In re: James Nathaniel Douse

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-1786
In re: JAMES NATHANIEL DOUSE,
Petitioner.
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. (5:24-cv-00277-M-BM)
Submitted: August 21, 2025 Decided: August 26, 2025
Before WILKINSON, HARRIS, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Nathaniel Douse, Petitioner Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
James Nathaniel Douse petitions for a writ of mandamus complaining about a data
security breach involving his personal information and seeking a permanent injunction
against the United States and Greylock McKinnon Associates, Inc. (“GMA”). We
conclude that Douse is not entitled to mandamus relief.
Mandamus relief is a drastic remedy and should be used only in extraordinary
circumstances. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004); In re Murphy-Brown,
LLC, 907 F.3d 788, 795 (4th Cir. 2018). Further, mandamus relief is available only when
the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought and “has no other adequate means to
attain the relief [he] desires.” Murphy-Brown, 907 F.3d at 795 (alteration and internal
quotation marks omitted).
The data breach about which Douse complains is the subject of a federal civil action
Douse brought against the United States and GMA, see Douse v. United States, No. 5:24-
cv-00277-M-BM (E.D.N.C., PACER No. 1), and the dismissal of that action was the
subject of a separate appeal in this court, see Douse v. United States, Appeal No. 25-1837.
Thus, to the extent Douse is attempting to use mandamus as a substitute for appeal of the
district court’s dismissal order, mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. In
re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 2007). And to the extent Douse
asks that the United States and GMA be permanently enjoined from disclosing additional
information, Douse fails to establish “a clear and indisputable right to the requested relief.”
Murphy-Brown, 907 F.3d at 796 (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Heckler v.
Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984) (“The common-law writ of mandamus, as codified in 28

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U.S.C. § 1361, is intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff only if he has exhausted all
other avenues of relief and only if the defendant owes him a clear nondiscretionary duty.”).
Accordingly, we deny the petition for a writ of mandamus. We also deny all
pending motions. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
PETITION DENIED

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