United States of America v. Rashaun L. Smith

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4544
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RASHAUN L. SMITH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:18-cr-00088-JAG-3)
Submitted: April 24, 2025 Decided: April 28, 2025
Before RICHARDSON and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Laura J. Koenig, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF
THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Erik S.
Siebert, United States Attorney, Peter S. Duffey, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Rashaun L. Smith appeals the 24-month sentence imposed following the revocation
of his supervised release. On appeal, Smith asserts that the imposed sentence is plainly
unreasonable because it is above the policy statement range applicable to his violations and
that the district court failed to explain why a sentence within the range was insufficient.
Finding no error, we affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436 (4th Cir. 2020). We
“will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly
unreasonable.” Id. Before deciding “whether a revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable, [we] must first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or
substantively unreasonable,” id., evaluating “the same procedural and substantive
considerations that guide our review of original sentences” but taking “a more deferential
appellate posture than we do when reviewing original sentences,” United States v. Padgett,
788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). Only if we conclude that a revocation
sentence is either procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we proceed to consider
whether it “is plainly unreasonable—that is, whether the unreasonableness is clear or
obvious.” Patterson, 957 F.3d at 437 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the Chapter Seven policy statement range
and the applicable [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) sentencing factors.” Id. at 436; see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e) (listing applicable factors). “[A]lthough the court need not be as detailed or

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specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-
conviction sentence, it still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed.”
United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). Thus, the district
court must, at a minimum, explain the sentence sufficiently to permit meaningful appellate
review, “with the assurance that the court considered any potentially meritorious arguments
raised by [the defendant] with regard to his sentencing.” United States v. Gibbs, 897 F.3d
199, 205 (4th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). “A sentence is substantively reasonable if the totality
of the circumstances indicates that the court had a proper basis for its conclusion that the
defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” United States v. Amin, 85 F.4th 727, 740
(4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the revocation sentence imposed
here is not unreasonable. Specifically, the district court properly calculated the policy
statement range, which it expressly acknowledged. The court also provided the parties the
opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence during which time the Government asked
that the 24-month statutory maximum be imposed to run consecutive to Smith’s state
sentence. Defense counsel did not request a specific sentence or a sentence within the
policy statement range, asking only that the court allow Smith to serve the revocation
sentence in state prison or consider running the sentence concurrent to Smith’s state
sentence. The district court explained the imposed sentence, expressly tethering it to the
applicable § 3553(a) factors, and indicated that Smith would be designated to serve the
sentence in state prison. Given the court’s explanation for the 24-month sentence, which

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is the statutory maximum, we find that the imposed sentence is substantively reasonable.
See Slappy, 872 F.3d at 207-08.
Accordingly, we affirm the revocation order. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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