Harris Emanuel Ford v. Erik A. Hooks

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-7647
HARRIS EMANUEL FORD,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ERIK A. HOOKS; KENNETH E. LASSITER; KATY POOLE; DEAN LOCKLEAR;
LIEUTENANT KAREN HENDERSON; QUEEN GERALD; JERRY INGRAM; SGT.
CAMERON E. GADDY,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. Loretta C. Biggs, District Judge. (1:19-cv-00444-LCB-LPA)
Argued: March 19, 2024 Decided: July 2, 2024
Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Gregory and Judge Agee joined.
ARGUED: Abigail Haglage, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Orlando Luis Rodriguez, NORTH CAROLINA
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:
Erica Hashimoto, Director, Salvatore Mancina, Supervising Attorney, Yiyang Wang,
Student Counsel, Appellate Litigation Program, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW
CENTER, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, NORTH
CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

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NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
Harris Ford, an inmate in the North Carolina Department of Corrections prison
system, commenced this action against six prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
claiming that, by failing to protect him from a fellow inmate who attacked him with a shank
and severely injured him, the prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Ford
alleged that he had made prison officials aware of the risk of such an attack by filing
numerous complaints and grievances but that the officials were deliberately indifferent to
them, giving rise to the attack.
The district court granted the prison officials summary judgment, concluding that
Ford’s complaints and grievances had not been sufficiently specific to enable the officials
to investigate and respond and that Ford had failed to demonstrate the mens rea of
deliberate indifference necessary for an Eighth Amendment violation.
We affirm the district court’s judgment as to five of the six prison officials whom
Ford named as defendants. But as to Officer Jerry Ingram, we conclude that, “taking the
facts in the best light for the nonmoving party,” Ausherman v. Bank of America Corp., 352
F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting that summary judgment is appropriate if, “taking the
facts in the best light for the nonmoving party, no material facts are disputed and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”), there was a question of fact that
precluded summary judgment, namely whether Officer Ingram knowingly aggravated the
risk to Ford and possibly contributed to the cause of the attack. Accordingly, as to Officer
Ingram, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

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I
Shortly after Ford’s 2004 incarceration at the Scotland Correctional Institution in
Laurinburg, North Carolina, for first-degree rape, Ford cooperated with a North Carolina
district attorney in successfully prosecuting a murder charge against a fellow inmate. At
Ford’s request, the prosecutor advised the North Carolina Department of Corrections of
Ford’s cooperation and his desire to be transferred due to safety concerns. In an effort to
protect Ford from reprisal, the Department of Corrections moved Ford to various
institutions over the next decade. On March 15, 2017, he was transferred back to the
Scotland Institution, where he had initially been housed.
Shortly after arriving at the Scotland Institution, an inmate, who was allegedly a
member of a gang, threatened Ford, “check off or get blowed,” which Ford understood to
mean he would be “shanked” if he did not receive protective custody. Ford reported the
threat to prison officials and requested protective custody. In response, Officer Jerry
Ingram had Ford temporarily placed in protective custody while he conducted an
investigation of Ford’s complaint. During the investigation, however, Ingram was unable
to uncover the identity of the person who had made the threat, and, accordingly, he denied
Ford’s request for protective custody “due to inmate Ford not providing any names of the
inmates[] who allegedly put a hit out on him.” In a grievance that Ford subsequently filed,
Ford said, “[T]he names of people[,] I do not know[.] [A]ll I know is nicknames.”
Following a three-step grievance review procedure in which different prison officials
participated, the prison concluded that Ford had not provided “information that would
allow a proper investigation,” and Ford’s grievance was denied.

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About a month later, in April 2017, Ford was again threatened by a gang member,
who told Ford to give him food, toiletries, and other supplies or “get blowed,” which Ford
understood to mean get “shanked.” After Ford complied with the demand, two gang
members nonetheless stabbed him with a shank and called him a snitch. They also warned
him not to report the incident. Out of fear, Ford did not then report that incident.
Another month later, in early May 2017, Ford sent a letter to the Director of Prisons
complaining that “inmates [we]re making shanks” and that he “feared for [his] safety.”
The letter was forwarded to Warden Katy Poole at the Scotland Institution, who directed
Officer Queen Gerald to conduct an investigation of the claims and “ensure a [protective
custody] investigation has been completed.” Gerald did undertake the investigation but
did not report back on its status for two years.
Also in May 2017, Ford complained that he was again threatened by a gang member,
and again he was placed in protective custody while his complaint was investigated.
During the investigation, Ford provided documentation demonstrating his cooperation with
the North Carolina prosecutor some 10 years earlier, but he failed to provide any names or
additional information to advance the current investigation. His complaint was therefore
rejected, and his subsequent related grievance was likewise denied.
After Ford’s second request for protective custody was denied and Ford was
returned to the general population, Officer Ingram entered his cell and yelled at him,
“[w]ithin earshot of other inmates on the unit,” demanding that Ford name the individuals
threatening him. Ford refused to publicly answer Officer Ingram. Ford then filed another
request for protective custody in which he complained about Officer Ingram’s conduct,

