United States of America v. William A. Merritt

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4715
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM A. MERRITT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Newport News. Arenda L. Wright Allen, District Judge. (4:18-cr-00016-AWA-LRL-1)
Submitted: March 21, 2019 Decided: April 30, 2019
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, THACKER, Circuit Judge, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Bryan L. Saunders, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellant. Robert Edward Bradenham,
II, Assistant United States Attorney, Megan Marina Cowles, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newport News, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
William A. Merritt pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). The district court sentenced Merritt to 78
months of imprisonment and he now appeals. On appeal, counsel filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether the sentence is
reasonable. The Government, however, has moved to dismiss the appeal based on the
waiver of appellate rights contained in the plea agreement. For the reasons that follow,
we affirm in part and dismiss in part.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, a defendant may waive his appellate rights under 18
U.S.C. § 3742 (2012). United States v. Archie, 771 F.3d 217, 221 (4th Cir. 2014). A
waiver will preclude appeal of a specific issue if the waiver is valid and the issue is
within the scope of the waiver. Id. Whether a defendant validly waived his right to
appeal is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. at 168.
“The validity of an appeal waiver depends on whether the defendant knowingly
and intelligently agreed to waive the right to appeal.” United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d
162, 169 (4th Cir. 2005). To determine whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent, this
Court examines “the totality of the circumstances, including the experience and conduct
of the defendant, his educational background, and his knowledge of the plea agreement
and its terms.” United States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 494 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, if the district court
fully questions a defendant regarding the waiver of his right to appeal during the Rule 11
colloquy, the waiver is both valid and enforceable. Id.

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Moreover, the purpose of the Rule 11 colloquy is to ensure that the plea of guilt is
entered into knowingly and voluntarily. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58
(2002). Accordingly, prior to accepting a guilty plea, a trial court, through colloquy with
the defendant, must inform the defendant of, and determine that he understands, the
nature of the charges to which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the
maximum possible penalty he faces, and the various rights he is relinquishing by pleading
guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). The court also must determine whether there is a factual
basis for the plea. Id.; United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that the magistrate judge
fully complied with the requirements of Rule 11. We further conclude that Merritt
voluntarily pleaded guilty and that his waiver of his appellate rights was knowing and
intelligent. The appellate waiver included Merritt’s right to appeal his conviction and any
sentence within the statutory maximum on any ground whatsoever. Here, we have
concluded that Merritt’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, and the district court
sentenced Merritt within the statutory range. The challenge to his sentence that Merritt
seeks to raise on appeal is, therefore, waived.
We have examined the entire record in accordance with the requirements of
Anders and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm in part
and grant the Government’s motion to dismiss in part. This court requires that counsel
inform Merritt, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States
for further review. If Merritt requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to

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withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was
served on Merritt. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
DISMISSED IN PART

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