United States of America v. Mark Anthony Skeete, a/k/a Mark Skeete, a/k/a Mark Anthony Brown, Jr., a/k/a Mark…

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-4676
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARK ANTHONY SKEETE, a/k/a Mark Skeete, a/k/a Mark Anthony Brown, Jr.,
a/k/a Mark Brown, Jr., a/k/a Clean Up, a/k/a Hakeem,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Newport News. David J. Novak, District Judge. (4:19-cr-00062-DJN-DEM-1)
Submitted: June 28, 2022 Decided: June 30, 2022
Before NIEMEYER and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: James R. Theuer, JAMES R. THEUER, PLLC, Norfolk, Virginia, for
Appellant. Lisa Rae McKeel, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Mark Anthony Skeete pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to two
counts of use of a firearm resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j), and the
district court sentenced Skeete to two consecutive life sentences to be followed by five
years’ supervised release. Skeete’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), conceding that there are no meritorious issues for appeal,
but asking us to review (1) whether Skeete’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary; and
(2) the reasonableness of the imposed sentence. Although notified of his right to do so,
Skeete did not file a pro se supplemental brief. The Government moves to dismiss Skeete’s
appeal in light of the appeal waiver in Skeete’s plea agreement. We grant the motion to
dismiss in part, dismiss the appeal as to all issues within the scope of the appeal waiver,
and affirm Skeete’s convictions; however, as explained below, we vacate Skeete’s sentence
and remand for resentencing.
We review the validity of an appellate waiver de novo to “determine whether [the
appellant] knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal.” United States v. McCoy,
895 F.3d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 2018). An appellate waiver is enforceable “if the record
establishes that the waiver is valid and that the issue being appealed is within the scope of
the waiver.” United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Our review of the record confirms that Skeete knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to appeal with limited exceptions. We therefore hold that the
waiver is valid and enforceable and grant in part the Government’s motion to dismiss.

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We also review de novo whether the sentence imposed in the written judgment is
consistent with the district court’s oral pronouncement of the sentence. United States v.
Rogers, 961 F.3d 291, 296 (4th Cir. 2020). While a district court need not orally pronounce
all mandatory conditions at the sentencing hearing, “all non-mandatory conditions of
supervised release must be announced at a defendant’s sentencing hearing.” Id.
In announcing the terms of Skeete’s supervised release at sentencing, the district
court announced eight special conditions of supervised release. However, in the written
judgment, the district court imposed 10 special conditions of supervised release.∗ In United
States v. Singletary, we explained that a challenge to discretionary supervised release terms
that were not orally pronounced at sentencing falls outside the scope of a plea waiver
because “the heart of a Rogers claim is that discretionary conditions appearing for the first
time in a written judgment . . . have not been ‘imposed’ on the defendant.” 984 F.3d 341,
345 (4th Cir. 2021). In situations such as the one presented here, where the court fails to
announce or otherwise incorporate the discretionary conditions of supervised release, the
appropriate remedy is to vacate the sentence and remand for a full resentencing hearing.
See id. at 346 & n.4. Because we vacate Skeete’s sentence, we do not otherwise consider
the reasonableness of the sentence. See id. at 346-47 (declining to consider additional
challenges to original sentence).
∗ The special conditions included in the written judgment that were not announced
at sentencing were the conditions requiring that Skeete (1) “not incur new credit charges
or open additional lines of credit without the [probation officer’s] approval,” and (2) “apply
monies received from [various sources] . . . to the outstanding court-ordered financial
obligation.” (Sentencing Transcript at 84-85).

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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record and have found no
other meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore grant the Government’s motion to
dismiss as to all issues within the scope of the appeal waiver and affirm Skeete’s
convictions, but we deny the Government’s motion to dismiss, in part, vacate Skeete’s
sentence, and remand for resentencing. This court requires that counsel inform Skeete, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If Skeete requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would
be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Skeete. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED

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