06-50641•Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. Rodrick Lighteard
06-50641Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit25 de jun. de 2007
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
June 25, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-50641
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
RODRICK LIGHTEARD
Defendant - Appellant
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 5:05-CR-718-ALL
--------------------
Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Rodrick Lighteard pleaded guilty to possession of more than
five grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844, and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Lighteard was sentenced to
concurrent imprisonment terms of 188 months on his drug
conviction and 120 months on his firearm conviction. He appeals
his firearm conviction.
Lighteard challenges his firearm conviction on the ground
that the factual basis supporting his plea did not establish that
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the firearm he possessed had traveled in or affected interstate
commerce. Because Lighteard did not challenge the sufficiency of
the factual basis in the district court, this court reviews the
issue for plain error. See United States v. Castro-Trevino, 464
F.3d 536, 541 (5th Cir. 2006). The record contains no indication
that Lighteard ever took issue with whether the firearm had
traveled in or affected interstate commerce, and Lighteard does
not argue that he would not have pleaded guilty but for the
district court’s error, thus waiving any such argument. See
United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004);
United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 647 (5th Cir. 2002). As
such, Lighteard has failed to make the requisite showing. See
Castro-Trevino, 464 F.3d at 544.
Lighteard also argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional
on its face because it does not require a substantial affect on
interstate commerce, relying on Jones v. United States, 529 U.S.
848 (2000), United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). This argument is
foreclosed by this court’s precedent. See United States v.
Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1996).
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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