Luis (janer) Rullan v. Jill K. Goden, in her individual capacity

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-1913
LUIS (JANER) RULLAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JILL K. GODEN, in her individual capacity and as Personal Representative for
Frederick I. Greenberg and the Frederick I. Greenberg Revocable Trust; ERIC S.
GODEN; CACAPON RIVER CAMPS, INC.; CACAPON CAMPS, INC; JOHN
DOE; YOUTH WORLD, LTD.; YOUTH WORLD INTERNATIONAL
COMPANY, LTD,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
ALEX REECE,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Catherine C. Blake, Senior District Judge. (1:17-cv-03741-CCB)
Submitted: May 10, 2024 Decided: July 19, 2024
Before THACKER, RICHARDSON, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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ON BRIEF: Peter C. Choharis, THE CHOHARIS LAW GROUP, PLLC, Washington,
D.C., for Appellant. Bart Colombo, SABOURA, GOLDMAN & COLOMBO, P.C.,
Leesburg, Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Luis (Janer) Rullan appeals the district court’s orders denying his motion for a
preliminary injunction and denying his motion for reconsideration.1 He contends that the
district court failed to make particularized findings of fact, ignored case law authorizing
injunctions to prevent the dissipation of assets, and failed to consider his motion for a
preliminary injunction under state law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 64. We affirm.
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in
the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). When
ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court must “state the findings
[of fact] and conclusions [of law] that support its [decision].” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2). We
review the district court’s denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction for an abuse of
discretion. Di Biase v. SPX Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 229 (4th Cir. 2017). When making that
determination, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo. Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 722 F.3d 184, 188
(4th Cir. 2013).
In denying Rullan’s motion, the district court made sufficient findings of fact and
reasonably concluded that, based on Rullan’s deficient factual submissions and years-long
1 We previously vacated the district court’s denial of Rullan’s motion for
preliminary injunction and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Rullan v.
Goden, 782 F. App’x 285, 286 (4th Cir. 2019) (No. 19-1037).

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delays, his speculation that Defendants would dissipate assets and may become judgment-
proof was insufficient to satisfy his burden of establishing a likelihood of irreparable harm
absent an injunction.2 See id. This alone justified the denial and the district court was not
required to address the remaining Winter factors, Frazier v. Prince George’s Cnty, 86 F.4th
537, 544 (4th Cir. 2023), nor was it required to make factual findings expressly refuting
Rullan’s insufficient speculations. See id. (Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2) does not require the
district court to issue a “tome that memorializes all factual minutiae or respond to every
legal assertion. Instead, the findings and conclusions required are those that are necessary,
in context, to the action taken.” (internal citation omitted)).
We have reviewed the record submitted on appeal and find no error by the district
court in denying Rullan’s motion for a preliminary injunction and denying his motion for
reconsideration. We therefore affirm the district court’s orders. We grant the parties’
motion to submit on the briefs and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
2 Having correctly found that Rullan’s assertion that Defendants may dissipate
assets was “too speculative to entitle him to preliminary relief,” the district court did not
abuse its discretion by declining to issue an injunction under Maryland law. See Levitt v.
Md. Deposit Ins. Fund Corp., 505 A.2d 140, 147 (Md. App. 1986) (permitting court to
enjoin dissipation of assets where facts indicate a “substantial likelihood of fraud” and “the
probability that the defendants will, before judgment, dispose of assets” (emphasis added)).

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