United States of America v. Deante Lamont Banks

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4629
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DEANTE LAMONT BANKS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:15-cr-00023-CCE-1)
Submitted: May 24, 2016 Decided: June 16, 2016
Before AGEE, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Todd A. Smith, LAW OFFICE OF TODD ALLEN SMITH, Graham, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Terry M. Meinecke, Assistant United States Attorney, Winston-
Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Deante Lamont Banks appeals his conviction following his
guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2012). Two
prior North Carolina convictions served as predicate felonies
for purposes of § 922(g)(1): possession of cocaine, for which
the state court sentenced Banks to 6 to 17 months of
imprisonment, and possession of a schedule II controlled
substance, for which the state court sentenced him to 5 to 15
months of imprisonment. On appeal, Banks asserts that the
offenses were not felonies because neither exposed him to an
active prison term of more than 12 months. We affirm.
In United States v. Barlow, 811 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2015),
we addressed the impact of the Justice Reinvestment Act of 2011
(“JRA”), 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 192, on the North Carolina
Structured Sentencing Act. “[T]he Structured Sentencing Act and
its statutory tables determine if a crime is punishable by a
term of imprisonment of more than one year.” Id. at 137; see
United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 240, 249-50 (4th Cir.
2011) (en banc). “[T]he [JRA] mandates terms of post-release
supervision for all convicted felons except those serving
sentences of life without parole.” Barlow, 811 F.3d at 137. In
Banks’ case, the JRA required him to serve 9 months of his 6-to-
17-month and 5-to-15-month sentences on postrelease supervision.

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We reiterated in Barlow that, in determining whether a
prior term of imprisonment qualifies as a felony, Simmons
requires us to “ask only what term of imprisonment the defendant
was exposed to for his conviction, not the most likely duration
of his imprisonment.” Id. at 140. We held that “state law
renders post-release supervision part of the term of
imprisonment,” id., such that “all North Carolina felonies now
qualify as federal predicate felonies,” id. at 137.
Thus, as Banks acknowledges, our decision in Barlow
forecloses his appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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