United States v. Estrada

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
August 8, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 05-41042
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
RAMIRO SALAICES ESTRADA,
Defendant-Appellant.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
_______________
m 05-41089
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
JORGE MANUEL ESTRADA,
Defendant-Appellant.

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_________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
_________________________
Before SMITH and STEWART, Circuit Judges,
and HANEN,* District Judge.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
Ramiro Estrada (“Ramiro”) and his brother
Jorge Estrada (“Jorge”) were charged with aid-
ing and abetting the possession of 68 kilograms
of marihuana with intent to distribute. They en-
tered into conditional guilty pleas, reserving the
right to appeal the denial of their motions to
suppress. We affirm.
I.
On November 13, 2004, Ramiro and Jorge
were returning from Zacatecas, Mexico, in Ra-
miro’s 1989 Chevy. The vehicle was stopped
at approximately 12:08 a.m. on I-10 by trooper
Sergio Villarreal and sergeant Gary Chandler.
The video recording of the traffic stop shows
that about one minute after the stop, Villarreal
approached the vehicle and read the license
plate number for the computer check. The
driver, Jorge, was told that he was stopped for
having a defective rear license plate lamp in
violation of TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 547.322 (Vernon 1995).
Villarreal asked for identification of the
driver and passenger and for registration and
insurance papers. At the same time, he shined
his flashlight onto the front windshield for the
vehicle identification number and then quickly
flashed the back of the truck cab as he began
to review the paperwork. At 12:11, Villarreal
told Jorge that he would give him a warning
for the defective lamp, then asked him to step
outside the vehicle. Villarreal went back to
Ramiro, who was still in the passenger seat.
He questioned him about the car and his travel
plans. Ramiro told him, among other things,
that he has owned the car for about a month.
At 12:13, Villarreal walked to the back of
the truck and, on his way, shined his flashlight
to the area to the back of the truck’s cab and
bed. At this time he saw “fresh marks” and
“scratches” around the fuel tank eye piece
latches and vehicle frame. He explained that
the “eye piece latches” were devices holding
the tank to the truck frame and that he noticed
that they were topped by a hardened adhesive
material.
At that time, he thought the marks were
“out of the ordinary”: They were short, no
more than three inches in width, indicating that
the metal strap to the fuel tank had been re-
cently “removed or tampered with.” He de-
scribed the adhesive material as “hardened,”
“discolored,” and with a consistency much like
“J-B Weld” or “Bondo-type” material.
Villareal further explained that the material
was the type of substance used for filling or re-
pairing holes during automotive repair and * District Judge of the Southern District of
Texas, sitting by designation.

