Johnnie Williams v. Lance Corporal Kyle Strickland

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-6219
JOHNNIE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
and
SON ODARIOUS WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff
v.
LANCE CORPORAL KYLE STRICKLAND
Defendant - Appellant
and
CPL HEROUX; SGT WALTER CRIDDLE; BEAUFORT COUNTY SHERIFF
OFFICE; RAYMOND S. HEROUX,
Defendants.
No. 18-6220
JOHNNIE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
and
SON ODARIOUS WILLIAMS,

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Plaintiff,
v.
RAYMOND S. HEROUX,
Defendant - Appellant,
and
CPL HEROUX; SGT WALTER CRIDDLE; BEAUFORT COUNTY SHERIFF
OFFICE; LANCE CORPORAL KYLE STRICKLAND,
Defendants.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Beaufort. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior District Judge. (9:15-cv-01118-PMD)
Argued: December 13, 2018 Decided: March 5, 2019
Before KEENAN, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the opinion in which Judge Keenan
and Judge Thacker joined.
ARGUED: Elloree A. Ganes, HOOD LAW FIRM, LLC, Charleston, South Carolina;
Mary Bass Lohr, HOWELL, GIBSON & HUGHES, P.A., Beaufort, South Carolina, for
Appellants. Jordan Calloway, MCGOWAN, HOOD & FELDER, LLC, Rock Hill, South
Carolina for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Whitney B. Harrison, MCGOWAN, HOOD &
FELDER, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

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FLOYD, Circuit Judge:
Johnnie Williams brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two law enforcement
officers: Kyle Strickland and Raymond Heroux. Williams claimed that the officers
violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using deadly force while arresting him. The
officers moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The district
court denied their motions, and the officers now appeal. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
I.
On June 29, 2012, Williams drove from Georgia to South Carolina to visit a relative.
His six-year-old son was with him. When Williams and his son arrived in South
Carolina, they stopped at a gas station. There, Williams ran into an acquaintance,
Anthony Ancrum, who needed a ride to his apartment. Ancrum’s apartment complex
was nearby, and Williams offered to drive him.
On the way to the apartment complex, Williams crossed paths with Officer Heroux,
who was on duty in a patrol car. Heroux ran Williams’s license plate through dispatch
and learned that the plate had been stolen. He followed Williams into the parking lot of
the apartment complex, where he turned on his blue lights. In response, Williams pulled
into a parking space. Heroux got out to approach him. Two other officers, Kyle
Strickland and Walter Criddle, arrived on the scene.
What happened over the next several seconds forms the heart of this appeal. When

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Heroux was about ten feet from Williams’s car, Williams shifted the car into reverse and
cut the wheel, causing the front end of the car to swivel in Heroux’s direction. Heroux,
believing himself to be in danger, stepped back and drew his gun. At the same time,
Strickland started walking toward Williams’s car. Williams then put the car in drive,
straightened out, and drove toward Strickland.
Heroux and Strickland opened fire on the car. Crucially, it is not clear—at this
stage—how far Williams got before Heroux and Strickland started shooting. He may
have been headed toward Strickland. He may have been passing by Strickland, such that
Strickland was alongside the car and out of the car’s trajectory. Or he may have already
driven past Strickland, such that Strickland, like Heroux, was behind the car.
One of Heroux’s shots hit Williams in the back.1 Williams lost control of the car and
crashed into a tree. He was airlifted to the hospital for emergency surgery, after which he
was placed in a medically induced coma. Despite several subsequent surgeries, Williams
has, among other things, “lost the full and proper function of his bowels, lungs, and other
bodily systems.” J.A. 45.
Years later, Williams was charged with three counts of assault and battery related to
the incident. He pleaded guilty. As part of his plea deal, he admitted that he had
deliberately rotated the car in Heroux’s direction and that he had driven towards
Strickland. Notably, Williams also agreed as part of his plea deal that the officers had
started shooting only after his car had driven past them.
1 Ancrum, too, was injured, but he is not party to this action.

