Boggan v. MS Conf United Meth

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
February 1, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 06-60782
(Summary Calendar)
_____________________
PETER BOGGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant
MISSISSIPPI CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED METHODIST CHURCH,
Defendant-Appellee
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Appeal from the United States District Court
the Southern District of Mississippi
(3:05-CV-553)
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BEFORE SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Peter Boggan, a Methodist minister
previously employed as a pastor by Defendant-Appellee Mississippi
Conference of the United Methodist Church (“MCUMC”), appeals the
district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of his Title VII and 42
U.S.C. § 1981 action grounded in race discrimination. As fully
explained by the court in its Memorandum Opinion and Order of May
5, 2006, Boggan’s claims failed to present any basis for possible
recovery, as they are among the larger class of employment
discrimination claims that are barred by the so-called minister-

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clergy exception, which is firmly rooted in the Free Exercise
clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The district court rejected both of Boggan’s alternative arguments,
viz., that (1) our holdings in Combs v. Central Texas Annual
Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.2d 343 (5th Cir.
1999) and Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999), which
continued to approbate this exception, are not good law and should
be rejected by this court, and (2) alternatively, his claim remains
cognizable because elimination of race discrimination, as
compelling government interest, should be addressed under the two-
part test of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), by
application of Title VII and § 1981, if —— as Boggan contends ——
the Supreme Court’s declaration of the RFRA’s unconstitutionality
in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) does not apply to
federal law.
Having thoroughly reviewed the facts of this case and the
applicable law as reflected in the record on appeal and the briefs
of the parties, we are convinced that the district court ruled
correctly in dismissing Boggan’s action under Rule 12(b)(6). Our
1999 holdings in Combs and Starkman remain fully viable and
controlling. Unless they are nullified by some future holding of
the Supreme Court of the United States or by this court en banc,
the courts of this circuit continue to be bound by the holdings of
Combs and Starkman. For essentially the reasons cogently and
correctly expressed by the district court, its judgment of

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dismissal is, in all respects,
AFFIRMED.

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