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that, based on his extensive classroom training
and on-the-job experience, including an occa-
sion at which he had found illegal narcotics
concealed in a gas tank in similar fashion, he
suspected that a false compartment or a con-
tainer had been built into the fuel tank to con-
ceal contraband. Villarreal indicated that con-
traband is concealed in fuel tanks after an open-
ing is cut into the tank. Adhesive material is
typically used to cover newly created com-
partments to prevent seepage of fuel and con-
traband.
The videotape shows that next Villarreal
pointed to the license plate and showed Jorge
that the lights did not work and told him that he
would give him a warning. At 12:14, he pulled
Jorge away from the vehicle and to the edge of
the road and asked him similar questions and
also whether any repairs had been done on the
truck. Jorge advised that Ramiro had had the
truck for about three months, Jorge did not
know of any repairs.
At 12:16, Villarreal walked back to the DPS
car and told Chandler that “the story is about
the same, they have been in Zacatecas (Mex-
ico), they have traveled about 15 hours, they
are carpet layers, but Ramiro indicated he
bought the vehicle in October 2004 and his
brother stated he had bought it 3 months ago.”
He also noted that he saw “a strap across the
gas tank, with a slit, which turns to lock, and it
looks like it has been turned recently.” While
Villarreal was talking to Chandler, the compu-
ter check on the defendants’ criminal history
(which was requested only about eight minutes
into the stop) came back negative at 12:18.
Villarreal walked back to Jorge, who was
standing by the side of the road, and began a
new inquiry. Villarreal asked Jorge a series of
questions, including whether he had had any
problems with the gas tank. After receiving
the answers, Villarreal went to the passenger,
Ramiro, and asked him a set of similar ques-
tions.
At 12:22, Villarreal asked Ramiro to get
out of the truck, then proceeded to ask him
another series of questions. At 12:23, Villar-
real asked Ramiro in Spanish for permission to
“inspect” the truck, and Ramiro agreed. Then
he also obtained permission, in Spanish, from
Jorge. Villarreal testified at the suppression
hearing that the demeanor of the defendants
was one of calmness.
Villarreal began to search by going to the
driver’s side and viewing the back of the cab.
He flashed his light again and stated, “See
where the black strap comes out, it has rust
but I see a lighter mark, like the strap has been
moved.” Then, he looked under the vehicle at
the gas tank. He knocked on the tank, which
produced a hollow sound. When Villarreal
went to the passenger side of the tank, he stat-
ed, “There’s a bump on top and it looks like a
J-B weld on the tank but its hard to tell how
fresh it is. It has scratch marks and I see a
light blue color but it could be from wear and
tear, I don’t know.”
Villarreal testified that he saw “fresh
scratch marks” and more adhesive material
along a ridge of the gas tank. He also ob-
served that the bolts used to hold the straps to
the frame of the truck were not the same size
and were loose. It appeared that the bolts had
been removed and replaced without being
tightened, so they were flush with the bed of
the truck.
The tape next shows (22 minutes and 57
seconds after the stop) that Villarreal stated
that he was going to call “Schulenberg P.D. to

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see if they have a scope and density meter.”
Sergeant Koehne with the Schulenberg police
department arrived on the scene approximately
one hour after the initial stop. After assembling
the scope and inserting it into the gas tank,
Koehne and Villarreal identified that the tank
had a green wall, inconsistent with the rest of
the tank.
By 1:30., Koehne identified several walls
that could serve as compartments, and Koehne
and Villarreal decided to bring down the tank.
At 1:45, Villarreal began to call garages for the
dropping of the tank. He located a garage at
1:54.
At about 2:00, Villarreal told both defen-
dants that they were not under arrest but were
merely detained, and handcuffed them and seat-
ed them in the DPS vehicle. The defendants
and the Chevy truck were driven to the garage,
where they arrived at 2:27, whereupon the
work began to drop the tank. The marihuana
was found, and at that point, about three hours
after the initial stop, Villarreal told the defen-
dants they were under arrest and read them
their Miranda rights.
II.
Following a hearing, Ramiro and Jorge en-
tered conditional guilty pleas, reserving the
right to appeal the rulings on the motions to
suppress. On appeal, they do not challenge the
validity of the stop, but only its duration and
scope and the voluntariness of the consent to
search.
III.
In assessing whether there was reasonable
suspicion, we review the district court’s find-
ings of fact for clear error and its determination
of reasonable suspicion de novo. See Ornelas
v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).
We view the evidence introduced at a suppres-
sion hearing in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party. United States v. Orozco, 191
F.3d 578, 581 (5th Cir. 1999).
A routine traffic stop is a limited seizure
that closely resembles an investigative deten-
tion as was addressed in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968). See United States v. Shabazz,
993 F.2d 431, 435 (5th Cir.1993). Accord-
ingly, the Terry framework is used to analyze
cases in which motorists are stopped for vio-
lating traffic laws. Id. The Estradas concede
that the initial stop was a valid traffic stop for
driving with a defective light. They aver, how-
ever, that Villarreal exceeded the scope of that
stop when he continued to question them after
he received the results of the criminal back-
ground check at 12:18. See United States v.
Dortch, 199 F.3d 193, 198-99 (5th Cir. 1999).
Once the purpose of a valid traffic stop has
been completed and an officer’s initial suspi-
cions have been verified or dispelled, the de-
tention must end unless there is additional rea-
sonable suspicion supported by articulable
facts. United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261
F.3d 425, 434 (5th Cir. 2001); Shabazz, 993
F.2d at 436. This is because a detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is neces-
sary to effect the purpose of the stop, unless
further reasonable suspicion, supported by ar-
ticulable facts, emerges. Dortch, 199 F.3d at
200. Mere “uneasy feelings” and inconsistent
stories between a driver and a passenger do
not constitute articulable facts that support a
reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking. See
United States v. Santiago, 310 F.3d 336,
338-39 (5th Cir. 2002).
To the extent that the Estradas argue that
the length of the stop was unreasonable before
12:18, that argument is foreclosed by United

