United States of America v. Ijaz Oliver

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-4199
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
IJAZ OLIVER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
Charleston. David A. Faber, Senior District Judge. (2:24-cr-00047-1)
Submitted: May 18, 2026 Decided: May 22, 2026
Before RICHARDSON and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Scott C. Brown, SCOTT C. BROWN LAW OFFICE, Wheeling, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Amy Lynn McLaughlin, Assistant United States Attorney, Jeremy
Bryan Wolfe, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Ijaz Oliver pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to being a felon in possession
of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(8). The district court sentenced
Oliver to 18 months’ imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release.
On appeal, Oliver’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 783
(1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether the
district court erred in denying Oliver’s motion for a downward variant sentence and
sentencing him at the high end of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Oliver was
informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done so. We affirm.
“We review the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) using an
abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of ‘whether [the sentence is] inside, just outside,
or significantly outside the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212
(4th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41
(2007)). In performing that review, we first “evaluate procedural reasonableness,
determining whether the district court committed any procedural error, such as improperly
calculating the Guidelines range, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id.
If “the district court has not committed procedural error,” we then assess the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. Our substantive reasonableness review
“takes into account the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards
set forth in § 3553(a).” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Any sentence within “a

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properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively [substantively] reasonable. Such a
presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when
measured against the . . . § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306
(4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
We are satisfied that Oliver’s 18-month sentence is procedurally reasonable. The
district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range, considered the § 3553(a) factors,
provided a meaningful explanation for its chosen sentence, and addressed defense
counsel’s arguments for a downward variance. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-51. We also
conclude that nothing in the record rebuts the presumption of substantive reasonableness
afforded to Oliver’s within-Guidelines term of imprisonment. See Louthian, 756 F.3d at
306. The district court assessed the circumstances of Oliver’s case and reasonably arrived
at a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment, specifically explaining its reasons for choosing
a sentence at the high end of the advisory Guidelines range. We therefore conclude that
Oliver’s term of imprisonment is substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Oliver, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Oliver requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Oliver. We dispense with oral argument because the facts

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and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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