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In 2015, Williams filed a § 1983 suit against Strickland, Heroux, and other
defendants who are no longer parties to the action. He alleged that by firing on him
during the course of his arrest, the officers had subjected him to excessive force, violating
his rights under the Fourth Amendment.
After discovery, Strickland and Heroux each moved for summary judgment on the
basis of qualified immunity. In relevant part, the officers argued that they were entitled
to summary judgment because the undisputed facts showed that they had not violated
Williams’s clearly established rights. More specifically, they argued that when they
opened fire on Williams, they believed that Williams was about to hit Strickland with his
car; under those circumstances—according to the officers—Williams had no clearly
established right to be free from the use of deadly force.
The district court denied the officers’ motion. The court determined that a reasonable
jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Williams, could conclude that
when the officers discharged their weapons, Williams’s car was either (a) in the process
of passing Strickland or (b) already past Strickland. According to the district court, if
either (a) or (b) were true, then the officers’ use of deadly force would have violated
rights that we clearly established in Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 2005).
Since a reasonable jury could conclude that the officers had acted in a way that violated
Williams’s clearly established rights, the district court held that the officers were not
entitled to summary judgment. The officers now appeal.2
2 We note that Heroux brings an additional appeal, separate from Strickland. Below,

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II.
Our first task here is to determine whether, and to what extent, we may subject the
district court’s order to appellate review. Generally, our jurisdiction is limited to final
decisions of the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 246 (4th
Cir. 2017). This means that we cannot normally review a district court’s order denying
summary judgment, since orders denying summary judgment are interlocutory, not final.
Hensley v. Horne, 297 F.3d 344, 347 (4th Cir. 2002). There are, however, exceptions.
One exception is the “collateral order doctrine,” which “permits appellate review of a
small class of orders that are conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from
the merits, and that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the
underlying action.” Adams v. Ferguson, 884 F.3d 219, 223–24 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
A district court’s denial of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is a
collateral order and therefore subject to immediate appellate review, despite being
interlocutory. Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 234 (4th Cir. 2008). Our review of such
Heroux moved for summary judgment on the ground that Williams’s claim against him
was untimely. The district court denied his motion. He asks us to reverse. But a denial
of summary judgment on statute-of-limitations grounds is an interlocutory order, and in
general, such orders are not immediately appealable. Cf. Martin Marietta Corp. v.
Gould, Inc., 70 F.3d 768, 769–70 (4th Cir. 1995) (reviewing order denying summary
judgment on statute-of-limitations grounds because the district court had certified its
order for appeal). Heroux fails to advance any argument as to why we should—or may—
exercise appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s rejection of his statute-of-
limitations defense in this case. Accordingly, we leave that portion of the district court’s
order undisturbed.

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orders is limited to a narrow legal question: if we take the facts as the district court gives
them to us,3 and we view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, is the
defendant still entitled to qualified immunity? Id.; see also Brown v. Elliott, 876 F.3d
637, 641–42 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[W]hen resolving the issue of qualified immunity at
summary judgment, a court must ascertain the circumstances of the case by crediting the
plaintiff’s evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Waterman, 393 F.3d at 473 (“In reviewing the denial
of summary judgment based on qualified immunity, we accept as true the facts that the
district court concluded may be reasonably inferred from the record when viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.”). Significantly, we cannot reach whether the
plaintiff has produced enough evidence to survive summary judgment. Winfield v. Bass,
106 F.3d 525, 530 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
What this amounts to is: We may review the portion of the district court’s order
denying Strickland and Heroux’s motions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified
immunity. But our review may reach only one question: would the officers be entitled to
qualified immunity if a jury concluded that they had fired on Williams when they were
no longer in the trajectory of Williams’s car? We turn to that question now.
3 This is not to say that we are strictly confined to the four corners of the district court’s
order: we may assume some facts when the district court does not explicitly state them,
provided that we draw all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d
95, 98 (4th Cir. 2015) (“To the extent that the district court has not fully set forth the facts
on which its decision is based, we assume the facts that may reasonably be inferred from
the record when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).

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III.
Qualified immunity “protects government officials from liability for violations of
constitutional rights that were not clearly established at the time of the challenged
conduct.” Iko, 535 F.3d at 233. Given this standard, we must determine two things.
First, if Strickland and Heroux fired on Williams after they were no longer in the path of
Williams’s car, did they violate Williams’s Fourth Amendment right to freedom from
excessive force? Second, as of June 29, 2012, was it clearly established that using deadly
force against Williams after the officers were no longer in the car’s trajectory would
violate Williams’s right to freedom from excessive force?4 The answer to both questions
is yes.
A.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement officers from using excessive
force to make a seizure. Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir. 2003).
“Whether an officer has used excessive force is analyzed under a standard of objective
reasonableness.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011).
Because deadly force is extraordinarily intrusive, it takes a lot for it to be reasonable.
See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985) (“The intrusiveness of a seizure by means
4 We do not need to answer these questions in sequence. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 236 (2009). But in this case, we see no reason not to.