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States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 507 (5th Cir.
2004) (en banc). In a valid traffic stop, an of-
ficer may request a driver’s license and vehicle
registration and run a computer check thereon.
Brigham, 382 F.3d at 508.
As the district court correctly determined,
Villarreal’s questioning of Ramiro and Jorge
before Villarreal’s request for a computer check
about eight minutes into the stop does not
implicate Fourth Amendment concerns. As
Brigham explained, “neither our prior cases nor
any other caselaw . . . institutes a per se rule
requiring an officer immediately to obtain the
driver’s license and registration information and
initiate the relevant background checks before
asking questions.” Brigham, 382 F.3d at 511.1
Even questions unrelated to the reason for the
stop do not, in themselves, constitute a Fourth
Amendment violation.2
Therefore, the registration and license check,
as well as the questions that Villarreal asked the
brothers within the first ten minutes of the stop
before, and while waiting for, the computer
results did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Under Brigham, the purpose of the initial stop
ended at 12:18, when the results of the criminal
background check came back negative, unless
the officers formed additional reasonable suspi-
cion before that time.
Reasonable suspicion exists when the de-
taining officer can point to specific and articul-
able facts that, when taken together with ra-
tional inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant the search and seizure. Santiago, 310
F.3d at 340. The determination of whether
Villarreal had developed a reasonable suspi-
cion must be made based on the totality of the
circumstances and the collective knowledge
and experience of the officer or officers. See
Jones, 234 F.3d at 241.
Reasonable suspicion does not arise solely
from the inconsistent answers regarding the
length of Ramiro’s ownership of the truck.
This case, however, is distinguishable from
Dortch, Santiago and Jones, because in those
cases there were no physical facts suggesting
the presence of a hidden compartment. In
contrast, in this case there was significant
physical evidence that, taken together with the
officer’s training and experience, gave rise to
reasonable suspicion.
As we have recounted, the videotape shows
that at 12:13, Villarreal directed his flashlight
to the area from the passenger’s side to the
back of the truck’s cab and bed. He testified
at the suppression hearing that at that time, he
saw “fresh marks” and “scratches” around the
fuel tank eye piece latches and vehicle frame;
which were “out of the ordinary” and showed
the presence of an adhesive material and sug-
gested that the gas tank had been tampered
with. Based on his extensive classroom train-
ing and on-the-job experience, including an oc-
casion at which he found illegal narcotics
concealed in a gas tank in similar fashion, he
suspected that a false compartment or con-
tainer was built into the fuel tank to conceal
contraband. Adhesive material is typically
used to cover newly created compartments to
prevent seepage of fuel and contraband.
1 See also Brigham, 382 F.3d at 509 (“Finally,
this process, from the time Trooper Conklin started
questioning Brigham until he returned to his patrol
car to check the registration and I.D.’s provided by
Brigham and the others, lasted only seven minutes.
Conklin’s questioning exemplified a graduated re-
sponse to emerging facts.”).
2 Id. at 508 & nn.5-6 (“‘[D]etention, not ques-
tioning, is the evil at which Terry’s second prong is
aimed.’”) (citation omitted).

