Chinwendu v. Ashcroft

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
October 26, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-60018
Summary Calendar
OKWU DANIEL CHINWENDU,
Petitioner,
versus
JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
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Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A78 328 901
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Before GARZA, DEMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Okwu Daniel Chinwendu petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’s (BIA’s) decision denying his request for
asylum. We hold that the BIA’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence. See Lopez-Gomez v. Ashcroft, 263 F.3d 442,
444 (5th Cir. 2001).
Chinwendu cites Ninth Circuit authority for the proposition
that the murder of his father constituted past persecution of
Chinwendu. However, the Ninth Circuit has held that to be

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evidence of past persecution, violence against a family member
must have created a pattern of persecution closely tied to the
asylum applicant. See Salazar-Paucar v. INS, 281 F.3d 1069, 1075
(9th Cir.), amended by, 290 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2002); Arriaga-
Barrientos v. INS, 937 F.2d 411, 414 (9th Cir. 1991). Chinwendu
has shown no such nexus. We further hold that the BIA’s
determination that the threats made against Chinwendu, his
inability to attend church in Kano, and his witnessing of the
Kaduna massacre independently and cumulatively did not rise to
the level of past persecution. Rather, the evidence supports the
conclusion that (1) the threat by the parents of his Muslim
students was not on account of his religious beliefs but rather
on account of his decision to discuss religion in the classroom;
(2) his confrontation with the Muslim youths was an isolated
incident involving only shouting, which did not result in
physical harm; (3) he was free to practice Christianity in his
home state; and (4) neither the Nigerian nor the Kaduna
Government sanctioned the Kaduna violence and both took efforts
to quell any future ethno-religious disorder. See Eduard v.
Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2004); Abdel-Masieh,73 F.3d
579, 583 (5th Cir. 1996); Adebisi v. INS, 952 F.2d 910, 913-14
(5th Cir. 1992).
Finally, the BIA’s determination that it is reasonable for
Chinwendu to relocate to the southern, predominantly Christian
portion of Nigeria is supported by evidence that Nigerian states

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with a clear Muslim or Christian majority generally explicitly
favor the majority religion. The southern portion of the country
is predominantly Christian and many Christians living in the
North have returned to their historic homelands in the Southeast,
fearing further violence following the Kaduna massacre. See
Lopez-Gomez, 263 F.3d at 445.
PETITION DENIED.

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