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stating, “[T]he reason I make this request is d[ue] to the fact all the inmates heard what was
said and now they want to harm [me] due to the fact that they believe I’m a snitch. . . . I
can identify the individuals I got problems with and I have documents to show that some
of these people are still here. I can give you the names of these people. I’ll give this
information directly to [Officer] Gerald in a statement.” The officer who reviewed Ford’s
request, however, denied it, stating that the evidence he was able to uncover was
“insufficient due to no names were given and no document from inmate [F]ord was given
to state the names of the inmates involved.”
In a third grievance filed in late May 2017, Ford described the various earlier threats
and, for the first time, revealed that he had been stabbed in April. He offered to view a
photo array to identify those threatening him. This grievance, however, was again rejected,
this time because Ford’s second grievance making similar claims was still pending.
Finally, Ford filed a general grievance in June 2017, including the complaints that
had already been denied. This grievance was denied for lack of “enough information for
the investigation.”
Three months later — on September 24, 2017 — inmate Jamal McRae stabbed Ford
repeatedly with a shank, requiring that Ford receive dozens of stitches at the hospital. Ford
and McRae, however, gave conflicting testimony about the circumstances of the attack.
Ford said that McRae entered his cell and attacked him unprovoked. He stated that he had
not touched McRae or said anything to him to provoke him. Ford concluded that McRae
was a gang member and alleged that McRae called him a “snitch” during the attack.

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McRae, however, told a significantly different story. He stated that he was “kicking
it” with Ford in Ford’s cell going over McRae’s legal documents, which McRae had paid
Ford $600 to help prepare. McRae stated that, while preparing them food, Ford made
sexual advances on him. He stated that he told Ford that he did not “play that way” and
that, after some back and forth, he tried to grab his legal materials and leave the cell.
McRae claimed that Ford then “grabbed him from behind and pulled him in his lap” and
that they then started “tussling and it turned into a fight,” during which McRae used a shank
in self defense. McRae stated that once Ford let him go, he ran out of the cell. After the
incident, McRae’s legal materials were indeed found in Ford’s cell.
A video camera in the hallway, while capturing the aftermath of the events, was of
limited use as to what occurred inside the cell.
Following the attack, Ford was transferred to another facility.
Ford filed his complaint in this action in April 2019, alleging, as relevant here, that
six prison officials — Warden Katy Poole, Assistant Superintendent Dean Locklear,
Captain Karen Henderson, Officer Queen Gerald, Officer Jerry Ingram, and Sergeant
Cameron Gaddy — were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of the attack and
resulting injuries and thus violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Following discovery,
both Ford and the prison officials filed motions for summary judgment.
The district court — adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendations — granted
summary judgment to the defendants. While the court identified several disputed facts, it
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to show the prison officials’ deliberate
indifference required for an Eighth Amendment violation.

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From the district court’s judgment dated October 26, 2021, Ford filed this appeal.
II
Ford contends that the six prison officials named as defendants in their individual
capacity inflicted on him cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, because the attack on him and the injuries he sustained in September 2017
were a product of the officials’ deliberate indifference to the risk of that injury.
It is well settled that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against the infliction of
“cruel and unusual punishments” reaches beyond a prisoner’s sentence to “the treatment of
a prisoner . . . in prison and the conditions under which he is confined.” Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). While that construction “does not mandate comfortable
prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), it does place on prison officials
“a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners,” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (cleaned up). In short, “[b]eing violently assaulted in
prison is simply not ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their
offenses against society.’” Id. at 834 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). But that said, “it
is not . . . every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another that translates into
constitutional liability for prison officials.” Id. Such injury must be the product of prison
officials’ deliberate indifference to the risk of injury.
Thus, to demonstrate a violation of the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must satisfy
two requirements — first, he must demonstrate that the deprivation was, “objectively,
sufficiently serious,” and second he must demonstrate that the prison official had a

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“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (cleaned up). And in cases
challenging conditions of confinement — including those alleging prison officials’ failure
to protect an inmate from other inmates — that state of mind must be at least “deliberate
indifference” to the inmate’s “health or safety.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Brown v. N.C.
Dep’t of Corr., 612 F.3d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 2010).
“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard,” and “a showing of mere
negligence will not meet it.” Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir.
2004) (quoting Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999)). Instead, as the Farmer
Court explained, “deliberate indifference” is a culpable mens rea that requires proof that
the prison official subjectively “knew” of the substantial risk of harm to a prisoner and
“consciously disregarded” it, thus incorporating the concept of criminal recklessness as
defined in the Model Penal Code. See 511 U.S. at 837, 839. In sum, in circumstances such
as those presented here, the prisoner must show both (1) “that the [prison] official in
question subjectively recognized a substantial risk of harm” and (2) that the official also
“subjectively recognized” that any actions he took in response “were inappropriate in light
of that risk.” Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303 (cleaned up). It is not enough that the prison official
should have recognized the risk and the inadequacy of his response. Instead, the official
“actually must have perceived” both. Id.
Applying this standard to the circumstances before us, we conclude first that Ford
has failed to establish both requirements with respect to Warden Poole. In Ford’s May 7,
2017 letter, which Warden Poole received, Ford stated that “inmates are making shanks”
and that he “feared for [his] safety.” He also “asked for protection but [complained that]

