United States of America v. Derrick Lee Racer

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-4642
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DERRICK LEE RACER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
Charleston. Joseph R. Goodwin, District Judge. (2:20-cr-00095-1)
Submitted: June 17, 2022 Decided: July 7, 2022
Before HARRIS and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Wesley P. Page, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, Appellate
Counsel, Lex A. Coleman, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. William S.
Thompson, United States Attorney, Kristin F. Scott, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Derrick Lee Racer pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), reserving the right to appeal the district court’s order denying his
motion to suppress a firearm recovered from his person and inculpatory statements he made
when he was stopped on his bicycle for violating a local ordinance. The district court
sentenced Racer to 24 months’ probation, and he now appeals. On appeal, Racer argues
that the officer’s questioning whether Racer was armed violated his Fourth Amendment
rights.
In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review legal
conclusions de novo and the underlying factual findings for clear error, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Government. United States v. Cloud, 994 F.3d
233, 241 (4th Cir. 2021). “A traffic stop constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment
and is subject to review for reasonableness.” United States v. Hill, 852 F.3d 377, 381
(4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). We evaluate the legality of a traffic
stop under the two-pronged inquiry announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). United
States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238, 245 (4th Cir. 2015). Pursuant to this inquiry, we ask
(1) whether the stop was justified at its inception, and (2) “whether the officer’s actions
during the seizure were reasonably related in scope to the basis for the traffic stop.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, because Racer does not argue that the traffic stop
was unjustified at its inception, our analysis is limited to the second question.
We have reviewed the record and the relevant legal authorities and conclude that
the district court did not err in denying Racer’s suppression motion. As the court

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concluded, the officer’s question regarding whether Racer was armed was related to officer
safety, and it did not prolong the stop or seek to detect criminal activity without reasonable
suspicion of such activity. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED

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