Long v. Thommessen

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
November 6, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 06-10653
Summary Calendar
_______________
IN THE MATTER OF:
THOR K. TJONTVEIT,
Debtor.
E. PATRICIA LONG,
Appellant,
VERSUS
BJORN KOHLER THOMMESSEN,
FORMERLY KNOWN AS BJORN KOHLER,
Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
m 3:06-CV-63
______________________________

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Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Patricia Long appeals the district court’s af-
firmance of the bankruptcy court’s imposition
of sanctions. We affirm.
I.
This matter stems from an ancillary bank-
ruptcy case in which Bjorn Thommessen, the
trustee of a Norwegian bankruptcy proceed-
ing, sought permission to conduct discovery in
the United States related to that proceeding.
In his motion to authorize discovery pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 304(b)(3), Thommessen includ-
ed a statement about Long:
Tjontveit [the debtor in the Norwegian
bankruptcy proceeding] and a business as-
sociate, E. Patricia Long (“Long”), are un-
der criminal investigation in Norway for al-
leged tax fraud relating to Tjontveit’s
and/or Long’s receipt of value added tax
rebates in the approximate sum of $12 mil-
lion (U.S.) which were received from the
Norwegian Directorate of Taxes.
Long, proceeding pro se, moved for sanc-
tions against Thommessen, contending that she
was not under criminal investigation and that
Thommessen’s unsupported statement dam-
aged her personal integrity and business repu-
tation. Long failed, however, to abide by the
safe harbor provision in Federal Rule of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure 9011SSshe filed the motion
without first serving it on Thommessen.1
Thommessen suggested that she withdraw the
motion, but she refused, so Thommessen filed
a cross-motion for sanctions against Long.
The bankruptcy court denied Long’s mo-
tion and granted Thommessen’s, imposing a
$14,000 sanction on Long. In support of its
denial of Long’s motion, the court reasoned
that (1) Thommessen’s statement that Long
was under investigation was accurate, because
the trustees of the Norwegian bankruptcy es-
tate were investigating Long; and (2) Long
had reason to know of this investigation be-
cause of a press release from OKOKRIM, a
Norwegian unit that investigates and prose-
cutes economic and environmental crime.
Justifying its impositions of sanctions, the
court found that Long had engaged in a pat-
tern of abusive litigation in addition to the mo-
tion for sanctions against Thommessen: She
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has de-
termined that this opinion should not be published
and is not precedent except under the limited cir-
cumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1 Rule 9011(c)(1)(A) states, in relevant part:
A motion for sanctions under this rule shall
be made separately from other motions or re-
quests and shall describe the specific conduct
alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be
served as provided in Rule 7004. The motion
for sanctions may not be filed with or presented
to the court unless, within 21 days after service
of the motion (or such other period as the court
may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, de-
fense, contention, allegation, or denial is not
withdrawn or appropriately corrected, except
that this limitation shall not apply if the conduct
alleged is the filing of a petition in violation of
subdivision (b). If warranted, the court may
award to the party prevailing on the motion the
reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees in-
curred in presenting or opposing the motion.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9001(c)(1)(A).

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filed grievances with the state bar, two law-
suits in courts that likely lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, and a separate suit against another
Norwegian trusteeSSall of which contain sim-
ilarly groundless allegations as did her motion
for sanctions against Thommessen. The bank-
ruptcy court outlined the negative effects of
Long’s conduct and concluded sanctions were
required. In a careful and thorough opinion
the district court affirmed.
II.
We review rule 9011 sanctions for abuse of
discretion. Krim v. First City Bancorporation
Inc. (In re First City Bancorporation Inc.),
282 F.3d 864, 867 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curi-
am). “A court abuses its discretion when its
ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law
or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the
evidence.” Id.
The bankruptcy court correctly viewed the
law. The court analyzed Long’s motion for
sanctions under the appropriate ruleSSrule
9011SSand imposed the sanctions pursuant to
9011(b)(1) for filing for an improper purpose.2
The court committed no legal error in applying
this provision to Long’s motion.
Further, the court was not clearly erroneous
in its assessment of the evidence. It found that
Long had engaged in “a pattern of activity,”
suing Thommessen repeatedly and frivolously,3
and that Long had refused the opportunity to
correct her conduct.
The judgment of the district court, affirm-
ing the bankruptcy court, is AFFIRMED.
2 Rule 9011(b)(1) states that by filing a motion
a party is certifying that the motion “is not being
presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation.” FED. R. BANKR.
P. 9001(b)(1). The district court stated that the
bankruptcy court had imposed sanctions based on
rule 9001(b)(1) and (3). We read the bankruptcy
court’s order to impose sanctions relying only on
subpart (b)(1), but it provides an independently
sufficient basis for sanctions, so the difference in
our and the district court’s understanding of the or-
der is immaterial.
3 Long appeared pro se in the bankruptcy court
but retained counsel for the appeals. The district
court rightly states that “sanctions may be appro-
priate when pro se litigants are shown to have a
history of submitting frivolous claims . . . . Men-
doza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 194-97 (5th Cir.
1993).” See generally Coghlan v. Starkey, 852
F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (regarding
the imposition of sanctions on pro se litigants).

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