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Defendants assert that Villareal could not
have seen the scratch marks and the adhesive at
12:13, because he admitted at the suppression
hearing that this happened later, after he asked
for consent to search the car, at 12:23. We
disagree.
In the testimony to which defendants point,
Villareal testified only that he looked below the
car later, not that he did not see the scratch
marks until later. He indicated that at the point
when he flashed his flashlight to the area to the
back of the truck cab and the truck bed (12:13),
he saw scratches and a discolored substance
that he thought was adhesive that is used for
creating hidden compartments in the gas tanks
to conceal contraband. Furthermore, Villarre-
al’s testimony that he saw adhesive and scratch
marks (indicating that the gas tank has been
tampered with) is not merely convenient ex post
testimony by Villarreal; the videotape’s audio
shows that he told Chandler before 12:18, at
about 12:16, that there was a strap across the
gas tank, with a slit, that turns to lock, and it
looked like it has been turned recently.
These facts, taken together with the officers’
experience, and seen from the totality of the cir-
cumstances, including the fact that the vehicle
had recently crossed from Mexico, “a common
origin of illicit drugs,”3 suggest that there was
a reasonable likelihood that the vehicle’s gas
tank had a hidden compartment that was meant
to transport drugs.
The facts here do not reflect a mere custom-
ization of the vehicle that could also support a
conclusion of innocent travel. Rather, Villar-
real’s expert experience conforms with com-
mon sense: It is hard to conceive of a legiti-
mate use for a large hidden storage compart-
ment in any part of a vehicle, let alone in the
gas tank.
Courts must allow law enforcement “offi-
cers to draw on their own experience and spe-
cialized training to make inferences from and
deductions about the cumulative information
available to them that ‘might well elude an un-
trained person.’” United States v. Arvizu, 534
U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). The adhesive
marks and other scratches, together with the
other evidence, do not fully exclude the possi-
bility of innocent travel given the age of the
vehicle,4 but the likelihood of criminal activity
need not rise to the level required for probable
cause, and it falls considerably short of satis-
fying a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7
(1989). Because under the law of this circuit,
evidence of a hidden compartment supports
“probable cause” for a search/arrest, evidence
indicating the existence of a hidden compart-
ment also supports the lesser standard of “rea-
sonable suspicion.”5
3 United States v. Jurado-Vallejo, 380 F.3d
1235, 1238-39 (10th Cir. 2004).
4 See also Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9-10 (holding
that factors which by themselves were “quite
consistent with innocent travel” collectively
amounted to reasonable suspicion).
5 See United States v. Inocencio, 40 F.3d 716,
724 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that evidence of hid-
den compartment contributed to probable cause to
search); United States v. Price, 869 F.2d 801, 804
(5th Cir. 1989) (“Once the agents had discovered
the secret compartment they had probable cause to
search the compartment itself.”); see also United
States v. Nicholson, 17 F.3d 1294, 1298 (10th Cir.
1994) (considering, among other factors providing
probable cause, a “four or five-inch difference in
the truck bottom and the floor which indicated a
(continued...)

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As we explained in Innocencio, 40 F.3d at
724, the “discovery of fresh paint (on a brand
new truck) around the fender wells and the
fresh undercoating beneath the bed of the
truck” all contributed in creating “a reasonable
belief that the vehicle contained a false
compartment” and this “belief would create
sufficient probable cause to search the vehicle.”
Similarly here, the discovery of the scratch
marks and the adhesive created a reasonable
belief that the vehicle contained a false com-
partment that has recently been used, and this
belief created at least reasonable suspicion.
IV.
Because Villarreal’s continued detention of
Ramiro and Jorge after Villarreal obtained neg-
ative results from the computer check was sup-
ported by reasonable suspicion developed be-
fore 12:18, Ramiro’s and Jorge’s consent to the
search the car at 12:23 was not unconstitution-
ally tainted.6 Thus, the government’s burden to
prove consent by the preponderance of the evi-
dence is not as heavy as it would have been
had a Fourth Amendment violation preceded
the consent. Dortch, 199 F.3d at 201. We
agree with the district court that the consent
was free and voluntary.
The voluntariness of consent is a question
of fact to be determined on the totality of the
circumstances. Id. We look to (1) the volun-
tariness of the defendant’s custodial status;
(2) the presence of coercive police procedures;
(3) the extent and level of the defendant’s co-
operation with the police; (4) the defendant’s
awareness of his right to refuse consent;
(5) his education and intelligence; and (6) his
belief that no incriminating evidence will be
found. Id. Although all six factors are rele-
vant, no single one is dispositive. Id.
Here, multiple factors favor a finding of
voluntariness: The records shows that Ramiro
and Jorge were calm and cooperative and does
not indicate that Villarreal engaged in coercive
tactics. Defendants’ educational levels, how-
ever, and their testimony that they were not
aware that they could refuse consent, favor a
finding that the consent was not voluntary.
But, we will not reverse the district court’s
finding that consent was voluntary unless it is
clearly erroneous. Id. If the district court
“bases a finding of consent on the oral testi-
mony at a suppression hearing, the clearly
erroneous standard is particularly strong since
the judge had the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses.” Id.
Based on a review of the videotape, the
district court found that the consent given was
5(...continued)
hidden compartment designed to carry contraband”);
United States v. Martel-Martines, 988 F.2d 855,
858-59 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v.
Arango, 912 F.2d 441, 447 (10th Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing that evidence of hidden compartment, along with
inadequate amount of luggage for claimed duration
of trip, furnished probable cause); United States v.
Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, 1066 (10th Cir. 1997)
(holding discovery of “what appeared to be a hidden
compartment in the gas tank,” along with evidence
of air freshener and conflicting stories from the
passengers, sufficient to furnish probable cause);
United States v. Toro-Pelaez, 107 F.3d 819, 825
(10th Cir. 1997) (“Recent Fourth Amendment cases
in this circuit and others have determined that
evidence of a concealed compartment can give rise
to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”).
6 See Brigham, 382 F.3d at 512 (reasoning that
(continued...)
6(...continued)
absent a Fourth Amendment violation, consent to
search a vehicle is not unconstitutionally tainted).

