pro se on behalf of Jayden because he was then a minor. See Osei-Afriyie v. Med.
Coll. Of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991). Second, the court alleviated that issue by
deciding to appoint counsel for Jayden, and it decided to appoint counsel for Sparkle too.
Third, the court held that Sparkle could pursue a claim on her own behalf for violation of
the IDEA (which claim the court dismissed without prejudice for lack of exhaustion) and
for violation of the McKinney-Vento Act. Fourth, the court held that the School District
did indeed violate the McKinney-Vento Act by refusing to enroll Jayden and that
1 When referring to petitioners individually, we use their first names for ease of reference
and without intending any undue informality or disrespect.

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violations of that Act are enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But fifth, the court held
that plaintiffs cannot recover damages for this violation unless they establish the School
District’s municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
These rulings allowed Jayden to pursue his claims through appointed counsel and
allowed Sparkle, also through appointed counsel, to amend her IDEA claim and pursue
damages for violation of the McKinney-Vento Act on a Monell theory. Toward these
ends, the court appointed counsel (ECF No. 31), who later filed an amended complaint on
behalf of both Jayden and Sparkle (ECF No. 38). Defendants answered the amended
complaint (ECF No. 40), and the District Court entered an amended scheduling order
teeing up the case to proceed to discovery.
But things soon went sideways. About two weeks after the court entered its
amended scheduling order, appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw reporting
irreconcilable differences with Sparkle, who counsel reported had been contacting
defendants and the court on her own. (ECF No. 47.) The court granted counsel’s motion
to withdraw and advised Sparkle that it would not appoint new counsel for her because
she had shown an ability to represent herself. (ECF Nos. 49 & 50.) But because Jayden
was a still a minor, the court appointed new counsel for him. (ECF Nos. 53 & 57.)
The case took another turn when Jayden’s new counsel apparently requested
“funding for a disability advocate to facilitate communication with her client.” (ECF No.

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73.)2 That request prompted the Magistrate Judge to schedule a meeting with Jayden and
counsel. Following that meeting and additional correspondence from counsel, who
advised the court that Jayden had then turned 18, the Magistrate Judge ordered the
appointment of a guardian ad litem for Jayden by order entered August 7, 2025. (ECF
No. 80.)3 The order also directed counsel to identify an appropriate person to serve as the
guardian. Just four days later, Jayden’s new counsel too filed a motion to withdraw and
requested appointment of new counsel experienced in education or disability law. (ECF
No. 81.) Sparkle then filed a motion to vacate the guardianship order as unwarranted.
(ECF No. 84.) Jayden too objected to the order and also requested new counsel
experienced in education law. (ECF No. 85.) The District Court held a hearing on
Sparkle’s motion to vacate the guardianship order and denied the motion on September
2 We say “apparently” because the only mention of this request in the record is a
Magistrate Judge’s reference to the request in the text-only order at ECF No. 73.
3 Although the Magistrate Judge ordered appointment of a “guardian ad litem,” we do not
read the order to appoint such a guardian in the ordinary sense. For example, the
Magistrate Judge specified that she was addressing and granting Jayden’s counseled
request for a “disability advocate.” And while the Magistrate Judge proceeded to rely on
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2), which authorizes appointment of a guardian or other appropriate
protection only for “a minor or incompetent person,” Jayden had turned 18 by that time
and the Magistrate Judge does not appear to have found him incompetent. The
Magistrate Judge also specified that the guardian would not have decision-making
authority and would instead merely facilitate Jayden’s participation in the litigation.
Nevertheless, we will refer herein to a “guardian” as the Magistrate Judge did. We also
note that, although this order is sealed in the District Court, petitioners have attached it to
their mandamus petition and have not requested sealing in this Court. They also have
requested the unsealing of documents in the District Court. We express no opinion on
that issue but note that we describe the order herein because petitioners challenge that
order and have themselves filed it publicly in this Court. See also n.4, infra.

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16, 2025. (ECF No. 91.) The court also apparently ordered Jayden’s counsel to continue
seeking an appropriate person to serve as his guardian.
Three further developments since then are presently relevant. First, the Magistrate
Judge entered an order advising that she had received a “letter from a health care provider
relaying Plaintiff Sparkle Martin’s request for a stay of the case due to certain medical
concerns.” (ECF No. 107.) In response, the Magistrate Judge ordered the matter
administratively terminated as to Sparkle pending further updates.
Second, Jayden’s counsel filed letters advising the Magistrate Judge that she was
still trying to locate someone to serve as Jayden’s guardian. Those letters prompted the
Magistrate Judge to enter an order administratively terminating the matter as to Jayden
too. (ECF No. 118.) The Magistrate Judge also directed counsel to continue filing status
reports regarding her efforts and directed Sparkle to file status reports regarding her
desire to proceed with the case. (Id.)
Third, Sparkle and Jayden thereafter filed a flurry of pro se motions, including a
motion and amended motion to vacate the administrative terminations and reopen the
case. (ECF Nos. 121 & 124.) In these and other filings, they argued that Jayden did not
want or need a guardian and advised the court that Jayden instead wanted Sparkle to
proceed on his behalf pursuant to a power of attorney. For that reason and others,
Jayden’s counsel then filed a second motion to withdraw. (ECF No. 122.) After Sparkle
later filed over a dozen other motions and other documents, the District Court entered an
order on March 13, 2026. (ECF No. 142.) The order directed the court’s Clerk to

