Bruno v. Starr, et al

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
September 10, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 07-30111
Summary Calendar
_______________
VINCENT BRUNO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
MICHAEL STARR; RMS HOLDINGS, L.L.C.; W. CHRISTOPHER BEARY;
JAMES STARR; AND RUTH STARR,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
m 2:05-CV-1887
______________________________
Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Vincent Bruno appeals the imposition of
sanctions. Finding no abuse of discretion, we
affirm.
This appeal stems from a RICO complaint
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has de-
termined that this opinion should not be published
and is not precedent except under the limited
(continued...)
*(...continued)
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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Bruno filed against defendants and their law-
yer, W. Christopher Beary. The court granted
defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we af-
firmed because “Bruno’s claims as plead are
clearly foreclosed by this court’s precedent.”
Bruno v. Starr, 182 F. App’x 297, 298 (5th
Cir. 2006).
Defendants moved for sanctions against
Bruno and his attorney under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11, claiming there was no le-
gal basis for the RICO claims and that the suit
was filed for an improper purpose. The dis-
trict court found that Bruno and his attorney
had violated rule 11, and it imposed sanctions
of $11,500 on each of them.1 The court con-
cluded that the lawyer had not made a reason-
able inquiry into the relevant law and that Bru-
no had sued for an improper purpose. The
court noted that Bruno had filed five suits for
claims arising out of the same transaction, that
he had been denied relief in all of them, and
that the serial filing constituted harassment.
“This Court reviews the imposition of sanc-
tions for an abuse of discretion.” Maguire Oil
Co. v. City of Houston, 143 F.3d 205, 208
(5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Matta v. May, 118
F.3d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1997)). “A court
abuses its discretion to impose sanctions when
a ruling is based on an erroneous view of the
law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of
the evidence.” Id. Rule 11 authorizes the
imposition of sanctions against a party as well
as his attorney. See Skidmore Energy, Inc. v.
KPMG, 455 F.3d 564, 567 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied 127 S. Ct. 524 (2006). Parties generally
may not, however, be sanctioned for violating
rule 11(b)(2), which makes the filing of legally
frivolous pleadings sanctionable. Id. at 567-
68.
Bruno argues on appeal that he should not
have been sanctioned for his attorney’s actions
and asserts that he was relying on his lawyer’s
advice that his claims were legally sound. This
contention overlooks the court’s rationale for
its imposition of sanctions. If Bruno had been
sanctioned for advancing legally frivolous
arguments, his reasoning would have merit.
Only Bruno’s attorney, however, was sanc-
tioned for the frivolous claims; Bruno was
sanctioned for filing this lawsuit for the im-
proper purpose of harassment. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 11(b)(1). He continued to file lawsuits
on which he was denied reliefSSfive in totalSS
arising from the same claim. He overlooks the
plain language of rule 11, which states that
sanctions can be levied against parties for, in-
ter alia, filing suits for the improper purpose
of harassment. Accordingly, the district
court’s ruling is not based on an erroneous
vew of the law.
Bruno also argues that the court incorrectly
found that he was denied relief in his five prior
suits and that it incorrectly found that he had
been ordered to pay damages and attorney’s
fees for improperly causing a temporary re-
straining order to be issued.2 We will disturb
the factual findings of the district court only if
they are clearly erroneous. Bruno does not
provide any citations to the record in his
allegations that the court’s factual findings are
incorrect; he only summarily states that the
1 In their Rule 11 motion, defendants requested
their total attorneys’ fees, $35, 208.86, which the
court found was excessive.
2 The record includes an order from a state
court directing that Bruno and his co-plaintiff “are
responsible for damages, including attorney’s fees,
for the wrongful issuance of the Temporary Re-
straining Order.”

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findings are wrong. This is insufficient to
establish clear error.3
AFFIRMED.4
3 “Clear error exists if (1) the findings are with-
out substantial evidence to support them, (2) the
court misapprehended the effect of the evidence,
and (3) although there is evidence which if credible
would be substantial, the force and effect of the
testimony, considered as a whole, convinces the
court that the findings are so against the preponder-
ance of credible testimony that they do not reflect
or represent the truth and right of the case.” Water
Craft Mgmt., LLC v. Mercury Marine, 457 F.3d
484, 488 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Moorhead v.
Mitsubishi Aircraft Int’l, Inc., 828 F.2d 278, 283
(5th Cir. 1987)). See also United States v. Infante,
404 F.3d 376, 393-94 (5th Cir. 2005) (“As long as
a factual finding is plausible in light of the record
as a whole, it is not clearly erroneous.”).
4 Defendants’ motion to strike Bruno’s brief and
its exhibits is DENIED.

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