White v. Astrue

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
July 9, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 07-30071
Summary Calendar
_______________
PHIL H. WHITE, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee,
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
m 6:05-CV-272
______________________________
Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN,
Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*
Phil White filed an application for disability
benefits on account of chronic back pain and
headaches. After a hearing, his claim was
denied based on a finding by the administrative
law judge (“ALJ”) that there existed sub-
stantial work in the national economy that
White could perform. White appeals, and we
affirm.
I.
Between February and April 2000, White
sustained injuries in several motor vehicle
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has de-
termined that this opinion should not be published
and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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accidents. As a consequence, he suffers from
degenerative disc disease, back pain syndrome,
and a meniscal tear of his left knee.
White filed an application for title II dis-
ability benefits, alleging that his injuries pre-
vented him from working. The state agency
reviewed his claim and denied benefits based
on a finding that he could perform his past
work as a security officer as it is normally per-
formed in the national economy. White ap-
pealed the denial and received a hearing before
an ALJ.
The ALJ found the presence of severe, sig-
nificantly limiting impairments, but concluded
that the impairments do not meet the require-
ments of any impairment listed in the regula-
tions for presumptive disability. The ALJ con-
sidered White’s residual functional capacity,
and after assuming that he was restricted to a
degree, found that White could perform
“essentially a full range of light work.” The
ALJ turned to the Medical-Vocational Guide-
lines and found a framework such that “con-
sidering the claimant’s residual functional ca-
pacity, age, education, and work experience,
he is not disabled.” After unsuccessful appeals
to the appeals council and the district court,
White initiated this appeal to challenge the
denial of benefits.
II.
The Commissioner conducts a five-step
sequential analysis in evaluating a disability
claim, see Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431,
435 (5th Cir. 1994), and determines whether
(1) the claimant is presently working; (2) the
claimant has a severe impairment; (3) the
impairment meets or equals an impairment
listed in appendix 1 of the social security regu-
lations; (4) the impairment prevents the claim-
ant from doing past relevant work; and (5) the
impairment prevents the claimant from doing
any other substantial gainful activity. See id.
A finding that a claimant is not disabled at any
point in the five-step process terminates the
inquiry. See Crouchet v. Sullivan, 885 F.2d
202, 206 (5th Cir. 1989).1 Title 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(1)(A) defines disability as an
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determina-
ble physical or mental impairment . . . .”
Our review is limited to determining wheth-
er substantial evidence in the record supports
the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits
and whether the Commissioner applied the
proper legal standards.2 Substantial evidence
must be “relevant and sufficient for a
reasonable mind to accept as adequate to sup-
port a conclusion; it must be more than a
scintilla, but it need not be a preponderance.”3
We may not reweigh the record evidence,
try the issues de novo, or substitute our judg-
ment for that of the Commissioner. See John-
son, 864 F.2d at 343. If, under these criteria,
substantial evidence supports such findings,
they are conclusive. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
1 At the first four steps of the analysis, the
claimant bears the burden of showing he is dis-
abled. See Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 125
(5th Cir. 1991). On the fifth, the Commissioner
must show that there is other, substantial work in
the national economy that the claimant can per-
form. See id.
2 See Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236
(5th Cir. 1994); Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340,
347 (5th Cir. 1998).
3 Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir.
1995) (citing Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289,
295 (5th Cir. 1992)).

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(1971).
III.
The Commissioner can meet his step five
burden by demonstrating that “the claimant
can perform other substantial work in the na-
tional economy.” Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d
457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005). White asserts that
the ALJ erred by relying solely on the Medical-
Vocational Guidelines (“Grid Rules”) to find
that the Commissioner had met his burden at
step five and that White was not disabled.
White argues that he suffers from significant
non-exertional impairmentsSSpain-producing
conditionsSSsuch that reliance solely on the
Grid Rules was impermissible.4 If so, the
ALJ’s decision at step five would be
unsupported by substantial evidence, because
the Commissioner would have failed to pro-
vide evidence of the existence of sufficient
work for a person with White’s residual func-
tional capacity in the national economy.
Based on a review of the record, the ALJ
relied solely on the Grid Rules in determining
that White could find work in the national
economy and was not disabled. The voca-
tional expert who testified did not address the
existence of substantial work except to say
that if White’s testimony were found credible
there would be no job he could perform on a
full-time sustained basis.
Because the Commissioner did not bring
forth additional evidence at step five, our re-
view focuses solely on whether bare applica-
tion of the Grid Rules to meet the Commis-
sioner’s step five burden was permissible. In
other words, the issue is whether there was
substantial evidence that White did not suffer
from significant non-exertional impairments
which would render use of the Grid Rules
improper.
The mere existence of pain does not pro-
hibit reliance on the Grid Rules where the ALJ
finds that the pain will not significantly com-
promise a claimant’s capacity for a full range
of work. See Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296,
1304 (5th Cir. 1987). The ALJ discredited
White’s testimony, and found that he could
perform “essentially a full range of light
work.” That finding is supported by substan-
tial evidence.
At step two, the ALJ found that White suf-
fered the following severe impairments: severe
degenerative disc disease, post-traumatic back
pain syndrome, cervical strain/sprain, and a
meniscal tear in the left knee. Although White
alleges that these are “pain-producing
impairments,” the ALJ considered White’s tes-
timony about pain and found that “claimant’s
allegations as to the severity of his im-
pairments, pain, and functional limitations are
not consistent with the medical evidence.”
As elaborated by the district court, the
medical records are inconsistent with White’s
report of severe pain requiring bed rest; not a
single record indicated such a debilitating
condition. The ALJ considered the effect of
4 See Crowley v. Apfel, 197 F.3d 194, 199 (5th
Cir. 1999) (“Use of the ‘Grid Rules’ is appropriate
when it is established that a claimant suffers only
from exertional impairments, or that the claimant’s
nonexertional impairments do not significantly
affect his residual functional capacity.”); Loza v.
Apfel, 219 F.3d 378, 399 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[I]f it
should be determined on remand that [claimant’s]
non-exertional mental impairments during the
period of disability were not merely a slight
abnormality of minimal effect on ability to work,
the ALJ’s reliance on the Grid Rules at the fifth
level also constitutes error and must be recon-
sidered.”).

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pain on White’s ability to work, then con-
cluded that he was able to perform a full range
of light work. Where the medical evidence is
inconclusive, an ALJ has discretion to consider
the disabling nature of pain. See Cook v.
Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 1985).
The ALJ’s finding that pain did not prevent
White from performing a full range of light
work is supported by substantial evidence.
An ALJ’s finding of a severe non-exertional
impairment at step two precludes the ALJ
from relying solely on the Grid Rules at step
five.5 The ALJ determined, however, that
White’s severe disc problems prevented him
from lifting heavy objects or sitting and stand-
ing for prolonged periods of time. These are
exertional limitations, fully consistent with
application of the Grid Rules.
Because the ALJ reasonably found that
White did not suffer from significant non-ex-
ertional impairments, his reliance on the Grid
Rules at step five was proper. The judgment
is AFFIRMED.
5 See, e.g., Hearne v. Barnhart, 111 Fed. Appx.
256, 257-58 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that a finding
of severe depression prevented application of the
Grid Rules alone to satisfy the Commissioner’s
step five burden).

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