Robert Bolus, individually, and d/b/a BOLUS TRUCK SALES CENTER v. Fleetwood Rv, Inc.; Tom Johnson Camping Center Charlotte, Inc.; Cummins Atlantic, LLC

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1922
ROBERT BOLUS, individually, and d/b/a BOLUS TRUCK SALES
CENTER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
FLEETWOOD RV, INC.; TOM JOHNSON CAMPING CENTER CHARLOTTE,
INC.; CUMMINS ATLANTIC, LLC,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:12-cv-00898-NCT-JLW)
Submitted: March 31, 2016 Decided: April 25, 2016
Before WYNN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Norman B. Smith, SMITH, JAMES, ROWLETT & COHEN, LLP, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Reid Calwell Adams, Jr., Travis
L. Wherry, WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE, LLP, Winston-Salem,
North Carolina; Valerie B. Mullican, BARNES & THORNBURG LLP,
Grand Rapids, Michigan; Marc E. Gustafson, ESSEX RICHARDS, P.A.,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Robert Bolus and Bolus Truck Sales & Center, Inc. (Bolus)
appeal the district court’s order dismissing his suit for
failure to comply with an order to pay Appellees’ attorney’s
fees. The district court found that Bolus’ failure to take any
action for five months after the case was transferred from the
Middle District of Pennsylvania led Appellees to incur
litigation costs, and ordered Bolus to pay Appellees’ reasonable
attorney’s fees “incurred in bringing and litigating their
motions to dismiss and all matters reasonably stemming
therefrom.” The court also found that Bolus was required to re-
serve process on two Appellees, but granted his request for an
extension of time to complete this service, conditioned on
Bolus’ payment of the attorney’s fees.
Appellees requested a total of $35,415.70 in attorney’s
fees. Bolus moved for reconsideration of the sanctions order,
arguing that he could not afford to pay this amount. Bolus also
stated that if the court denied his motion, he would seek an
immediate appeal of the fee award under Fed. R. App. P. 5. The
court denied the motion to reconsider, found that “Bolus has
elected not to pay attorneys’ fees” as ordered, and dismissed
the case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f)(1) and
37(b)(2)(A)(v).

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Rule 16(f)(1) authorizes sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(vii), including dismissal, “if a party or its
attorney: (A) fails to appear at a scheduling or other pretrial
conference; (B) is substantially unprepared to participate—or
does not participate in good faith—in the conference; or (C)
fails to obey a scheduling or other pretrial order.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 16(f)(1), 37(b)(2)(A)(v). The Rule also authorizes the
court to require the noncomplying party “to pay the reasonable
expenses—including attorney’s fees—incurred because of any
noncompliance with this rule.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f)(2). We
review a dismissal under Rule 37 for abuse of discretion.
Hathcock v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 53 F.3d 36, 40 (4th
Cir. 1995). Bolus argues that no sanctions were appropriate
because he did not violate a court order and that any violation
did not warrant sanctions because it was caused by the court’s
erroneous implication that Bolus could not represent himself.*
Because Bolus failed to comply with the court’s November
19, 2012, scheduling order and Local Rule 16.1(b), we conclude
that sanctions were authorized under Rule 16(f). We also
* Bolus also argues that re-service of process was
unnecessary. We do not reach this issue because the district
court dismissed the case for failure to comply with court
orders, not for lack of service of process, and we conclude that
disposition of this issue would not affect the outcome of this
case.

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conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that Bolus’ failure to exercise greater diligence in
seeking local counsel warranted sanctions. Although Bolus
argues that he would have appeared pro se had he known this was
an option, Bolus Truck is a corporation, and “may appear in the
federal courts only through licensed counsel.” Rowland v. Cal.
Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1993). Moreover, Bolus’
belief that he could not represent himself does not explain his
failure to seek local counsel in the months prior to January
2013 after Pennsylvania counsel failed to promptly do so.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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