United States of America v. Troy Mcfarland, a/k/a Troy Goodlife, a/k/a Nathaniel Hom

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-4717
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TROY MCFARLAND, a/k/a Troy Goodlife, a/k/a Nathaniel Hom,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Newport News. Henry E. Hudson, Senior District Judge. (4:20-cr-00044-HEH-DEM-1)
Submitted: November 30, 2022 Decided: June 7, 2023
Amended: June 7, 2023
Before DIAZ and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Dismissed in part, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: James R. Theuer, JAMES R. THEUER, PLLC, Norfolk, Virginia, for
Appellant. David McLean Coleman, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Troy McFarland pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to conspiracy to
commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 1343; wire fraud, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1343, 2; and aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A(a)(1),
2. The district court sentenced McFarland to concurrent terms of 72 months’ imprisonment
on the wire fraud and conspiracy counts, to be followed by a 24-month term on the
aggravated identity theft count, for a total sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment.
McFarland timely appealed.
McFarland’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), conceding that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning
whether McFarland’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, challenging the procedural
and substantive reasonableness of the sentence, and asserting that the written criminal
judgment is not consistent with the court’s oral pronouncement at sentencing. McFarland
filed a pro se supplemental brief also challenging his guilty plea and contesting the
Sentencing Guidelines calculations.1 The Government moves to dismiss McFarland’s
appeal in light of the appeal waiver in McFarland’s plea agreement. We grant the motion
to dismiss in part, dismiss the appeal as to all issues within the scope of the appeal waiver,
and affirm McFarland’s convictions; however, as explained below, we vacate McFarland’s
sentence and remand for resentencing.
1 We grant McFarland’s motion to file his pro se supplemental brief out of time.

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We review the validity of an appeal waiver de novo and “will enforce the waiver if
it is valid and the issue[s] appealed [are] within the scope of the waiver.” United States v.
Adams, 814 F.3d 178, 182 (4th Cir. 2016). Generally, if the district court fully questions a
defendant regarding the waiver of his right to appeal during a plea colloquy performed in
accordance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and the record shows that the defendant understood
the waiver’s significance, the waiver is both valid and enforceable. United States v.
Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 528 (4th Cir. 2013). McFarland’s appellate waiver does not
preclude our review of the validity of his guilty plea. United States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d
358, 364 (4th Cir. 2018). Our review of the record confirms that McFarland’s guilty plea
was knowing and voluntary and that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
appeal. We therefore hold that the waiver is valid and enforceable, grant in part the
Government’s motion to dismiss, and dismiss the appeal as to all issues within the scope
of the appeal waiver.
We also review de novo whether the sentence imposed in the written judgment is
consistent with the district court’s oral pronouncement of the sentence. United States v.
Rogers, 961 F.3d 291, 296 (4th Cir. 2020). While a district court need not orally pronounce
all mandatory conditions at the sentencing hearing, “all non-mandatory conditions of
supervised release must be announced at a defendant’s sentencing hearing.” Id.
In pronouncing the terms of McFarland’s supervised release at sentencing, the
district court announced several special conditions of supervised release. However, as
McFarland points out, in the written judgment, the district court included a special

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condition of supervised release that had not been orally pronounced at sentencing.2 In
United States v. Singletary, we explained that a challenge to discretionary supervised
release terms that were not orally pronounced at sentencing falls outside the scope of a plea
waiver because “the heart of a Rogers claim is that discretionary conditions appearing for
the first time in a written judgment . . . have not been ‘imposed’ on the defendant.” 984
F.3d 341, 345 (4th Cir. 2021). In situations such as the one presented here, where the court
fails to announce or otherwise incorporate the discretionary conditions of supervised
release, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the sentence and remand for a full resentencing
hearing. See id. at 346 & n.4. Because we vacate McFarland’s sentence, we do not
consider any other issues related to the sentence. See id. at 346-47 (declining to consider
additional challenges to original sentence).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record and have found no
other meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore grant the Government’s motion to
dismiss as to all issues within the scope of the appeal waiver and affirm McFarland’s
convictions, vacate McFarland’s sentence, and remand for resentencing. This court
requires that counsel inform McFarland, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If McFarland requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy
2 This special condition requires that, if so directed by the probation officer,
McFarland must participate in a program for financial counseling approved by the United
States Probation Office and is responsible for the cost of the program.

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thereof was served on McFarland. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART,
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED

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