Robbie Lynn Newby v. DAVID LEU, Warden

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-6922
ROBBIE LYNN NEWBY,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
DAVID LEU, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Alexandria. Rossie David Alston, Jr., District Judge. (1:24-cv-00225-RDA-WBP)
Submitted: March 26, 2026 Decided: March 31, 2026
Before RICHARDSON and BERNER, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robbie Lynn Newby, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Robbie Lynn Newby, a federal prisoner, seeks to appeal the district court’s order
denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition in which he challenged the calculation of his
sentence. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was
not timely filed.
When the United States or its officer or agency is a party in a civil case, the notice
of appeal must be filed no more than 60 days after the entry of the district court’s final
judgment or order, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court extends the appeal
period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional
requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).
The district court entered its order on February 27, 2025, so the appeal period
expired on April 28, 2025. Newby filed his notice of appeal on October 17, 2025.1 Because
Newby failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the
appeal period, we dismiss the appeal of the order denying Newby’s § 2241 petition.2
1 For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date appearing on the envelope
containing the notice of appeal is the earliest date Newby could have delivered the notice
to prison officials for mailing to the court. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1); Houston v. Lack, 487
U.S. 266, 276 (1988).
2 The record establishes that Newby did not receive the district court’s order until
on or around May 19, 2025. But Newby did not seek to reopen the appeal period within
14 days, as required under Rule 4(a)(6)(B).

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Newby’s notice of appeal, however, was timely as to the district court’s order
denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion.3 Limiting our review to the issues raised in
Newby’s informal brief, we find no reversible error. See Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d
170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The informal brief is an important document; under [4th Cir. R.
34(b)], our review is limited to issues preserved in that brief.”). Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s order denying Newby’s Rule 60(b) motion. Newby v. Leu, No. 1:24-cv-
00225-RDA-WBP (E.D. Va. filed Oct. 8, 2025 & entered Oct. 9, 2025). We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART,
AFFIRMED IN PART
3 Newby contends that the district court should have construed his motion for
reconsideration as a timely motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). But such a motion “must
be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and
that deadline cannot be extended, Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). Accordingly, the court properly
construed the motion as arising under Rule 60(b).

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