Richardson v. US Postal Service

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
January 29, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 06-30729
Summary Calendar
_______________
RAYMOND RICHARDSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
m 5:02-CV-1831
______________________________
Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Raymond Richardson sued the United
States Postal Service (“USPS”), alleging em-
ployment discrimination and constitutional vio-
lations. The district court granted the USPS’s
motion for summary judgment, and we affirm.
I.
The Postal Service has employed Richard-
son, who is black, as a mail handler since
1985. In January 1997 Richardson suffered a
stroke. A few months later, his two doctors
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has de-
termined that this opinion should not be published
and is not precedent except under the limited cir-
cumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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completed a “request for a light duty assign-
ment” on his behalf and stated he was ready to
return to work, but the reports contained dis-
crepancies. The doctors wrote new reports,
both of which stated Richardson had difficulty
with speech and comprehension. Richardson
then underwent a fitness-for-duty exam at the
direction of the USPS. The examining doctor
recommended that he not lift over fifty
pounds or operate or be around heavy equip-
ment.
Based on the doctors’ requests and the ex-
am report, the USPS in July 1997 denied Rich-
ardson’s request for light duty, because “[a]ll
examinations still indicate that you have diffi-
cultywith comprehension/understanding. This
may present a safety problem in our work.”
After a second fitness-for-duty exam in De-
cember 1997, also scheduled by the USPS,
Richardson was notified to report back for
duty in January 1998, and he resumed his
work.
After pursuing relief through administrative
channels,1 Richardson, proceeding pro se,
sued, alleging discrimination based on disabil-
ity, hostile work environment, interference
with Family and Medical Leave Act leave, vio-
lations of procedural due process, and breach
of contract. Unable to decipher Richardson’s
claims, the district court ordered him twice to
file statements outlining the specific claims he
was asserting.
The court based its summary judgment on
Richardson’s second statement in which he
alleged race discrimination under title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16, et seq., disability discrimi-
nation under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794, et seq., and due process violations un-
der the Fifth Amendment. He asserts that he
suffered these ills from March 1997, when his
doctors released him to return to work after
his stroke, until January 1998, when he re-
sumed work. More specifically, he claims in-
jury from the USPS’s failure to grant his re-
quest for light duty and its insistence on his
second fitness-for-duty examination, which
delayed his return. In his briefs on appeal,
Richardson asserts claims beyond those in-
volved in the summary judgment ruling, but
we limit our discussion to the issues resolved
by the district court.2
II.
We apply the familiar standard of review of
summary judgments.
We review a grant of summary judgment de
novo, applying the same standard as the
district court. A motion for summary judg-
ment is properly granted only if there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact. An
issue is material if its resolution could affect
the outcome of the action. In deciding
whether a fact issue has been created, we
must view the facts and the inferences to be
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party.
Roberts v. Cardinal Servs., Inc., 266 F.3d
368, 373 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal citations
omitted).
1 The district court’s ruling outlines Richard-
son’s successes and failures before the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Services and the Merit Sys-
tems Protection Board. Our disposition in this
opinion does not require recounting those proceed-
ings.
2 The district court explicitly stated that these
three claims were the only claims at issue before it.
It summarily dismissed other claims Richardson
had previously raised.

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First, Richardson’s contention that the
USPS discriminated against him because of his
race fails because he offered no evidence that
the USPS’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for its adverse employment decision was
false or pretext for illicit discrimination. Under
McDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting frame-
work,3 Richardson must establish a prima fa-
cie case of discrimination. Frank v. Xerox
Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 137 (5th Cir. 2003). If
a plaintiff is successful, the burden shifts to the
employer to proffer a legitimate, non-discrim-
inatory reason for its adverse employment de-
cision. Id. If it does so, the burden shifts back
to the employee to demonstrate that the em-
ployer’s reason was a pretext for discrimi-
nation. Id.
Assuming without deciding that Richardson
established a prima facie case, he did not dem-
onstrate that the USPS’s reason for refusing to
assign him light-duty work or for requiring him
to undergo a second fitness-for-duty examine
was pretext for discrimination. The USPS
claimed that Richardson’s comprehension limi-
tations posed a safety problem, and Richard-
son offered no evidence that this nondiscrimi-
natory reason was false or a pretext. He failed
to meet his burden under McDonnell Douglas,
so summary judgment on this issue was not
error.
Second, Richardson urges that the USPS
discriminated against him because he is dis-
abled. Richardson, however, has not made the
requisite showing that he is disabled as defined
by the Rehabilitation Act,4 so the court rightly
granted summary judgment. “An individual
with a disability is any person who (1) has a
physical or mental impairment which ‘substan-
tially limits one or more of such person’s ma-
jor life activities’; (2) has a ‘record’ of such an
impairment; or (3) is ‘regarded’ as having such
an impairment.”5
Richardson offered no evidence that his im-
pairments substantially limited a major life ac-
tivity, so he is not disabled under the first
prong. To have an impairment that substan-
tially limits a major life activity, an “individual
must have an impairment that prevents or se-
verely restricts the individual from doing activ-
ities that are of central importance to most
people’s daily lives. The impairment’s impact
must also be permanent or long term.” Toyota
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S.
184, 198 (2002).
Richardson does not even allege that his
impairments prevent or severely restrict major
life activities, and the evidence suggests that
his do not. His doctors and the examinations
all concluded his ability to lift was not sub-
stantiallyimpaired, and none suggested that his
comprehension limitations prevented or se-
verely restricted activities that are of central
importance to most people’s daily lives. Thus,
3 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973).
4 Hileman v. City of Dallas, 115 F.3d 352, 353 1
(continued...)
4(...continued)
(5th Cir. 1997) (“To qualify for relief under the 2
Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must prove that 3
(1) he is an ‘individual with a disability’; (2) who 4
is ‘otherwise qualified’; (3) who worked for a ‘pro- 5
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assis- 6
tance’; and (4) that he was discriminated against 7
‘solely by reason of her or his disability.’ 29 8
U.S.C. § 794(a); Chandler v. City of Dallas, 9
2 F.3d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir.1993).”). 10
5 Hileman, 115 F.3d at 353 (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(8)(B) (West Supp. 1997)).

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the district court did not err in its conclusion
Richardson is not disabled under the first
prong.
Similarly, Richardson presented no evi-
dence that there was a record of an impairment
that substantially limited a major life activity,
so he was not disabled under the second
prong. His best evidence that the USPS re-
garded him as having an impairment that sub-
stantially limits a major life activity is the fact
that the USPS did not permit him to work.
Nonetheless, “[a]n employer’s belief that an
employee is unable to perform one task with
an adequate safety margin does not establish
per se that the employer regards the employee
as having a substantial limitation on his ability
to work in general.” Chandler v. City of Dal-
las, 2 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1993).
Without more evidence, Richardson failed
to present evidence that the USPS regarded
him as disabled. Because he was not disabled
under the Rehabilitation Act, his claim of dis-
crimination because of disability was correctly
dismissed at summary judgment.
Finally, Richardson complains of a violation
of his constitutional procedural due process
rights. Without reaching whether he can assert
such claims given the statutory remedies avail-
able to him, we agree with the district court
that Richardson has not offered evidence that
any of his procedural rights was violated. He
had access to and was heard by both adminis-
trative and judicial bodies, which addressed
his claims.
AFFIRMED.

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