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of deadly force is unmatched.”). Indeed, an officer may reasonably apply deadly force to
a fleeing suspect—even someone suspected of committing a serious felony—only if the
officer has “probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death
or serious physical injury to the officer or others.” Id. at 3.5 And even a “significant
threat of death or serious physical injury” to an officer does not justify the use of deadly
force unless the threat is “immediate.” Id. at 3, 11; accord Henry, 652 F.3d at 532.
Over a decade ago, we applied these principles when deciding Waterman v. Batton, a
case that bears striking similarities to the one at hand. There, we held that officers who
used deadly force against the driver of a car had not violated the Fourth Amendment
when, in the aftermath of a high-speed chase (during which the driver had reportedly
tried to run an officer off the road), the officers were standing in or immediately adjacent
to the car’s forward trajectory, and the car “lurched forward” and “began to accelerate,”
such that the officers reasonably believed that the car was going to run them over “in
approximately one second.” 393 F.3d at 474-76, 475 n.6. We also held that the same
officers had violated the Fourth Amendment to the extent that they started to use deadly
force, or continued to use deadly force, once the car had driven by them—i.e., once it was
no longer reasonable for them to believe that the car was about to run them (or their
fellow officers) over. Id. at 482. This was true even though mere seconds separated the
point at which deadly force was lawful from the point at which deadly force was
5 Nothing in the record or the parties’ briefs suggests that Williams posed a significant
threat to anyone but the officers at any point during the encounter at issue; therefore,
there is no need for us to consider the “or others” portion of the standard.

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unlawful. Id. As we put it then, “force justified at the beginning of an encounter is not
justified even seconds later if the justification for the initial force has been eliminated.”
Id. at 481.
Following Waterman, we have no difficulty concluding that if Strickland and Heroux
started or continued to fire on Williams after they were no longer in the trajectory of
Williams’s car, they violated Williams’s Fourth Amendment right to freedom from
excessive force.6
B.
Despite having violated a plaintiff’s constitutional right, defendants may be entitled
to immunity from the plaintiff’s suit for damages if, at the time of the violation, the
plaintiff’s right was not “clearly established.” Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 186
(4th Cir. 2018). To determine whether a right was clearly established, we typically ask
whether, when the defendants violated the right, there existed either controlling authority
(such as a published opinion of this Court) or a “robust consensus of persuasive
authority,” Booker v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 544 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted), that would have given the defendants “fair warning that their
conduct,” under the circumstances, “was wrongful,” Williamson, 912 F.3d at 187
(internal quotation marks omitted).
6 We note that this conclusion is consistent with our opinion in Krein v. Price, 596 F.
App’x 184, 189–90 (4th Cir. 2014), which dealt with similar circumstances and applied
Waterman in substantially the same way.

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The “clearly established” inquiry has some important guideposts. On the one hand,
the Supreme Court instructs us “not to define clearly established law at a high level of
generality.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014). On the other hand,
defendants can violate clearly established law even under “‘novel factual
circumstances.’” Stirling, 912 F.3d at 187 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741
(2002)); see also id. (stating that “clearly established law encompasses not only
specifically adjudicated rights, but also those [rights] manifestly included within more
general applications of the core constitutional principles invoked” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Thus, although we must avoid ambushing government officials with
liability for good-faith mistakes made at the unsettled peripheries of the law, we need
not—and should not—assume that government officials are incapable of drawing logical
inferences, reasoning by analogy, or exercising common sense. In some cases,
government officials can be expected to know that if X is illegal, then Y is also illegal,
despite factual differences between the two.
That said, the instant case requires no subtle line-drawing: The right that the officers
allegedly violated falls well within the ambit of clearly established law. When we
decided Waterman, in 2005, we clearly established that (1) law enforcement officers
may—under certain conditions—be justified in using deadly force against the driver of a
car when they are in the car’s trajectory and have reason to believe that the driver will
imminently and intentionally run over them, but (2) the same officers violate the Fourth
Amendment if they employ deadly force against the driver once they are no longer in the

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car’s trajectory. 393 F.3d at 480–82. Waterman obviously and manifestly encompasses
the facts of this case. In light of Waterman, there can be no question that the right
Williams seeks to vindicate was clearly established on the day he was shot.
To summarize: A reasonable jury could conclude that Strickland and Heroux acted in
a way that, as a matter of law, violated Williams’s clearly established federal rights—
specifically, his Fourth Amendment right to freedom from excessive force. Therefore,
the officers are not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and
the district court correctly denied their motions.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

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