United States v. Adams

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-11393
Summary Calendar

United States of America,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Ralph Jay Adams, also known as Evil,

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:18-CR-6-10

Before Davis, Stewart, and Dennis, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Ralph Jay Adams appeals the sentence imposed for his guilty plea
conviction of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The
Government moves to dismiss the appeal based on the appeal waiver in his
plea agreement. Adams contends that the appeal waiver is unenforceable

*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
December 30, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Case: 19-11393 Document: 00515688756 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/30/2020

No. 19-11393
2
because the Government violated an implied term of the plea agreement by
not moving for the additional one-level credit for acceptance of responsibility
under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).
When a plea agreement “is unambiguous, this court generally will not
look beyond the four corners of the document.” United States v. Long,
722 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2013). Adams’s plea agreement unambiguously
contains no term obligating the Government in any way concerning credit for
acceptance of responsibility or the filing of a motion under § 3E1.1(b). The
plain and unambiguous language of the plea agreement is not overcome by
Adams’s assertions that the filing of a § 3E1.1(b) motion was an implied term
during plea negotiations. See id. Adams has not shown that the appeal waiver
is unenforceable due to a breach of the plea agreement by the Government.
His alternative argument that he did not enter into the plea agreement
knowingly and voluntarily also is unavailing. Adams indicated in the plea
agreement and at rearraignment that the plea agreement was a complete
statement of the parties’ agreement, the plea agreement superseded any
other promises and representations by the parties, he was not pleading guilty
based on any promises outside of the plea agreement, and he fully understood
the plea agreement and accepted it voluntarily. See United States v. McClure,
854 F.3d 789, 793, 797 (5th Cir. 2017); Long, 722 F.3d at 264. Lastly, Adams
is incorrect that the Government failed to dispute his assertions in the district
court about its obligation to file a § 3E1.1(b) motion, as the Government
contended in the district court that it retained the discretion to decide
whether to file a § 3E1.1(b) motion.
Adams has not shown that the appeal waiver is unenforceable or that
the challenges he seeks to make to his sentence fall within an exception to the
appeal waiver. Accordingly, the Government’s motion is GRANTED, and
the appeal is DISMISSED.
Case: 19-11393 Document: 00515688756 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/30/2020