Perrin v. Hayward Baker

20-30241Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit11 de dez. de 2020

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United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-30241

Jarred Brent Perrin,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Hayward Baker, Incorporated,

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:19-CV-278

Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Dennis, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Appellant Jarred Perrin is a commercial diver, who was injured while
working on the Columbia Lock and Dam Project on the Ouachita River. He
appeals orders enforcing a settlement agreement and dismissing his claim
against Hayward Baker, Inc., a subcontractor responsible for grout work on
the dam project. We affirm.

*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
December 10, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
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No. 20-30241
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I.
At the time of his accident, Perrin was employed as a commercial diver
by Specialty Divers, Inc., working on the Columbia Lock and Dam Project.
Hayward Baker “was a sub-contractor who was hired by Massman
Construction Company to provide coring and grouting work on the Columbia
Lock & Dam Project.” In October 2018, while Perrin was underwater
monitoring the pouring of grout, a pipe “shot up from the floor of the Lock
& Damn structure through the water and into the air” and came down on his
leg, fracturing his left femur.
Perrin brought suit against Hayward Baker for negligence under
maritime law in January 2019. But he instructed his counsel not to bring suit
against his employer, Specialty. As trial approached, Perrin’s counsel—now,
intervenors below—negotiated a settlement with counsel for Hayward Baker.
On November 12, 2019, Perrin’s counsel represented to Hayward Baker’s
counsel that he “spoke to Mr. Perrin who has advised that if offered he would
accept $145,000 in full and final settlement.” Hayward Baker agreed, and the
parties notified the court that they had reached a settlement. In light of this
settlement, t he court dismissed the case but retained jurisdiction to enforce
the settlement agreement.
As of January 10, 2020, Perrin indicated that he intended to abide by
the settlement, but by January 14, counsel for Hayward Baker had learned
that Perrin would not execute final documentation. Hayward Baker then
moved to enforce the settlement, attaching correspondence between counsel
as evidence of the agreement. Perrin, now assisted by new counsel, filed a
response in which he argued that the correspondence was legally insufficient
to constitute a binding settlement agreement under Louisiana law. He also
argued that he did not intend to release either Specialty or Massman, the
project’s general contractor, from liability. In support, he filed only a copy of
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No. 20-30241
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the settlement agreement. Hayward Baker replied, filing additional
correspondence and an affidavit from Perrin’s former counsel confirming
that Perrin had agreed to release all three companies associated with the
Columbia project for the sum of $145,000. With the motion fully briefed, the
district court scheduled the matter for oral argument on March 11, 2020.
The evening before oral argument, nearly two weeks after Hayward
Baker’s reply, Perrin filed a sur-reply and affidavit in which he attempted to
create an issue of fact by contending that his counsel lacked authority to enter
into the settlement. Perrin’s late filing prompted the district court to hear the
party’s competing evidence during the March 11th proceedings. Counsel for
both parties were present along with counsel for Specialty and the
intervenors, Perrin’s former counsel. Despite having filed an affidavit the
night before, Perrin did not attend the proceedings. The district court heard
evidence and argument from both parties and the intervenors.
At the close of the hearing, the district court ruled that Perrin sued
under general maritime law, and thus the settlement’s enforceability would
be assessed under maritime law, not Louisiana law. The district court
determined that Perrin’s former counsel was credible and the testimony and
documentary evidence indicated that Perrin knowingly agreed to settle his
claim against Hayward Baker and to release the related parties, Specialty and
Massman, with the understanding that Specialty would waive an insurer’s
lien arising from Perrin’s receipt of benefits after his accident. The district
court granted Hayward Baker’s motion to enforce the settlement and
ordered Perrin to execute the agreement. When Perrin failed to execute the
agreement, Hayward Baker made, and the district court granted, a motion
dismissing Perrin’s claim with prejudice and adopting the settlement
agreement. Perrin appealed.
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II.
Perrin contends that the district court erred by finding the parties had
reached an enforceable settlement and violated due process by declining to
defer its ruling until Perrin appeared to give live testimony. Perrin also
challenges the district court’s jurisdiction to enforce the settlement, given
that Hayward Baker filed its motion to enforce after the deadline the court
set for such a motion in its first dismissal order.
The district court correctly concluded that federal maritime law, not
Louisiana law, governed enforcement of the settlement because Perrin’s only
asserted claim arose under general maritime law.
1
Consequently, we
conclude that there is no jurisdictional defect in the orders at issue. Although
the settlement agreement is a contract, the district court correctly found that
it retained authority to adjudicate questions of the agreement’s validity and
enforceability by virtue of the agreement’s maritime subject matter, even if
Hayward Baker filed the relevant motion after the court’s self-imposed
deadline.
A “district court has inherent power to recognize, encourage, and
when necessary enforce settlement agreements reached by the parties.”
2

“We review the district court’s exercise of this inherent power for abuse of
discretion.”
3
“Federal courts have held under a great variety of
circumstances that a settlement agreement once entered into cannot be

1
See Borne v. A & P Boat Rentals No. 4, Inc., 780 F.2d 1254, 1256 (5th Cir. 1986)
(“Because Borne alleged causes of action under general maritime law and the Jones Act,
federal law governs his challenge of the validity or enforceability of his settlement
agreement with A & P.”).
2
Bell v. Schexnayder, 36 F.3d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1994).
3
Del Bosque v. AT & T Advert., L.P., 441 F. App’x 258, 260 (5th Cir. 2011).
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repudiated by either party and will be summarily enforced.”
4
“On appeal, a
district court’s conclusion regarding the validity of a seaman’s release will be
reversed only if the conclusion is clearly erroneous.”
5

“When a seaman is acting upon independent advice and that advice is
disinterested and based on a reasonable investigation, there being no question
of competence, a settlement agreement will not be set aside.”
6
Here,
settlement discussions concluded after the parties had completed discovery
and filed a joint pretrial order, indicating that both sides had thoroughly
investigated the negligence claim. Nothing in Perrin’s briefs or affidavit
raised a serious challenge to the independence or competence of his former
counsel. Under maritime law, oral settlement agreements are enforceable,
“even when a party later refuses to sign the memorializing documents.”
7

Here, the record contains ample correspondence indicating that all parties
believed a settlement was reached. This is sufficient to support the district
court’s conclusion that Perrin agreed to settle his claim on November 12,
2019.
We are not persuaded that the district court violated due process in
reaching this conclusion. As of February 28th, the parties had briefed and
submitted exhibits bearing on the motion to enforce. On March 5th, the
district court entered an order setting the motion for argument on March
11th. Perrin waited until the night before argument to submit an unauthorized
sur-reply disputing his counsel’s authority to settle. He then chose not to

4
Strange v. Gulf & South American S.S. Co., Inc., 495 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir.
1974).
5
Durley v. Offshore Drilling Co., 288 F. App’x 188, 190 (5th Cir. 2008).
6
Borne, 780 F.2d at 1258.
7
Hardison v. Abdon Callais Offshore, L.L.C., 551 F. App’x 735, 738 (5th Cir. 2013).
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attend the proceedings next day. The hearing transcript indicates that the
district court nonetheless considered Perrin’s affidavit and another exhibit to
his sur-reply in addition to hearing argument from his counsel. Under the
circumstances, we find no reversible error.
We affirm the orders dismissing Perrin’s claim and enforcing the
settlement agreement.
Case: 20-30241 Document: 00515669710 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/10/2020

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