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administratively terminate all pending motions other than the second motion of Jayden’s
counsel to withdraw. The order also states that “the Court will address the issues of
reopening this matter and pro bono representation in due course.” (Id.) About two weeks
later, Jayden and Sparkle filed the mandamus petition at issue here.4
II.
A writ of mandamus is a “drastic” and “extraordinary remedy” that we have the
discretion to grant only when, inter alia, the petitioner has a “clear and indisputable” right
to relief and no other way to obtain it. In re Pressman-Gutman Co., 459 F.3d 383, 398-
99 (3d Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). Under this standard, we deny petitioners’ petition
because the forms of intervention they seek are not warranted at this time.
Petitioners’ primary request is that we vacate the administrative termination of
their claims and order the District Court to proceed. We see no need to do so. A district
court’s inaction can warrant mandamus relief when it amounts to a failure to exercise
jurisdiction. See Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996). But in this case,
petitioners filed their petition just two weeks after the court entered an order stating its
intention to address reopening and the issue of representation “in due course.” And
although more time has passed since then, we discern no undue delay given the
4 As noted above, Jayden is now an adult and does not appear to have been adjudicated
incompetent. He also has personally signed documents in support of the mandamus
petition. Thus, we see no impediment to his ability to proceed with the petition on his
own behalf. In so noting, we express no opinion on the merits of the guardianship order,
the issue of Jayden’s representation in the District Court, or how that court should
conduct its own further proceedings.

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challenges posed by this difficult case. We instead commend the District Court for its
attention to this matter thus far, and we so no reason not to take the court at its word that
it will address reopening and proceed with the case in due course.
Petitioners also raise a number of arguments regarding how they want the court to
proceed with the case. We see no need for our intervention in that regard either. We
address three of petitioners’ specific requests.
First, petitioners ask us to vacate the Magistrate Judge’s order finding it
appropriate to appoint a guardian ad litem for Jayden.5 They argue that Jayden requested
only a disability advocate, not a guardian, and that a guardian is unnecessary because
Jayden is a competent adult. If the Magistrate Judge’s order were a true guardianship
order, then petitioners’ arguments might raise concerns. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2)
(authorizing appointment of a guardian ad litem or other appropriate protection only for
“a minor or incompetent person”).
5 Sparkle unsuccessfully sought District Court review of this order, and there may be
some question whether it was then immediately appealable or could have been certified
for immediate appeal. Compare In re Pressman-Gutman, 459 F.3d at 395-98 (holding
that an order was not immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine where it
appointed a guardian ad litem for an entity rather than a person who has the right to
proceed pro se), with id. at 410 (Irenas, J., dissenting). If so, then mandamus on this issue
might be inappropriate for that reason alone. See id. at 398, 399 n.15. But we need not
decide that point because we are denying relief for other reasons. We further note that
we decline to construe the mandamus petition as a notice of appeal on this issue because,
if it were a notice of appeal, it would be long untimely. See In re Arunachalam, 812 F.3d
290, 293 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam).

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But the order is not a true guardianship order as noted above. And the District
Court evidently is attuned to petitioners’ concerns because it denied Sparkle’s request to
vacate the guardianship order after holding a hearing on the issue. The record does not
reveal why,6 but the court can consider that issue further if necessary in considering the
issues of reopening and representation. We note that, if Jayden is not incompetent within
the meaning of Rule 17(c), there might be no impediment to his ability to pursue this
litigation as he wishes, including by adopting Sparkle’s filings. But we express no
opinion on that issue and instead leave the manner of conducting further proceedings to
the discretion of the District Court.
Second, petitioners ask us to order the court, after reopening this matter, to
immediately determine and award damages. They argue that the court already has found
the School District liable for damages and all that remains to be determined is the
amount.7 Petitioners are mistaken. The court has held only that damages potentially are
available under § 1983 for the School District’s violation of the McKinney-Vento Act but
that Sparkle must first prove that the School District is liable for damages under Monell.
Petitioners have filed an amended complaint asserting Monell liability, the School
6 The court’s order states that it denied this relief for the reasons it stated on the record at
the hearing, but the hearing evidently has not been transcribed.
7 They also argue that they need immediate funds for various reasons, and they ask us to
order an immediate interim award of damages. That request is denied.

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District has answered the complaint, and whether the School District is liable for
damages remains to be determined.
Third, petitioners ask us to order the reassignment of this matter to a new judge. It
is not clear whether they request reassignment to a new Magistrate Judge, a new District
Judge, or both. But to the extent that petitioners seek recusal or disqualification of the
Magistrate Judge, they should address that request to the Magistrate Judge first and then
to the District Court if necessary. See Cole v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 366 F.3d 813, 817-20 (9th
Cir. 2004); In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2003). And to the
extent that petitioners seek the same relief as to the District Judge, they should address
that request to the District Judge in the first instance. Cf. In re Kensington, 353 F.3d at
224. In noting the appropriate way to request this relief, we do not suggest that it is due.
To the contrary, petitioners’ requests appear to be based largely on the kinds of “judicial
rulings” and “administration efforts” that typically do not state a basis for recusal or
disqualification. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 556 (1994). Nevertheless,
petitioners can raise these issues in the District Court as noted above.8
8 Petitioners also can raise with that court their requests for leave to file a supplemental
complaint and to “disqualify” Jayden’s appointed counsel. We deny those requests
without prejudice for that reason.

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III.
For these reasons, the petition for a writ of mandamus is denied. Petitioners’
motions and other requests for relief are denied as well except to the extent that we
permit and have considered all of their filings in this Court.9
9 Petitioners’ other requests are either unnecessary or unwarranted. For example, they
ask us to prohibit the District Court from “blocking” their filings through the Clerk’s
Office, but we see no indication of any restrictions on their ability to file documents with
the court. Petitioners also ask us to reverse a finding that Sparkle is “incapacitated,” but
we see no such finding. Nor do we see grounds for any other relief.

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