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nothing was done.” In response to the letter, Warden Poole directed Officer Gerald to
“investigate [the] allegations” and “ensure a [protective custody] investigation has been
completed.” She also stated that she had noticed that inmate Ford was presently in
restrictive housing “due to a [protective custody] investigation being in process.” Not only
did Warden Poole have no knowledge of any substantial risk of harm to Ford, she did not
recognize that her response to the letter, directing an investigation, was an inappropriate
one. In short, Ford failed to present evidence demonstrating that Warden Poole exhibited
deliberate indifference to Ford’s circumstances.
With respect to Ford’s claims against four other prison officials — Assistant
Superintendent Locklear, Captain Henderson, Sergeant Gaddy, and Officer Gerald — the
level of knowledge that Ford demonstrated was significantly higher than that which may
be imputed to Warden Poole. These officials were aware of Ford’s complaints requesting
protective custody and the reasons for his fear of reprisal. To be sure, they recognized that
they were addressing a fear arising out of Ford’s cooperation with prosecutors over 10
years earlier, but they also knew that Ford was claiming ongoing threats of harm by gang
members purportedly arising from that cooperation. These officers were also aware that
they were required by prison policy to investigate Ford’s claims and react appropriately by
providing him with protection as needed. Indeed, none of these prison officials concluded
or suggested that Ford’s complaints lacked merit. They did, however, uniformly conclude
that they did not have enough information to carry out an appropriate investigation, and
Ford has provided no evidence that he ever gave names or even nicknames in response to
the prison officials’ investigatory efforts.

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With respect to these officials, Ford thus adequately demonstrated the first prong of
the “deliberate indifference” element of his Eighth Amendment claim — that the prison
officials subjectively recognized a substantial risk of harm. But we conclude that he has
not presented sufficient evidence to show that these officials were deliberately indifferent
to his complaints because he has not demonstrated that they consciously disregarded the
risks that he described — i.e., that they recognized that their responses were
“inappropriate.” Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303. Ford does argue that the prison officials could
have shown him “photos of gang members to help identify the source of the threats” or
could have consulted with gang investigators “to determine whether and why Mr. Ford was
being targeted.” This argument, however, amounts, at most, to one that the officials’
responses were “unreasonable” because there was more that they could have done. But
such negligence is not enough to make an Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at 306–07.
Finally, as to Ford’s claim against Officer Ingram, Ingram’s circumstances for the
most part are not unlike those of the other four prison officials who received Ford’s
complaints; Ingram knew of Ford’s complaints and responded to them. Indeed, Officer
Ingram tried more forcefully to investigate them by pressing yet harder for the
identification of the perpetrators. But in doing so, his conduct raised a question of fact as
to whether his response actually revealed a conscious disregard of a serious risk of harm
that he knew was inappropriate.
As Ford claims, Officer Ingram, while carrying out his investigation of Ford’s
complaints, came to Ford’s cell and “yell[ed] in a very loud voice” “[w]ithin ear shot of
other inmates on the unit” that if Ford “want[ed] protective custody” he would have to tell

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him “who in here [he had] a problem with.” Ford showed further that Ingram then left his
cell and came back “yelling [about] the same thing” and then “asked [Ford] for a
statement.” Ford asserted that as a result, “all the inmates heard what was said and now
they want[ed] to harm” him because they thought he was a “snitch.” It is thus significant
that while Officer Ingram asked Ford, who he had a problem with and why he wanted
protective custody, by doing so in such a public manner, Ingram may perhaps have
knowingly exacerbated the danger to Ford that officers had already recognized. See Cox
v. Quinn, 828 F.3d 227, 233, 237 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding sufficient evidence that prison
officials knew their response was unreasonable when they confronted the inmate’s
attackers despite warnings that doing so would “put an X on [him] and make the situation
worse”).
We conclude, in light of this evidence as viewed most favorably to Ford, that there
were genuine factual disputes over whether Officer Ingram consciously disregarded a
known risk of harm to Ford and whether such conscious disregard, if shown, was a
sufficient cause of the harm Ford suffered. See Ausherman, 352 F.3d at 899. Accordingly,
we vacate the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Officer Ingram and remand to
permit further proceedings. As for the remaining prison officials, however, we affirm.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED

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