James Kost; Molly Kandle-Kost v. Honorable Suzanne Hoseth Kreeger, in her official capacity

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 21a0007n.06
No. 20-1455
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
JAMES KOST; MOLLY KANDLE-KOST,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
HONORABLE SUZANNE HOSETH
KREEGER, in her official capacity,
Defendant-Appellee.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE WESTERN
DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
OPINION
Before: SILER, CLAY and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs James Kost and Molly Kandle-Kost (“the Kosts”) appeal
the district court’s dismissal of their complaint against a Michigan state court judge, the Honorable
Suzanne Hoseth Kreeger of the Eighth Circuit Court, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Because
Plaintiffs’ suit is effectively an impermissible appeal of a state court’s judgment, we AFFIRM the
district court’s determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case.
This appeal represents the latest chapter in a decade-long property dispute between the
Kosts and their neighbors. However, until the filing of Plaintiffs’ federal complaint against Judge
Hoseth Kreeger in November 2019, this dispute had been adjudicated entirely by, and at all levels
of, the Michigan state judiciary. As relevant here, Judge Hoseth Kreeger determined that the Kosts
had, under Michigan law, abandoned their easement in a platted road through both nonuse and
their affirmative conduct. The Kosts appealed Judge Hoseth Kreeger’s order, and the Michigan
Court of Appeals affirmed. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in January 2019.

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In this litigation, Plaintiffs raise a number of arguments that Judge Hoseth Kreeger erred
in determining that they had abandoned certain property rights. But under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, district courts may not consider “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The doctrine is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1257,
which “vests sole jurisdiction” to “conduct[] appellate review of final state-court judgments” in
the Supreme Court. Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 298 (6th Cir. 2012).
“We determine whether Rooker-Feldman bars a claim by looking to the ‘source of the
injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint.’ If the source of the plaintiff’s injury is the
state-court judgment itself, then Rooker-Feldman applies.” VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott,
P.C., 951 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393
(6th Cir. 2006)). To determine the source of a plaintiff’s injury, a court must look to the requested
relief. Id.
Applying these well-established standards, Plaintiffs’ federal suit is barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. In their complaint, Plaintiffs assert “[t]his case seeks to challenge a state judicial
decision . . . .” (Compl., R. 1, Page ID #2) Accordingly, the self-declared source of Plaintiffs’
injury is Defendant’s state-court judgment. This conclusion is confirmed by reference to Plaintiffs’
request that the district court “grant declaratory and/or injunctive relief after finding that actions,
outcome, and/or judicial decision by Defendant SUZANNE HOSETH KREEGER violates the
Fifth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and enjoin/invalidate the
same . . . .” (Id. at Page ID #8) Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ assertion on appeal that they are not seeking

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No. 20-1455, Kost, et al. v. Kreeger
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to vacate or reject the state court’s judgment is not well-taken. While Rooker-Feldman “applies
only to an exceedingly narrow set of cases,” this is one of them. VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 400.
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district court’s order.

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