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voluntary and was an independent act of free
will. Therefore, because no single factor is dis-
positive, and because there were sufficient
factors supporting consent (and the district
court could have disbelieved defendants’ testi-
mony that they were unaware of their rights),
there is no clear error.
After Villarreal searched the truck with de-
fendants’ permission, he obtained additionalev-
idence that supported the prolonged detention,
as the district court determined. The Estradas
do not challenge the constitutionality of their
detention following Villarreal’s search of the
truck. Even if they challenged it, Keane’s
discovery of a hidden compartment with the use
of the scope constitutes probable cause, which
would permit a warrantless search and the
transfer of the car to the police station.7 There-
fore, we do not need to reach the issue of
whether the removal of the car exceeded the
scope of the consent.
The Estradas also complain about the use
of the handcuffs after the discovery of the
hidden compartment and before the move to
the garage, but the handcuffs were not
unconstitutional under a Terry stop analysis.8
Finally, although the brothers also complain
that they were not Mirandized until the mari-
huana was found, this complaint does not help
their case, because they are not claiming that
any information obtained from them in viola-
tion of Miranda was introduced in court.
AFFIRMED.
7 “[P]olice officers who have probable cause to
believe there is contraband inside an automobile that
has been stopped on the road may search it without
obtaining a warrant.” Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S.
380, 381 (1984) (per curiam). The officers do not
need to obtain a warrant to move the vehicle from
the roadside to a garage if there is probable cause to
search a vehicle. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42, 48, 52 n.10 (1970) (observing that it “was
not unreasonable . . . to take the car to the station
house”); United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582,
586 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he justification to conduct
a warrantless search under the automobile exception
does not disappear merely because the car has been
immobilized and impounded.”); United States v.
Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 550 (10th Cir. 1985) (“Under
the ‘automobile exception’ then, the police conduct
in moving Lopez from Interstate 40 to the Santa
Rosa State Police office is proper if it was sup-
ported by probable cause.”).
8 United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 709
(9th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he use of handcuffs, if reason-
ably necessary, while substantially aggravating the
intrusiveness of an investigatory stop, does not nec-
essarily convert a Terry stop into an arrest necessi-
tating probable cause.”); United States v. Ricardo
D., 912 F.2d 337, 340 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that officers “may move a suspect from the loca-
tion of the initial stop without converting the stop
to an arrest when it is necessary for safety or
security reasons”); United States v. Bradshaw, 102
F.3d 204 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the officer
“could lawfully detain [defendant in the back of the
squad car] until he had finished performing radio
checks and issuing the citation,” because it was
“well within the bounds of the initial stop.”).

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