United States of America v. Steve Dias, a/k/a Troy, a/k/a O’Neil Guthrie

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-6620
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STEVE DIAS, a/k/a Troy, a/k/a O’Neil Guthrie,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, Senior District Judge. (3:04-cr-00259-HEH-2)
Submitted: March 9, 2021 Decided: June 27, 2022
Before AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Frances H. Pratt, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Robert J. Wagner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE
OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. G.
Zachary Terwilliger, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, Richard D. Cooke,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Steve Dias appeals the district court’s order granting in part and denying in part
Dias’ motion for a reduction of sentence under § 404 of the First Step Act of 2018 (“First
Step Act”), Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. Dias sought a reduction in his 312-month
sentence, which the district court imposed in June 2005, to time-served; this would have
been a downward variance from Dias’ revised Sentencing Guidelines range of 235-293
months. The district court granted the motion, but instead reduced Dias’ sentence to 258
months. On appeal, Dias contends the district court did not adequately explain the reasons
for the selected reduction. Upon review for an abuse of discretion, see United States v.
Jackson, 952 F.3d 492, 497 (4th Cir. 2020), we affirm.
Since Dias appealed the district court’s April 1, 2020, order,∗ this court has clarified
that, in a First Step Act case, “when a [district] court exercises discretion to reduce a
sentence, the imposition of the reduced sentence must be procedurally and substantively
reasonable.” United States v. Collington, 995 F.3d 347, 358 (4th Cir. 2021). This requires
a district court “to consider a defendant’s arguments, give individual consideration to the
defendant’s characteristics in light of the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, determine—
following the Fair Sentencing Act—whether a given sentence remains appropriate in light
of those factors, and adequately explain that decision.” Id. at 360. We have further opined
“that the court’s explanation must be sufficient to allow for meaningful appellate review
∗ We held this appeal in abeyance for our decision in United States v. Gregg, which
recently issued. See United States v. Gregg, No. 20-6997, 2022 WL 1314018 (4th Cir.
May 3, 2022).

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and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” Id. at n.6 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also United States v. Webb, 5 F.4th 495, 499 (4th Cir. 2021).
Here, the district court explicitly ruled that Dias availing himself of educational and
training opportunities while incarcerated warranted a sentencing reduction. This was one
of the stronger arguments advanced by Dias because it was objective and supported by
evidence. The court’s decision to award a partial reduction on this basis thus was grounded
in the record in that the court calculated the new Guidelines range and acknowledged Dias’
postsentencing mitigation evidence, and does not reflect any misapprehension of the law
or facts. We therefore conclude that the district court’s explanation, though admittedly
brief, does not amount to an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, we affirm the court’s order granting a partial sentence reduction.
United States v. Dias, No. 3:04-cr-00259-HEH-2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 1, 2020). We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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