Gary Buterra Williams v. CHADWICK DOTSON, Director of Virginia Department of Corrections

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-6745
GARY BUTERRA WILLIAMS,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
CHADWICK DOTSON, Director of Virginia Department of Corrections,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, Senior District Judge. (3:23-cv-00235-HEH-MRC)
Submitted: January 31, 2025 Decided: February 12, 2025
Before GREGORY, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gary Buterra Williams, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Gary Buterra Williams seeks to appeal the district court’s orders dismissing his
preauthorized, subsequent 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as successive and denying
reconsideration. The orders are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a
certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of appealability
will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When, as here, the district court denies relief on procedural grounds,
the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and
that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v.
Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 140-41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).
We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Williams has not
made the requisite showing. Initially, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) requires a second or
subsequent habeas petition to be dismissed as successive unless the claims therein rely on
newly discovered facts or a new, retroactively applicable rule of constitutional law.
Although this court concluded that Williams made a prima facie showing that his proposed
subsequent claim satisfied § 2244(b)(2) and thus granted him authorization to file the
§ 2254 petition, this court’s authorization did not preclude the district court from
determining whether Williams’s claim “actually satisfied” § 2244(b)(2). In re Phillips,
879 F.3d 542, 546 (4th Cir. 2018); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4).

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Here, the district court concluded that the claim in Williams’s subsequent § 2254
petition did not satisfy § 2244(b)(2), and that conclusion is not debatable.* First,
Williams’s claim did not rely on newly discovered facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i).
Second, while Williams purported to premise his claim on a new, retroactively applicable
rule of constitutional law, the Supreme Court decision on which he relied did not announce
a new substantive rule. See Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 276 (2021) (defining
substantive rules and noting that only substantive rules apply retroactively on federal
collateral review); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (permitting consideration of subsequent
habeas petition premised on new constitutional rule only when rule has been “made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court”).
Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
DISMISSED
* In his informal brief, Williams argues that the district court judge should have
recused himself from the § 2254 proceedings. We conclude that the district judge did not
plainly err by declining to sua sponte recuse himself. See United States v. Beltran-Leon, 9
F.4th 485, 499 (7th Cir. 2021) (reviewing for plain error recusal claim raised for first time
on appeal); Belue v. Leventhal, 640 F.3d 567, 572-73 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing grounds
for recusal).

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